B1 · Intermediate
12 min
businessaviationgeopoliticseconomics
El Vuelo Continúa: AirAsia, Bahréin y el Negocio de Ignorar la Guerra
The Flight Continues: AirAsia, Bahrain, and the Business of Ignoring a War
Fletcher breaks down this story in English. Octavio reacts and expands in Spanish. Follow along with the live transcript, tap any word for its translation. Intermediate level — perfect for intermediate learners expanding their range.
So here is a headline I genuinely did not expect to read this week.
AirAsia, the Malaysian budget airline, says it is pushing ahead with plans to open a new hub in Bahrain.
During a war.
Bueno, mira, cuando lo escuché, pensé que era un error.
Well, look, when I heard it, I thought it was a mistake.
Bahréin está en el Golfo Pérsico, a muy pocos kilómetros de Irán.
Bahrain is in the Persian Gulf, just a few kilometers from Iran.
Es una situación muy difícil ahora mismo.
The situation there right now is very difficult.
Right, and to put it in perspective, Bahrain's defense forces announced this week that they've intercepted 188 missiles and 468 drones from Iran since the war started.
That is not a quiet neighborhood.
Es que 188 misiles es una cantidad enorme.
The thing is, 188 missiles is an enormous number.
Y sin embargo, AirAsia dice: no importa, vamos a abrir una base allí.
And yet AirAsia says: it doesn't matter, we are going to open a base there.
Es una decisión muy interesante para una empresa.
It is a very interesting decision for a company to make.
It is.
And I think it tells us something really important about how global business actually works, which is what I want to dig into today.
But first, Octavio, for listeners who don't know AirAsia, give us the basics.
A ver, AirAsia es una aerolínea de bajo coste de Malasia.
Well, AirAsia is a low-cost airline from Malaysia.
La fundó Tony Fernandes en 2001.
Tony Fernandes founded it in 2001.
Empezó muy pequeña, con dos aviones y muchas deudas.
It started very small, with two planes and a lot of debt.
Hoy es una de las aerolíneas más grandes de Asia.
Today it is one of the largest airlines in Asia.
Tony Fernandes is a fascinating character.
He bought the airline for something like one ringgit, which is about twenty cents, and turned it into a regional empire.
The man has a gift for looking at a terrible situation and seeing an opportunity.
Sí, y eso explica mucho sobre esta decisión.
Yes, and that explains a lot about this decision.
AirAsia no tiene miedo de los mercados difíciles.
AirAsia is not afraid of difficult markets.
Siempre buscó rutas que otras aerolíneas no querían, ciudades pequeñas, países pobres.
It always looked for routes that other airlines did not want, small cities, poorer countries.
Here's what gets me though.
Bahrain is not a small city or a poor country.
It is specifically a war zone right now.
So what is the calculation?
Why Bahrain, and why now?
Bueno, Bahréin es muy pequeño, pero su posición geográfica es perfecta.
Well, Bahrain is very small, but its geographic position is perfect.
Está en el centro del Golfo.
It is in the center of the Gulf.
Tiene conexiones con Arabia Saudí, con los Emiratos, con Kuwait.
It has connections to Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, Kuwait.
Es una puerta de entrada a toda la región.
It is a gateway to the entire region.
And there is a real gap in the market, isn't there.
The big Gulf carriers, Emirates, Etihad, Qatar Airways, they are not budget airlines.
They are luxury products.
AirAsia is coming for a completely different passenger.
Exactamente.
Exactly.
Hay millones de trabajadores en el Golfo, personas de Filipinas, de India, de Bangladesh, que necesitan volar pero no pueden pagar los precios de Emirates.
There are millions of workers in the Gulf, people from the Philippines, from India, from Bangladesh, who need to fly but cannot afford Emirates prices.
AirAsia quiere ese mercado.
AirAsia wants that market.
The extraordinary thing is that this passenger segment is enormous and almost completely underserved.
We are talking about the migrant worker economy of the Gulf, which is, frankly, the engine behind everything you see there.
La verdad es que sin los trabajadores extranjeros, el Golfo no funciona.
The truth is that without foreign workers, the Gulf does not function.
En Bahréin, en los Emiratos, en Qatar, más del cincuenta por ciento de la población no es ciudadana del país.
In Bahrain, in the Emirates, in Qatar, more than fifty percent of the population are not citizens of the country.
Son trabajadores de otros países.
They are workers from other countries.
I spent time in the Gulf in the nineties, and even then it was striking.
