B1 · Intermediate
13 min
politicshistorygeopoliticsasia
El General que Quiere Ser Presidente
The General Who Wants to Be President
Fletcher breaks down this story in English. Octavio reacts and expands in Spanish. Follow along with the live transcript, tap any word for its translation. Intermediate level — perfect for intermediate learners expanding their range.
So here is a sentence I did not expect to be reading this week: the general who staged a coup five years ago has now decided he wants to be president.
Officially.
With an election and everything.
Bueno, sí.
Right, yes.
Min Aung Hlaing dejó su cargo de jefe del ejército de Myanmar.
Min Aung Hlaing stepped down from his position as Myanmar's army chief.
Y ahora quiere ser presidente del país.
And now he wants to be president of the country.
Which, I mean, he already was running the country.
He has been running it since the coup in February 2021.
So the question I keep coming back to is: why bother with the election at all?
Mira, esa es exactamente la pregunta correcta.
Look, that is exactly the right question.
Él ya tiene el poder.
He already has the power.
Pero el poder militar y el poder político no son la misma cosa, ¿entiendes?
But military power and political power are not the same thing, you understand?
Right.
There is a difference between controlling a country with a gun and actually governing it with some kind of legitimate mandate.
And I think that distinction matters enormously here.
But let us back up, because Myanmar's history is complicated enough that we should probably walk through it.
A ver, en febrero de 2021, el ejército de Myanmar hizo un golpe de estado.
Right, so, in February 2021, the Myanmar military staged a coup.
Arrestaron a Aung San Suu Kyi, la líder civil del país, y tomaron el control del gobierno.
They arrested Aung San Suu Kyi, the country's civilian leader, and took control of the government.
And Aung San Suu Kyi, for listeners who need the context, is this remarkable figure.
Nobel Peace Prize winner, spent fifteen years under house arrest under the previous military regime, and then led her party to a landslide election victory in 2020.
The military did not accept those results.
Es que el ejército dijo que las elecciones de 2020 tuvieron fraude.
The thing is, the military said the 2020 elections had fraud.
Pero la verdad es que nadie fuera del ejército creyó esa historia.
But the truth is that nobody outside the military believed that story.
Nobody.
International observers, the UN, neighboring countries.
The election was considered legitimate.
So this was, by any reasonable measure, a straightforward power grab.
Sí.
Yes.
Y después del golpe, muchos ciudadanos salieron a las calles para protestar.
And after the coup, many citizens took to the streets to protest.
El ejército respondió con violencia.
The military responded with violence.
Mató a cientos de personas en los primeros meses.
It killed hundreds of people in the first months.
Hundreds became thousands.
The UN estimates somewhere north of five thousand civilians killed since the coup, and that is probably a conservative number.
And it turned into a full civil war, which is something I do not think the generals expected when they moved in February 2021.
No, claro que no lo esperaban.
No, of course they did not expect it.
Bueno, el pueblo formó grupos de resistencia, y también se unieron a grupos étnicos armados que ya luchaban contra el ejército desde hace muchos años.
Well, the people formed resistance groups, and they also joined armed ethnic groups that had already been fighting against the army for many years.
Here is what gets me about Myanmar's history.
The military, the Tatmadaw, has been the dominant institution in that country since independence in 1948.
With a brief, partial exception during Suu Kyi's period in government, the generals have always been the real power.
So this is not a new story.
La verdad es que Myanmar tuvo una constitución en 2008 que el ejército escribió.
The truth is that Myanmar had a constitution in 2008 that the military wrote.
Y esa constitución daba al ejército el 25% de los escaños en el parlamento automáticamente, sin elecciones.
And that constitution gave the military 25% of seats in parliament automatically, without any elections.
Which is a remarkable thing, when you think about it.
They essentially wrote themselves into permanent political relevance before even allowing a transition toward democracy.
And that 25% was enough to block any constitutional amendment, because you needed more than 75% to change the constitution.
Exacto.
Exactly.
Entonces, ¿quién es Min Aung Hlaing?
So, who is Min Aung Hlaing?
Fue jefe del ejército desde 2011.
He was army chief from 2011.
Durante muchos años, el mundo lo conoció principalmente por el genocidio contra los rohinyás.
For many years, the world knew him mainly for the genocide against the Rohingya.
The Rohingya campaign in 2017.
Around 700,000 people fled to Bangladesh.
The UN called it a textbook example of ethnic cleansing.
