B1 · Intermediate
14 min
politicsinternational relationsdiplomacyhistory
El viaje cancelado: Taiwán, China y África
The Cancelled Trip: Taiwan, China, and Africa
Fletcher breaks down this story in English. Octavio reacts and expands in Spanish. Follow along with the live transcript, tap any word for its translation. Intermediate level — perfect for intermediate learners expanding their range.
So here's a story that sounds almost bureaucratic on the surface, a cancelled plane trip, but pull on that thread and you find something much bigger underneath.
Bueno, mira, el presidente de Taiwán, Lai Ching-te, quería visitar Esuatini, un país pequeño en África.
Well, look, Taiwan's president, Lai Ching-te, wanted to visit Eswatini, a small country in Africa.
Pero tres países africanos, Madagascar, Mauricio y Seychelles, no le dieron permiso para volar sobre su territorio.
But three African countries, Madagascar, Mauritius, and the Seychelles, refused to allow his aircraft to fly over their territory.
Right, and Taiwan immediately said this wasn't a coincidence.
They pointed directly at Beijing, said China pressured those governments into blocking the route.
And honestly, given the pattern over the last decade, that's not a leap.
Es que Esuatini es muy especial para Taiwán.
The thing is, Eswatini is very special for Taiwan.
Es el único país de África que reconoce oficialmente a Taiwán como un país independiente.
It's the only country in Africa that officially recognizes Taiwan as an independent country.
Los otros países del continente reconocen a China.
Every other country on the continent recognizes China.
The only one.
Out of 54 countries on the African continent, Eswatini is the sole holdout.
That puts the weight of that cancelled trip in a completely different category.
A ver, Esuatini es un país muy pequeño, con poco más de un millón de personas.
See, Eswatini is a tiny country, with just over a million people.
Pero para Taiwán, esta relación diplomática es muy importante porque es un símbolo de su existencia como país.
But for Taiwan, this diplomatic relationship is very important because it's a symbol of Taiwan's existence as a country.
Let me just explain the overflight thing for a second, because it matters here.
When a head of state travels internationally, they need permission not just to land, but to fly through other countries' airspace.
Denying that is a diplomatic act.
A deliberate one.
Exactamente.
Exactly.
Y lo interesante es que Madagascar, Mauricio y Seychelles no explicaron por qué dijeron que no.
And what's interesting is that Madagascar, Mauritius, and the Seychelles didn't explain why they said no.
No hablaron públicamente.
They made no public statement.
Eso es típico cuando hay presión de China.
That's typical when there's pressure from China.
The silence speaks.
So let's go back a bit.
How many countries in the world actually recognize Taiwan right now?
Because I think people might be surprised by the number.
Bueno, hoy solo doce países reconocen a Taiwán.
Well, today only twelve countries recognize Taiwan.
Doce en todo el mundo.
Twelve in the whole world.
Y hace veinte o treinta años, el número era mucho más grande.
And twenty or thirty years ago, the number was much larger.
Muchos países cambiaron su posición porque China tiene mucho dinero y mucha influencia.
Many countries changed their position because China has a lot of money and a lot of influence.
Twelve.
Down from around thirty just fifteen years ago.
I mean, the speed of that erosion is remarkable.
And the mechanism is pretty consistent: China offers infrastructure investment, trade deals, and the price is switching diplomatic recognition.
La verdad es que China es muy activa en África.
The truth is that China is very active in Africa.
Construyó carreteras, hospitales, estadios de fútbol.
It built roads, hospitals, football stadiums.
En muchos países africanos, la gente puede ver edificios que China construyó.
In many African countries, people can see buildings that China constructed.
Es una estrategia muy inteligente.
It's a very smart strategy.
Here's what gets me, though.
This isn't new.
China's been doing this in Africa since at least the 1960s, when Zhou Enlai made a tour of the continent and started building relationships.
The difference now is the scale, and frankly the leverage.
Sí, y ahora China también tiene inversiones en aeropuertos, puertos y telecomunicaciones en muchos países africanos.
Yes, and now China also has investments in airports, ports, and telecommunications in many African countries.
Cuando China llama por teléfono, es muy difícil decir que no.
When China calls, it's very hard to say no.
Very hard to say no.
There's been a lot of debate about what people call the debt trap, where Chinese loans come with conditions that are difficult to meet, and suddenly the lender has significant influence over your infrastructure.
It's contested as a theory, but the leverage is real.
Mira, yo creo que no todos los países africanos son víctimas.
Look, I think not all African countries are victims here.
Muchos gobiernos tomaron estas decisiones porque necesitaban dinero para desarrollarse.
Many governments made these choices because they needed money to develop.