You land in Dubai, and the first thing you notice is that almost nobody serving you in any shop or restaurant is actually from the UAE.
Mira, eso es importante para entender por qué AirAsia quiere ir allí.
Look, that is important for understanding why AirAsia wants to go there.
No es solo el turismo.
It is not just tourism.
Es el tráfico regular de personas que viven y trabajan en el Golfo y viajan a sus países dos veces al año.
It is the regular traffic of people who live and work in the Gulf and travel back to their countries twice a year.
And that traffic does not stop because of a war.
If anything, some of it increases.
People need to go home, people need to evacuate family members, people need to move.
Es que eso es lo más interesante de la decisión de AirAsia.
That is what is most interesting about AirAsia's decision.
No es una locura, es un cálculo.
It is not madness, it is a calculation.
Ellos piensan que la guerra va a terminar, y cuando termine, quieren ya estar en Bahréin.
They think the war will end, and when it does, they want to already be in Bahrain.
Look, that is exactly the logic, and it is not new.
I covered the first Gulf War in 1991, and I remember being genuinely surprised by how quickly business interests moved back in after the shooting stopped.
Sometimes even before.
A ver, la historia del Golfo es así.
Well, the history of the Gulf is like that.
Hubo la guerra del Golfo en 1991, hubo la invasión de Iraq en 2003, y Dubái creció enormemente durante esos años.
There was the Gulf War in 1991, there was the invasion of Iraq in 2003, and Dubai grew enormously during those years.
Los conflictos no pararon el desarrollo económico de la región.
The conflicts did not stop the economic development of the region.
That is a really important point.
Dubai essentially built itself into a global hub during a period of regional instability.
The argument was, precisely because this neighborhood is volatile, you need a stable, neutral place to do business.
Sí, y Bahréin quiere hacer algo similar.
Yes, and Bahrain wants to do something similar.
Bahréin no tiene tanto petróleo como Arabia Saudí o Kuwait.
Bahrain does not have as much oil as Saudi Arabia or Kuwait.
Entonces necesita otros sectores, como el turismo, los servicios financieros y la aviación.
So it needs other sectors, like tourism, financial services, and aviation.
Right, Bahrain has been trying to diversify its economy for decades.
It was actually one of the first Gulf states to discover oil, and almost the first to start running out of it.
So they have had to think differently.
Por eso tienen el Fórmula 1, por eso tienen muchos bancos internacionales, por eso quieren aerolíneas nuevas.
That is why they have Formula 1, that is why they have many international banks, that is why they want new airlines.
Bahréin necesita ser más que un país de petróleo, y la aviación es parte de ese plan.
Bahrain needs to be more than an oil country, and aviation is part of that plan.
And here is the other thing.
Bahrain's airport, Bahrain International, is genuinely underutilized compared to Dubai or Doha.
There is physical capacity there.
AirAsia is not trying to squeeze into an overcrowded hub.
Bueno, eso es una ventaja muy real.
Well, that is a very real advantage.
En Dubái o en Doha, los precios son altísimos para las aerolíneas.
In Dubai or Doha, the prices for airlines are extremely high.
Las tasas del aeropuerto, los servicios.
Airport fees, services.
En Bahréin, seguramente AirAsia puede negociar condiciones mucho mejores.
In Bahrain, AirAsia can surely negotiate much better conditions.
Which is how budget aviation works everywhere.
Ryanair built its European empire by avoiding Heathrow and flying into airports nobody else wanted, Stansted, Charleroi, Girona.
The lower your costs, the lower your ticket prices can be.
Exacto, y AirAsia aprendió mucho de Ryanair.
Exactly, and AirAsia learned a lot from Ryanair.
El modelo es el mismo: aviones baratos de operar, un solo tipo de avión para reducir los costes de mantenimiento, y aeropuertos secundarios con menos tráfico.
The model is the same: cheap planes to operate, a single type of aircraft to reduce maintenance costs, and secondary airports with less traffic.
The thing is, this model works almost everywhere it has been tried in Asia.
It completely transformed how hundreds of millions of people travel.
Before AirAsia, flying in Southeast Asia was something most people simply could not afford.
Mira, eso es verdad en muchos países.
Look, that is true in many countries.
En España también pasó algo similar con Vueling y con Ryanair.
In Spain something similar happened with Vueling and Ryanair.
Antes, un vuelo de Madrid a Londres era muy caro.
Before, a flight from Madrid to London was very expensive.
Ahora, con las aerolíneas de bajo coste, lo puede hacer mucha más gente.