And Min Aung Hlaing was sanctioned by the United States and the EU over his role in that.
He is not exactly a figure with a clean international reputation.
No, para nada.
No, not at all.
Pero mira, desde el golpe de 2021, él fue el jefe del estado también.
But look, since the 2021 coup, he was also head of state.
Tenía los dos poderes: el militar y el político.
He held both powers: the military and the political.
Ahora quiere dejar el poder militar para tener solo el político.
Now he wants to give up military power to hold only the political.
And that distinction is everything.
Because right now, in the eyes of most of the world, he is a military dictator.
If he wins an election, even a deeply flawed one, he can start calling himself something else.
A president.
An elected leader.
And that changes the diplomatic conversation.
Claro.
Of course.
Es una estrategia muy vieja.
It is a very old strategy.
Muchos dictadores en la historia hicieron lo mismo: organizaron elecciones para parecer más legítimos ante el mundo.
Many dictators in history did the same thing: they organized elections to appear more legitimate to the world.
The extraordinary thing is how transparent the playbook is.
And yet it works, often enough.
Look at what happened in places like Egypt after 2013, or Zimbabwe after Mugabe.
The general puts on a suit, runs an election, wins it with 97% of the vote, and suddenly Western governments face an awkward choice about whether to engage.
Bueno, en el caso de Myanmar, hay un gobierno paralelo.
Well, in the case of Myanmar, there is a parallel government.
El Gobierno de Unidad Nacional, el GUN, que representa a los políticos elegidos en 2020.
The National Unity Government, the NUG, which represents the politicians elected in 2020.
Ellos no aceptan la legitimidad del ejército.
They do not accept the legitimacy of the military.
The NUG operates mostly in exile, though they have real connections inside the country.
And they have been recognized by some Western democracies as the legitimate government of Myanmar.
So you have this bizarre situation where two entities are both claiming to be the government of the same country.
Sí, y la guerra civil continúa.
Yes, and the civil war continues.
Los grupos de resistencia controlaron muchas áreas del país en los últimos años.
Resistance groups controlled many areas of the country in recent years.
El ejército perdió territorios importantes, especialmente en el norte y el oeste.
The military lost important territories, especially in the north and west.
Right, so this is the context in which Min Aung Hlaing is proposing an election.
The country is in the middle of a civil war.
Large parts of the territory are not under government control.
And he wants to hold a vote and call it democracy.
Mira, también hay que entender que el partido de Aung San Suu Kyi, la Liga Nacional para la Democracia, está prohibido.
Look, you also have to understand that Aung San Suu Kyi's party, the National League for Democracy, is banned.
Ella está en la cárcel.
She is in prison.
No puede participar en las elecciones.
She cannot participate in the elections.
She has been sentenced to something like 27 years, on charges that observers across the board called politically motivated.
So the main opposition, the party that won the last free election by a landslide, is banned.
Its leader is imprisoned.
And somehow this is being framed as a democratic transition.
Es que para Min Aung Hlaing, el objetivo no es la democracia real.
The thing is, for Min Aung Hlaing, the goal is not real democracy.
El objetivo es la estabilidad, el reconocimiento internacional, y el fin de las sanciones económicas.
The goal is stability, international recognition, and the end of economic sanctions.
The sanctions have been painful.
Western sanctions, targeted sanctions on military-linked businesses.
Myanmar's economy was already struggling before the coup and the situation has gotten significantly worse.
And here is where the geopolitics get interesting, because not everyone is sanctioning Myanmar.
China e India no pusieron sanciones importantes contra Myanmar.
China and India did not impose significant sanctions on Myanmar.
China especialmente tiene muchos intereses económicos en el país, con proyectos de infraestructura y gasoductos.
China especially has many economic interests in the country, with infrastructure projects and gas pipelines.
China's relationship with Myanmar is complicated in a fascinating way.
Beijing actually had decent ties with the NLD government under Suu Kyi, because she had signed on to Belt and Road projects.
Then after the coup, China maintained relations with the military, but has been frustrated by the instability.
They do not want chaos on their border.
Y la ASEAN, la organización de países del Sudeste Asiático, tampoco pudo hacer mucho.
And ASEAN, the organization of Southeast Asian countries, also could not do much.
Ellos tienen el principio de no interferir en los asuntos internos de otros países.
They have the principle of not interfering in the internal affairs of other countries.
