B2 · Upper Intermediate
15 min
historygeopoliticsmilitary historyenergy
The Strait and the Empire: Iran and the Control of the Sea
El Estrecho y el Imperio: Irán y el Control del Mar
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy announces new procedures to guarantee safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz. Fletcher and Octavio dig into the deep history of the Persian Gulf: why that narrow strait has been a pressure point for more than two thousand years.
La Armada del Cuerpo de la Guardia Revolucionaria Islámica anuncia nuevos procedimientos para garantizar el paso seguro por el Estrecho de Ormuz. Fletcher y Octavio se adentran en la historia profunda del Golfo Pérsico: por qué ese pequeño estrecho ha sido un punto de poder durante más de dos mil años.
6 essential B2-level terms from this episode, with translations and example sentences in Spanish.
| Spanish | English | Example |
|---|---|---|
| contener | to contain, to hold back | El mundo contiene la respiración mientras esperamos el resultado de las negociaciones. |
| asimétrico | asymmetric | La guerra asimétrica permite a un ejército más débil desafiar a una potencia mayor. |
| heredero | heir, inheritor | Irán se ve como el heredero de una civilización de más de dos mil años. |
| esfera de influencia | sphere of influence | El Golfo Pérsico ha sido la esfera de influencia iraní durante siglos. |
| punto de estrangulamiento | chokepoint | El Estrecho de Ormuz es el punto de estrangulamiento más importante del comercio mundial de petróleo. |
| vacilar | to hesitate, to waver | Las potencias occidentales vacilan antes de actuar militarmente en el Golfo. |
Here is a detail that stopped me cold this week: the IRGC Navy, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard's naval force, issued a statement saying safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz will now be managed under new procedures and guidelines.
Not the regular Iranian Navy.
The Revolutionary Guard.
Y esa distinción importa mucho.
And that distinction matters a great deal.
Hay dos fuerzas navales en Irán, y no son lo mismo.
There are two naval forces in Iran, and they are not the same thing.
La Armada iraní convencional existe desde la época del sha.
The conventional Iranian Navy has existed since the time of the Shah.
El CGRI tiene su propia armada, creada después de la Revolución de 1979, y responde directamente al Líder Supremo, no al gobierno civil.
The IRGC has its own navy, created after the 1979 Revolution, and it answers directly to the Supreme Leader, not to the civilian government.
Which tells you something about who is actually running the show in that waterway right now.
But before we get into the politics of it, I want to go much further back, because the Strait of Hormuz has been a chokepoint of civilization for a very long time, and I think most people have no idea.
Muy bien.
Very well.
El Estrecho de Ormuz tiene solo unos 33 kilómetros de ancho en su punto más estrecho.
The Strait of Hormuz is only about 33 kilometers wide at its narrowest point.
Es ridículamente pequeño para la cantidad de poder que concentra.
It is ridiculously small for the amount of power it concentrates.
Por ese canal pasa aproximadamente el 20% del petróleo del mundo.
Approximately 20% of the world's oil passes through that channel.
Twenty percent of the world's oil through a passage you could practically swim across on a calm day.
And that basic geography has been shaping empires since before Rome existed.
Exactamente.
Exactly.
Los persas aqueménidas, el imperio de Ciro el Grande, ya controlaban el Golfo Pérsico en el siglo VI antes de Cristo.
The Achaemenid Persians, the empire of Cyrus the Great, already controlled the Persian Gulf in the sixth century BC.
Para ellos, el mar era una extensión del poder imperial, una autopista comercial que conectaba Persia con la India, con Arabia, con el mundo mediterráneo.
For them, the sea was an extension of imperial power, a commercial highway connecting Persia with India, with Arabia, with the Mediterranean world.
And that name, the Persian Gulf, is actually a political flashpoint even today.
The Arabic-speaking countries on the other side call it the Arabian Gulf, and Iranians take that extremely seriously.
Es mucho más que una disputa de nombres.
It is much more than a dispute over names.
Es una disputa sobre quién tiene legitimidad histórica en esa región.
It is a dispute about who has historical legitimacy in that region.