Now, with budget airlines, many more people can do it.
And there is a democratic argument there that I find genuinely compelling.
Mobility is freedom.
The ability to go somewhere else, to see your family, to find work, that is not a luxury.
Budget airlines made that possible for people who never had it.
La verdad es que sí, pero también hay una parte menos bonita.
The truth is yes, but there is also a less pretty side.
Las aerolíneas de bajo coste a veces tratan muy mal a sus trabajadores.
Budget airlines sometimes treat their workers very badly.
Los pilotos y el personal de cabina tienen contratos muy difíciles.
Pilots and cabin crew have very difficult contracts.
Es un modelo que funciona para los pasajeros pero no siempre para los empleados.
It is a model that works for passengers but not always for employees.
No, you are absolutely right about that.
AirAsia had some very public labor disputes during the pandemic.
They laid off thousands of workers, and the way they handled it was, let us say, not their finest hour.
Es que la pandemia fue muy difícil para todas las aerolíneas.
The thing is, the pandemic was very hard for all airlines.
AirAsia casi desaparece en 2020.
AirAsia almost disappeared in 2020.
Perdió muchísimo dinero.
It lost a huge amount of money.
Y ahora, cinco años después, quiere expandirse en una zona de guerra.
And now, five years later, it wants to expand into a war zone.
Es un poco increíble, la verdad.
It is a little incredible, honestly.
I mean, that resilience is either inspiring or reckless, depending on how it turns out.
But here is what I keep coming back to.
If AirAsia is willing to bet on Bahrain right now, what does that tell us about what they actually think the war will do?
A ver, creo que piensan que el conflicto va a terminar relativamente pronto, y que los países del Golfo, Bahréin, Kuwait, los Emiratos, van a necesitar reconstruir y crecer.
Well, I think they believe the conflict will end relatively soon, and that the Gulf countries, Bahrain, Kuwait, the Emirates, will need to rebuild and grow.
Y quieren ser parte de eso desde el principio.
And they want to be part of that from the beginning.
The reconstruction economy.
I saw this in Beirut after the civil war, in Sarajevo, in Baghdad.
The moment the shooting stops, or sometimes before, the contractors and the airlines and the banks start showing up.
It is a real phenomenon.
Sí, y en el caso del Golfo, hay mucho dinero.
Yes, and in the Gulf's case, there is a lot of money.
Arabia Saudí, los Emiratos, Qatar, tienen fondos soberanos enormes.
Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, Qatar have enormous sovereign wealth funds.
Cuando la guerra termine, van a invertir muchísimo en recuperar la economía.
When the war ends, they will invest a great deal in recovering the economy.
Las aerolíneas van a ser muy necesarias.
Airlines will be very much needed.
So maybe the real story here is not that AirAsia is being reckless.
Maybe the real story is that this announcement is actually a signal, a piece of market intelligence.
The smart money, or at least the Southeast Asian budget airline money, thinks this ends soon.
Bueno, mira, eso es una manera muy optimista de verlo.
Well, look, that is a very optimistic way of seeing it.
Pero la verdad es que también es una apuesta.
But the truth is that it is also a bet.
Si la guerra continúa muchos meses más, AirAsia va a tener un problema muy serio con esa base en Bahréin.
If the war continues for many more months, AirAsia is going to have a very serious problem with that base in Bahrain.
Which is what business always is, ultimately.
A bet on the future.
And sometimes the most interesting bets are the ones that look crazy from the outside but make complete sense when you understand the logic behind them.
Sí.
Yes.
Y para los estudiantes de español que nos escuchan, hay una frase perfecta para esto: "el que no arriesga, no gana".
And for the Spanish learners listening to us, there is a perfect phrase for this: "el que no arriesga, no gana".
El que no arriesga nada, no puede ganar nada.
Nothing ventured, nothing gained.
AirAsia arriesga mucho, pero también puede ganar mucho.
AirAsia is risking a lot, but it can also win a lot.
El que no arriesga, no gana.
I like that.
And I think that is probably as good a place as any to land.
A Malaysian budget airline betting on Bahrain during a missile war as a window into how global business and geopolitics actually intersect.
Not how we think they do, how they actually do.
Exacto.
Exactly.
Y la próxima vez que alguien te diga que los negocios y la política son cosas separadas, recuerda a AirAsia en Bahréin.
And the next time someone tells you that business and politics are separate things, remember AirAsia in Bahrain.
No son separadas.
They are not separate.
Son la misma cosa.
They are the same thing.