La situación es más complicada que una simple historia de buenos y malos.
The situation is more complicated than a simple story of good guys and bad guys.
No, you're absolutely right about that.
I spent some time in East Africa years ago and the resentment toward Western development conditions, the strings attached to aid from the IMF, the World Bank, it was real and legitimate.
China offered something that felt different, even if it came with its own complications.
Exacto.
Exactly.
Pero volvamos a Taiwán.
But let's get back to Taiwan.
Taiwán también intentó usar una estrategia similar, especialmente en los años noventa y dos mil.
Taiwan also tried to use a similar strategy, especially in the 1990s and 2000s.
Daba dinero a países pequeños para mantener su reconocimiento diplomático.
It gave money to small countries to maintain their diplomatic recognition.
Right, and it worked for a while.
There was even a phrase for it, checkbook diplomacy, where both Beijing and Taipei were essentially bidding for recognition.
But China's economy grew so large that Taiwan simply couldn't compete anymore.
La economía de China es enorme.
China's economy is enormous.
La economía de Taiwán es interesante, es muy fuerte en tecnología, pero es mucho más pequeña que la de China.
Taiwan's economy is interesting, very strong in technology, but much smaller than China's.
En este juego de influencia, China tiene más dinero para gastar.
In this game of influence, China has more money to spend.
And yet Taiwan persists.
Twenty-three million people, one of the most dynamic democracies in Asia, leading the world in semiconductor manufacturing.
The TSMC factor alone gives Taiwan enormous strategic importance that goes well beyond those twelve diplomatic recognitions.
Bueno, y ahí está la paradoja.
Well, and that's the paradox.
Casi todos los países del mundo hacen negocios con Taiwán.
Almost every country in the world does business with Taiwan.
Compran sus chips, usan su tecnología.
They buy its chips, they use its technology.
Pero oficialmente dicen que Taiwán no es un país.
But officially they say Taiwan is not a country.
Es una situación muy extraña.
It's a very strange situation.
One China policy.
The diplomatic fiction that everyone has agreed to maintain, where countries recognize the People's Republic but trade freely with Taiwan under the pretense that it's a province.
It's one of the great sustained diplomatic illusions of modern history.
A ver, y Lai Ching-te es el presidente más difícil para China en muchos años.
See, and Lai Ching-te is the most difficult president for China in many years.
Él habló mucho sobre la identidad taiwanesa.
He has spoken a lot about Taiwanese identity.
Para él, Taiwán es un país independiente, no una provincia de China.
For him, Taiwan is an independent country, not a province of China.
Esto es muy provocador para Pekín.
This is very provocative for Beijing.
Lai won the presidency in January 2024 with the Democratic Progressive Party, the DPP, which has historically been more assertive about Taiwanese identity and independence.
Beijing absolutely despises him, labeled him a separatist before he even took office.
Es que hay dos visiones en Taiwán.
The thing is there are two visions in Taiwan.
El DPP, el partido de Lai, dice que Taiwán tiene su propia identidad y su propio gobierno.
The DPP, Lai's party, says Taiwan has its own identity and its own government.
El otro partido importante, el KMT, prefiere una relación más tranquila con China.
The other major party, the KMT, prefers a calmer relationship with China.
And that internal debate maps onto a broader question that Taiwanese people have been navigating for decades.
Who are we, exactly?
A Chinese province, a breakaway state, or simply Taiwan, something that has developed its own identity over 75 years of separation from the mainland.
Mira, cuando preguntas a la gente joven en Taiwán sobre su identidad, la mayoría dice que se siente taiwanesa, no china.
Look, when you ask young people in Taiwan about their identity, most say they feel Taiwanese, not Chinese.
Esto cambió mucho en los últimos treinta años.
This changed a lot in the last thirty years.
Es una transformación cultural muy importante.
It's a very significant cultural transformation.
The extraordinary thing is how that identity shift has been accelerated by watching what happened in Hong Kong.
After 2019, after the security law, the crackdown on protests, a lot of Taiwanese people who were maybe indifferent became very clear about not wanting what Beijing was offering.
Sí, Hong Kong fue un mensaje muy claro.
Yes, Hong Kong was a very clear message.
China prometió «un país, dos sistemas» para Hong Kong.
China promised 'one country, two systems' for Hong Kong.
Pero después de 2019, la gente en Taiwán miró a Hong Kong y dijo: no queremos eso.
But after 2019, people in Taiwan looked at Hong Kong and said: we don't want that.
Fue una lección política muy poderosa.
It was a very powerful political lesson.
So back to the cancelled trip.
On one level it's a humiliation, Taiwan's president can't even fly to one of his twelve remaining allies.