Cuando Irán dice «Golfo Pérsico», está diciendo: «Nosotros estuvimos aquí primero.
When Iran says 'Persian Gulf,' it is saying: 'We were here first.
Esta es nuestra esfera.» Y cuando Arabia Saudí o los Emiratos dicen «Golfo Arábigo», están rechazando exactamente esa afirmación.
This is our sphere.' And when Saudi Arabia or the Emirates say 'Arabian Gulf,' they are rejecting exactly that claim.
I covered that tension in the nineties.
You'd file a story mentioning the Persian Gulf and you'd get letters, actual paper letters, from Gulf state embassies.
It was that charged.
Y eso nos lleva al corazón de lo que es Irán como civilización.
And that brings us to the heart of what Iran is as a civilization.
Irán no se ve a sí mismo como un estado del siglo XX.
Iran does not see itself as a twentieth-century state.
Se ve como el heredero de dos mil quinientos años de historia imperial.
It sees itself as the heir to two thousand five hundred years of imperial history.
Eso no es propaganda, es una identidad profundamente arraigada.
That is not propaganda;
Which is something Western policy has consistently underestimated.
You don't negotiate the same way with a country that thinks in centuries as you do with one that thinks in election cycles.
Correcto.
Correct.
Y el Estrecho de Ormuz es el símbolo más concreto de esa identidad.
And the Strait of Hormuz is the most concrete symbol of that identity.
Controlar ese estrecho es, para Irán, una cuestión de dignidad nacional tanto como de estrategia militar.
Controlling that strait is, for Iran, a matter of national dignity as much as military strategy.
Let's talk about the modern history of that control, because there's a particular moment, the 1980s, the Tanker War, that I think is the direct ancestor of everything happening right now.
La Guerra de los Petroleros, entre 1984 y 1988, fue una parte de la guerra entre Irán e Irak.
The Tanker War, between 1984 and 1988, was a phase of the Iran-Iraq War.
Los dos países atacaron barcos petroleros en el Golfo para dañarse económicamente.
Both countries attacked oil tankers in the Gulf to damage each other economically.
Más de cuatrocientos barcos fueron atacados.
More than four hundred ships were attacked.
El Estrecho se convirtió en una zona de guerra activa.
The Strait became an active war zone.
And the United States eventually got pulled in directly.
Operation Earnest Will, 1987, the Navy started escorting reflagged Kuwaiti tankers.
That was the first time American warships were actively protecting commercial oil traffic through the Strait.
Y esa operación incluyó uno de los episodios más vergonzosos de la historia militar estadounidense reciente: el derribo del vuelo Iran Air 655.
And that operation included one of the most shameful episodes in recent American military history: the shooting down of Iran Air Flight 655.
Un crucero de la Marina de los Estados Unidos, el USS Vincennes, confundió un avión civil iraní con un avión de combate y lo derribó.
A US Navy cruiser, the USS Vincennes, mistook a civilian Iranian airliner for a combat aircraft and shot it down.
Murieron 290 personas.
Two hundred and ninety people died.
The United States never formally apologized.
Paid compensation, but never said the words.
That matters enormously in Iranian historical memory, and I think Americans genuinely don't realize how much.
Irán recuerda ese episodio constantemente.
Iran recalls that episode constantly.
No como un accidente histórico, sino como una prueba de que Estados Unidos nunca los ha tratado como iguales.
Not as a historical accident, but as proof that the United States has never treated them as equals.
Esta es la capa histórica que está debajo de cada negociación nuclear, de cada crisis en el Estrecho.
This is the historical layer that lies beneath every nuclear negotiation, every crisis in the Strait.
Now, the IRGC Navy specifically, which is the force making this week's announcement, that's a different beast from the regular navy.
When did they actually take over as the primary maritime force in the Strait?
Gradualmente, desde los años noventa, pero sobre todo después de 2000.
Gradually, from the 1990s onward, but especially after 2000.
La Guardia Revolucionaria fue creada para proteger la Revolución de enemigos internos y externos.
The Revolutionary Guard was created to protect the Revolution from internal and external enemies.
