B1 · Intermediate
12 min
businesseconomicsgeopoliticsenergyinternational trade
El Precio de la Paz: Petróleo, Mercados y la Guerra que Cuesta Billones
The Price of Peace: Oil, Markets, and the War That Costs Trillions
Fletcher breaks down this story in English. Octavio reacts and expands in Spanish. Follow along with the live transcript, tap any word for its translation. Intermediate level — perfect for intermediate learners expanding their range.
So, April 8th.
A ceasefire gets announced between Iran and the United States, and within hours, the Dow Jones jumps over a thousand points.
Oil drops below ninety-five dollars a barrel.
Markets move fast.
Bueno, mira, los mercados no esperan.
Well, look, markets don't wait.
Cuando hay una noticia importante, los precios cambian en segundos.
When there's big news, prices change in seconds.
Y esta noticia fue muy grande.
And this was very big news.
Right.
And here's what gets me about that number, ninety-five dollars.
Because at the peak of the Hormuz blockade, oil was trading well above a hundred and twenty.
So this was a significant drop.
That's real money for real people.
Es que el precio del petróleo afecta todo.
The thing is, the price of oil affects everything.
La gasolina, los alimentos, los productos en las tiendas.
Gasoline, food, products in shops.
Cuando el precio baja, la vida es un poco más barata para todo el mundo.
When the price falls, life gets a little cheaper for everyone.
I mean, that's the part that often gets lost in the geopolitical coverage.
We talk about missile strikes and ceasefire lines, but this conflict has been a massive, grinding tax on the global economy for months.
La verdad es que fue un problema enorme.
The truth is it was a massive problem.
El Estrecho de Ormuz es muy pequeño en el mapa, pero el veinte por ciento del petróleo del mundo pasa por allí.
The Strait of Hormuz is very small on the map, but twenty percent of the world's oil passes through it.
Cuando Irán cerró el estrecho, los precios subieron mucho en todo el mundo.
When Iran closed the strait, prices rose sharply all over the world.
Twenty percent.
I always want to pause on that figure.
One narrow chokepoint, maybe thirty kilometers wide at its narrowest.
That's the margin by which the global economy lives or suffocates.
A ver, no es solo el petróleo.
Well, it's not just oil.
También el gas natural.
Natural gas too.
Qatar, por ejemplo, exporta gas natural licuado por el estrecho.
Qatar, for example, exports liquefied natural gas through the strait.
Cuando el estrecho estaba cerrado, Europa pagó precios muy altos por la energía.
When the strait was closed, Europe paid very high prices for energy.
So the ceasefire announcement felt like the market finally exhaling.
But here's the thing, and I think this is the more interesting story.
Maersk, the Danish shipping giant, says it's taking a, quote, cautious approach.
Hapag-Lloyd, the German company, says it won't resume Hormuz transits at all.
Not yet.
Bueno, estas empresas tienen mucha experiencia.
Well, these companies have a lot of experience.
Maersk y Hapag-Lloyd son dos de las compañías de barcos más grandes del mundo.
Maersk and Hapag-Lloyd are two of the biggest shipping companies in the world.
Si ellas dicen que no es seguro, es porque tienen información muy buena.
If they say it's not safe, it's because they have very good information.
Exactly.
And Hapag-Lloyd put a number on it.
They said it would take six to eight weeks for normal operations to resume.
Six to eight weeks.
Even after the guns go quiet, the economic wound keeps bleeding.
Es que un barco grande no puede parar y empezar en un día.
The thing is a big ship can't stop and start in a day.
Necesita planificación.
It needs planning.
Los barcos estaban en otras rutas, más largas, porque evitaban el estrecho.
Ships were on other routes, longer ones, because they were avoiding the strait.
Cambiar la ruta otra vez requiere tiempo.
Changing route again takes time.
The extraordinary thing is that we have this almost real-time record of how much a war costs.
Hapag-Lloyd said the Iran crisis was costing them fifty to sixty million dollars extra every week.
Every week.
Y ese coste extra no lo pagaba solo la empresa.
And that extra cost wasn't paid only by the company.
Lo pagaban los consumidores.
It was paid by consumers.
Cuando un barco toma una ruta más larga, usa más combustible y necesita más tiempo.
When a ship takes a longer route, it uses more fuel and needs more time.