But I wonder if Lai can actually use this moment.
The optics are, in a way, useful for him domestically.
La verdad es que sí.
Truthfully, yes.
Cuando China actúa así, de forma muy agresiva, muchos taiwaneses dicen: mira, teníamos razón.
When China acts this way, very aggressively, many Taiwanese say: look, we were right.
No podemos confiar en Pekín.
We can't trust Beijing.
Es un resultado que China probablemente no quería.
That's probably an outcome China didn't want.
There's something almost self-defeating about the pressure campaign, at least in terms of hearts and minds.
Every time Beijing does something like this, it pushes ordinary Taiwanese people further away from any vision of peaceful reunification.
Pero China no habla con los ciudadanos de Taiwán en este momento, habla con los otros países del mundo.
But China isn't speaking to Taiwan's citizens right now, it's speaking to other countries in the world.
El mensaje es: si apoyas a Taiwán, vas a tener problemas con nosotros.
The message is: if you support Taiwan, you will have problems with us.
Es una presión constante.
It's a constant pressure.
And those three countries, Madagascar, Mauritius, the Seychelles, small island nations in the Indian Ocean.
They're not villains in this story.
They're countries with real economic needs, real relationships with China, and a very asymmetric calculation to make.
Exacto.
Exactly.
Para Mauricio o Seychelles, el turismo chino, las inversiones chinas, son muy importantes para su economía.
For Mauritius or the Seychelles, Chinese tourism and Chinese investment are very important for their economy.
No pueden ignorar lo que China quiere.
They can't ignore what China wants.
No es una decisión libre, pero tampoco es completamente forzada.
It's not a free decision, but it's not completely forced either.
Look, the question I keep coming back to is what happens to those twelve remaining countries.
There's a logic to the erosion.
Each one that switches emboldens the next round of pressure.
Does Eswatini hold?
They have for decades, but the circumstances keep changing.
Esuatini es una monarquía absoluta, el rey Mswati es el jefe del estado, y tiene una relación personal con Taiwán desde hace muchos años.
Eswatini is an absolute monarchy, King Mswati is the head of state, and he has had a personal relationship with Taiwan for many years.
Pero Esuatini también tiene muchos problemas económicos.
But Eswatini also has serious economic problems.
Es difícil saber cuánto tiempo puede resistir.
It's hard to know how long it can hold out.
And threading through all of this is the United States.
Taiwan's security ultimately relies on American ambiguity, the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, the idea that Washington would defend Taiwan without ever quite saying so.
Under this current administration, that ambiguity feels more fluid than usual.
Sí, y Trump habló de Taiwán en términos económicos más que en términos de democracia o seguridad.
Yes, and Trump spoke about Taiwan in economic terms more than in terms of democracy or security.
Dijo que Taiwán «robó» la industria de semiconductores a Estados Unidos.
He said Taiwan 'stole' the semiconductor industry from the United States.
Para Taiwán, estas palabras son muy preocupantes.
For Taiwan, these words are very worrying.
Which is one of the reasons this cancelled trip to Eswatini matters beyond its immediate smallness.
Taiwan is simultaneously losing diplomatic ground in Africa, facing a more transactional Washington, and has a president who is personally the most provocative figure Beijing could imagine.
The pressure from all sides is intense.
Bueno, pero la historia de Taiwán es una historia de sobrevivir bajo presión.
Well, but Taiwan's story is a story of surviving under pressure.
En 1971, las Naciones Unidas votaron para excluir a Taiwán y dar el asiento a China.
In 1971, the United Nations voted to exclude Taiwan and give the seat to China.
Mucha gente pensó que Taiwán desaparecería.
Many people thought Taiwan would disappear.
Y aquí estamos, cincuenta años después.
And here we are, fifty years later.
That's the thing, isn't it.
A cancelled flight to Eswatini is a small humiliation, but Taiwan has been absorbing this kind of pressure for half a century and still exists as a functioning, prosperous democracy.
The question is whether the current moment represents something qualitatively different, or just more of the same.
A ver, para mí lo más importante de esta historia no es Esuatini.
See, for me the most important thing about this story isn't Eswatini.
Es la geografía de la influencia.
It's the geography of influence.
China bloqueó un vuelo sin disparar una sola bala.
China blocked a flight without firing a single bullet.
Solo con llamadas telefónicas y relaciones económicas.
Just with phone calls and economic relationships.
Eso es poder real en el siglo veintiuno.
That is real power in the twenty-first century.
Power that operates in the silence of an unanswered question, in the absence of a public statement from three small governments, in a president sitting on the tarmac in Taipei with nowhere to fly.
That's a masterclass in soft coercion, and it's a story worth understanding deeply.