Pero con el tiempo, desarrolló capacidades militares propias, paralelas al ejército oficial, incluyendo una armada con pequeñas lanchas rápidas y misiles antibuque.
But over time it developed its own military capabilities, parallel to the official army, including a navy of fast patrol boats and anti-ship missiles.
The swarm tactics.
That's what military analysts call it.
Dozens of small fast boats surrounding a large vessel.
It's asymmetric warfare applied to the sea, and it's genuinely effective against conventional naval power.
Exactamente.
Exactly.
Irán no puede competir con la Marina estadounidense en términos de portaaviones o destructores.
Iran cannot compete with the US Navy in terms of aircraft carriers or destroyers.
Pero no necesita hacerlo.
But it does not need to.
Solo necesita convencer al mundo de que puede cerrar el Estrecho durante suficiente tiempo para causar un caos económico global.
It only needs to convince the world that it can close the Strait for long enough to cause global economic chaos.
Esa amenaza creíble es su poder de negociación.
That credible threat is its negotiating power.
Which is actually a very old strategic logic.
You don't have to win a fight to make fighting too costly for the other side.
The Persians understood that about mountain passes.
They just applied it to a waterway.
Hay un concepto en estrategia que se llama «negación de área».
There is a concept in strategy called 'area denial.' You do not control the space because you are stronger;
No controlas el espacio porque seas más fuerte;
you control it because you make it too dangerous for others to use.
lo controlas porque haces que sea demasiado peligroso para que otros lo usen.
The IRGC has built its entire naval doctrine around that idea.
El CGRI ha construido toda su doctrina naval alrededor de esa idea.
And now they're offering, in the middle of a ceasefire, to guarantee safe passage under their own procedures.
The framing of that is fascinating.
They're not saying the US is in charge here.
They're positioning themselves as the legitimate authority of the Strait.
Es un movimiento diplomático muy inteligente.
It is a very intelligent diplomatic move.
En un momento en que se habla de negociaciones con Estados Unidos, Irán no quiere aparecer como la parte débil que cede.
At a moment when negotiations with the United States are being discussed, Iran does not want to appear as the weak party that is giving in.
Esta declaración del CGRI dice: «Somos nosotros quienes controlamos este estrecho.
This IRGC statement says: 'It is we who control this strait.
Nosotros os permitimos pasar.»
We are allowing you to pass.'
Face.
It's about face.
I spent enough time in the Middle East to know that the way a deal is announced matters almost as much as what's in the deal.
Sometimes more.
Y aquí hay otro elemento histórico importante.
And there is another important historical element here.
El CGRI tiene intereses económicos enormes en el Estrecho.
The IRGC has enormous economic interests in the Strait.
Controla partes del comercio portuario, tiene empresas que operan en los puertos iraníes.
It controls parts of port commerce, it has companies operating in Iranian ports.
Un Estrecho cerrado también les cuesta dinero a ellos.
A closed Strait also costs them money.
That's the thing about Revolutionary Guard forces in general, across the region actually, when a militant organization becomes deeply embedded in an economy, their incentives get complicated.
They're not purely ideological actors anymore.
Así es.
That is right.
El CGRI es, al mismo tiempo, una fuerza militar, un movimiento ideológico y un conglomerado empresarial.
The IRGC is, simultaneously, a military force, an ideological movement, and a business conglomerate.
Esa combinación lo hace muy difícil de entender desde fuera y muy difícil de desmantelar desde dentro.
That combination makes it very difficult to understand from outside and very difficult to dismantle from within.
Let me ask you something about the deeper cultural weight of the sea in Iranian identity.
Because Iran is not, historically, thought of as a great maritime power.
The British had the Royal Navy, the Portuguese had their empire of the sea.
Where does Iran sit in that tradition?
Es una pregunta muy interesante.
It is a very interesting question.
Los persas eran, ante todo, una civilización continental.
The Persians were, above all, a continental civilization.
Su poder venía de la tierra: las grandes ciudades de Persépolis y Pasargada, las rutas de caravanas hacia la India y China.