Entonces los productos llegan más tarde y cuestan más.
So products arrive later and cost more.
Look, this actually reminds me of what happened with the Suez Canal blockage in 2021.
One container ship, the Ever Given, got stuck sideways for six days.
Six days.
And it disrupted global supply chains for months afterward.
Sí, eso fue increíble.
Yes, that was incredible.
Un barco solo, y el mundo entero esperaba.
One single ship, and the entire world waited.
Pero la crisis del Estrecho de Ormuz fue mucho más grave.
But the Hormuz Strait crisis was much more serious.
No fue un accidente.
It wasn't an accident.
Fue una guerra.
It was a war.
Right.
So now we get to the other big business story of the day, and this one is, honestly, kind of wild.
Trump threatens to impose fifty percent tariffs on any country that supplies military weapons to Iran.
Bueno, mira, Trump usa los aranceles como una herramienta política.
Well, look, Trump uses tariffs as a political tool.
No es nuevo.
It's not new.
Pero esta vez es diferente porque mezcla la guerra con el comercio.
But this time it's different because he's mixing war with trade.
Dice: si vendes armas a mi enemigo, yo te castigo económicamente.
He's saying: if you sell weapons to my enemy, I'll punish you economically.
And the countries he's implicitly pointing at are obvious.
Russia.
China.
North Korea.
These are the states that have been supplying Iran with drones, missiles, components.
So this is really a tariff threat against three of the world's largest economies.
La verdad es que Rusia y China ya tienen muchos aranceles con Estados Unidos.
The truth is Russia and China already have many tariffs with the United States.
Entonces, ¿cuánto más los puede castigar Trump?
So how much more can Trump actually punish them?
Es una pregunta difícil.
That's a hard question.
Here's what gets me.
The United States imports relatively little from Russia directly, especially after the Ukraine sanctions.
So fifty percent tariffs on Russian goods, I mean, what goods?
The leverage is actually limited.
Con China es diferente.
With China it's different.
China vende muchísimo a Estados Unidos.
China sells enormous amounts to the United States.
Electrónica, ropa, juguetes.
Electronics, clothing, toys.
Si Trump pone aranceles del cincuenta por ciento a China, los americanos pagan más por todo.
If Trump puts fifty percent tariffs on China, Americans pay more for everything.
Es un problema para Trump también.
That's a problem for Trump too.
No, you're absolutely right about that.
The tariff weapon cuts both ways.
You threaten China, China retaliates on American exports, and suddenly American farmers, American manufacturers, they're the ones paying the price.
A ver, históricamente, los aranceles como arma política no siempre funcionan bien.
Well, historically, tariffs as a political weapon don't always work well.
En los años treinta, Estados Unidos y otros países pusieron aranceles muy altos.
In the nineteen thirties, the United States and other countries imposed very high tariffs.
Fue un desastre económico.
It was an economic disaster.
Ayudó a crear la Gran Depresión.
It helped create the Great Depression.
The Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act.
1930.
Every economist's favorite cautionary tale.
Congress passed it to protect American industry, and instead it triggered retaliatory tariffs from sixty countries.
Global trade collapsed by sixty-six percent in three years.
Es que la economía global es muy conectada.
The thing is the global economy is very connected.
Cuando un país pone aranceles, el otro país responde.
When one country puts on tariffs, the other country responds.
Y al final, todos pierden.
And in the end, everyone loses.
Pero los políticos muchas veces no piensan en eso.
But politicians often don't think about that.
I spent time in Buenos Aires years ago, and Argentina has this long, painful history with economic isolation, protectionism, currency controls.
And every time, the people who suffer most are not the politicians making the decisions.
Sí, y España también tuvo esa experiencia en el siglo veinte.
Yes, and Spain had that experience too in the twentieth century.
Durante la dictadura de Franco, España intentó ser económicamente independiente.
During Franco's dictatorship, Spain tried to be economically independent.
El resultado fue muy pobre.
The result was very poor.
Cuando España abrió su economía en los años sesenta, todo cambió.
When Spain opened its economy in the sixties, everything changed.
The Desarrollismo period.
The technocrats from Opus Dei who basically dragged Spain kicking and screaming into the modern global economy.
It's a fascinating story.
But we're getting off track.
No, no, espera, es importante.
No, no, wait, it's important.