Es una regla muy importante para ellos.
It is a very important rule for them.
The non-interference principle.
Which is a polite way of saying that authoritarian neighbors prefer not to criticize each other too loudly, because they might be next.
ASEAN excluded Myanmar's junta from some meetings, which was unusual for them, but it did not change anything on the ground.
Entonces, ¿qué significa este movimiento de Min Aung Hlaing ahora?
So what does this move by Min Aung Hlaing mean now?
Bueno, creo que él está en una posición más débil de lo que parece.
Well, I think he is in a weaker position than he appears.
La guerra civil fue muy difícil para el ejército.
The civil war has been very difficult for the military.
That is a really important point.
In late 2023, a coalition of ethnic armed groups launched a major offensive, Operation 1027, and they took significant towns, border crossings, military bases.
The junta looked genuinely vulnerable for the first time.
So this election talk may partly be a response to that military pressure.
Exacto.
Exactly.
Cuando un dictador organiza elecciones, a veces es porque tiene mucho poder.
When a dictator organizes elections, sometimes it is because he has a lot of power.
Pero otras veces es porque necesita más legitimidad porque su poder está en problemas.
But other times it is because he needs more legitimacy because his power is in trouble.
Look, I spent time in places like this during my correspondent years.
And one thing I learned is that these transition moments, even fake democratic transitions, can sometimes crack things open in unexpected ways.
Not always.
Usually not.
But sometimes the process creates space that the rulers did not intend to create.
La verdad es que soy bastante pesimista en este caso.
The truth is I am quite pessimistic in this case.
Porque el ejército de Myanmar controló el país durante décadas y siempre encontró la manera de mantener el poder, incluso cuando parecía que iba a cambiar algo.
Because Myanmar's military controlled the country for decades and always found a way to maintain power, even when it seemed like something was going to change.
And the people who have suffered most, the ordinary citizens who went out to protest in 2021 with signs and paper helmets against soldiers with live ammunition, they have already paid an enormous price.
Whatever happens with this election, their sacrifice does not get undone.
Mira, para mí, la pregunta más importante es: ¿qué va a pasar con Aung San Suu Kyi?
Look, for me, the most important question is: what is going to happen to Aung San Suu Kyi?
Si ella sigue en la cárcel durante las elecciones, eso nos dice todo lo que necesitamos saber sobre la democracia que Min Aung Hlaing quiere construir.
If she remains in prison during the elections, that tells us everything we need to know about the democracy that Min Aung Hlaing wants to build.
No, you are absolutely right about that.
She is the litmus test.
If she is still behind bars when votes are being cast, this is theater.
Full stop.
And even her supporters have complicated feelings about her legacy now, after the way her government handled the Rohingya crisis, but that is a separate and very long conversation.
Sí, eso es otro episodio completo.
Yes, that is a whole other episode.
Pero a ver, lo esencial hoy es esto: un general que tomó el poder con violencia ahora quiere legitimidad política.
But look, the essential thing today is this: a general who took power through violence now wants political legitimacy.
Y eso nos dice que la fuerza militar sola no es suficiente para gobernar un país moderno.
And that tells us that military force alone is not enough to govern a modern country.
And there is something almost hopeful in that, buried under all the cynicism.
The fact that even a military dictator feels the need to perform democracy suggests that the idea of popular sovereignty, government by consent, still has power.
Still matters.
Even to the people who are trying to fake it.
Bueno, eso es verdad.
Well, that is true.
Nadie organiza elecciones porque cree que son malas.
Nobody organizes elections because they think they are bad.
Las organizan porque saben que la gente quiere votar.
They organize them because they know that people want to vote.
Y eso es algo que el ejército de Myanmar no puede controlar completamente: el deseo de la gente de participar en su propio futuro.
And that is something the Myanmar military cannot completely control: the desire of people to participate in their own future.
Myanmar is a country of 55 million people with extraordinary cultural and ethnic diversity, with a young population that has now seen what a functioning civilian government looked like, even briefly, and they are not going to forget that.
Whatever Min Aung Hlaing calls himself next year, that is what I would keep my eye on.
Sí.
Yes.
Los generales pasan, pero la memoria de la gente permanece.
Generals come and go, but the memory of the people remains.
Myanmar es un país que ya luchó por la democracia muchas veces.
Myanmar is a country that has already fought for democracy many times.
Y probablemente va a luchar otra vez.
And it will probably fight again.