El punto es que los países que se aíslan económicamente sufren.
The point is that countries that isolate themselves economically suffer.
La pregunta ahora es si los aranceles de Trump van a aislar a los enemigos de Estados Unidos, o también a Estados Unidos.
The question now is whether Trump's tariffs will isolate America's enemies, or also isolate America itself.
And look, there's a third layer here that I think is really worth sitting with.
This tariff threat, if it's serious, changes the calculation for every country in the world that has any kind of arms trade relationship with Iran.
Smaller countries, developing economies.
They face a choice.
Es una forma de presión muy fuerte.
It's a very strong form of pressure.
Trump dice: puedes hacer negocios con Irán, o puedes hacer negocios con Estados Unidos.
Trump is saying: you can do business with Iran, or you can do business with the United States.
Pero no los dos.
But not both.
Muchos países pequeños necesitan el mercado americano.
Many small countries need the American market.
This is actually what sanctions scholars call secondary sanctions.
You're not just sanctioning the country you're in conflict with.
You're sanctioning anyone who does business with them.
It's like economic siege warfare.
Bueno, y es interesante porque Estados Unidos usó las sanciones secundarias con Rusia también, después de la invasión de Ucrania.
Well, and it's interesting because the United States used secondary sanctions with Russia too, after the invasion of Ukraine.
Muchos bancos y empresas de otros países tuvieron que elegir.
Many banks and companies in other countries had to choose.
El dólar es muy poderoso.
The dollar is very powerful.
The dollar is the key word.
About eighty percent of global oil transactions are denominated in dollars.
That's America's ultimate leverage.
You threaten to cut someone off from the dollar system, and you're threatening their ability to buy and sell energy itself.
La verdad es que China y Rusia llevan años intentando crear alternativas al dólar.
The truth is China and Russia have been trying for years to create alternatives to the dollar.
China quiere que el yuan sea más importante en el comercio internacional.
China wants the yuan to be more important in international trade.
Pero todavía es muy difícil.
But it's still very difficult.
El dólar es dominante.
The dollar is dominant.
Though the extraordinary thing is that every time America uses the dollar as a weapon, it gives other countries more incentive to build those alternatives.
There's a long-term irony in aggressive sanctions policy.
You might win the battle and gradually weaken the tool.
Sí, exactamente.
Yes, exactly.
Y volviendo a los barcos.
And going back to the ships.
Maersk y Hapag-Lloyd son empresas europeas.
Maersk and Hapag-Lloyd are European companies.
Si Trump pone aranceles a países que ayudan a Irán, las empresas europeas también miran eso con preocupación.
If Trump puts tariffs on countries that help Iran, European companies are also watching that with concern.
El comercio global es muy frágil ahora.
Global trade is very fragile right now.
So what does all this add up to?
I mean, step back for a second.
The Dow jumps a thousand points, oil drops, markets celebrate.
But the shipping companies won't move, the tariff threats are flying, and the ceasefire already has cracks in it.
Markets maybe celebrated too early.
A ver, los mercados financieros reaccionan rápido, pero muchas veces se equivocan.
Well, financial markets react quickly, but they're often wrong.
Reaccionan a las noticias del momento, no al futuro.
They react to the news of the moment, not to the future.
La economía real, los barcos, las fábricas, los trabajadores, eso necesita más tiempo para recuperarse.
The real economy, ships, factories, workers, that takes much longer to recover.
The thing is, I keep coming back to that Hapag-Lloyd figure.
Six to eight weeks.
That's not a war.
That's the war's shadow.
The conflict ends and the economic consequences just keep walking forward.
Bueno, mira, yo creo que la lección más importante de todo esto es simple.
Well, look, I think the most important lesson from all of this is simple.
La guerra es muy cara.
War is very expensive.
No solo en vidas humanas, que es lo más importante.
Not only in human lives, which is the most important thing.
También en dinero, en comercio, en la vida diaria de personas normales en todo el mundo.
But also in money, in trade, in the daily lives of ordinary people all over the world.
And that's the connective tissue of it all, isn't it.
The thousand-point Dow surge, the tariff threat, the cautious shipping CEO in Hamburg looking at a map of the Persian Gulf.
They're all expressions of the same basic fact.
Everything is connected, and when one part breaks, you feel it everywhere.