Their power came from the land: the great cities of Persepolis and Pasargadae, the caravan routes toward India and China.
El mar era importante, pero secundario.
The sea was important, but secondary.
And the Portuguese, when they arrived in the Persian Gulf in the early 1500s, they changed that completely.
They were the first European power to establish a serious naval presence there, and they built a fort on Hormuz island itself.
That island actually gave the Strait its name.
Correcto.
Correct.
Y los persas Safávidas expulsaron a los portugueses en 1622, con ayuda de los ingleses, paradójicamente.
And the Safavid Persians expelled the Portuguese in 1622, with English help, paradoxically.
Eso es importante: los iraníes recuerdan ese momento como una victoria sobre la intrusión europea.
That matters: Iranians remember that moment as a victory over European intrusion.
La historia del Estrecho incluye ese capítulo de resistencia.
The history of the Strait includes that chapter of resistance.
With English help.
The British were already maneuvering for influence in the Gulf in the seventeenth century.
Which led, eventually, to them controlling the whole thing through the Trucial States, which became the UAE, through treaties and protectorates that lasted until 1971.
Y ese retiro británico en 1971 creó el vacío de poder que define el Golfo hasta hoy.
And that British withdrawal in 1971 created the power vacuum that defines the Gulf to this day.
El sha de Irán quiso llenarlo inmediatamente.
The Shah of Iran wanted to fill it immediately.
Tomó tres islas en el estrecho, Abu Musa y las dos islas Tunbs, que siguen siendo disputadas entre Irán y los Emiratos.
He seized three islands in the strait, Abu Musa and the two Tunb islands, which remain disputed between Iran and the Emirates.
Those islands are still a live dispute.
The UAE mentions them in nearly every diplomatic statement about Iran.
And what's remarkable is that the 1979 Revolution changed almost everything in Iran except that.
The Islamic Republic kept those islands.
Porque el control del Estrecho es una cuestión de Estado, no de ideología.
Because control of the Strait is a matter of state, not ideology.
El sha y Jomeini tenían visiones del mundo completamente opuestas.
The Shah and Khomeini had completely opposed worldviews.
Pero ambos estaban de acuerdo en que Irán debe controlar el Golfo Pérsico.
But both agreed that Iran must control the Persian Gulf.
Esa es la constante histórica.
That is the historical constant.
State interest survives revolutions.
That's one of the things you learn covering foreign policy long enough.
The flags change, the slogans change, the uniforms change.
The geography doesn't.
Muy bien dicho.
Very well put.
Y ahora mismo, esa constante histórica está en el centro de las negociaciones más importantes del mundo.
And right now, that historical constant is at the center of the most important negotiations in the world.
Lo que el CGRI está diciendo con este anuncio es: «Cualquier acuerdo que hagáis con Teherán, nosotros seguimos aquí, en el agua.»
What the IRGC is saying with this announcement is: 'Whatever deal you make with Tehran, we are still here, in the water.'
Which is a warning to Washington and a reassurance to their domestic base all at once.
One sentence doing two jobs.
That's actually impressive political communication.
Los iraníes son muy buenos en eso.
Iranians are very good at that.
Tienen una tradición cultural de comunicación indirecta, del doble sentido, que viene en parte de siglos de vivir bajo ocupaciones extranjeras donde decir las cosas directamente era peligroso.
They have a cultural tradition of indirect communication, of double meaning, that comes in part from centuries of living under foreign occupations where saying things directly was dangerous.
Ta'arof.
The elaborate system of social politeness that also functions as strategic ambiguity.
I had a fixer in Tehran once who explained it to me as: everyone knows what is really meant, but no one is obligated to acknowledge it.
Exacto.
Exactly.
Y eso explica por qué las negociaciones con Irán son tan complicadas para los occidentales, que prefieren la comunicación directa.
And that explains why negotiations with Iran are so complicated for Westerners, who prefer direct communication.
No es que los iraníes estén mintiendo.
It is not that Iranians are lying.
Es que están comunicando de una manera diferente, con capas de significado.
It is that they are communicating in a different way, with layers of meaning.
What I keep thinking about is what comes after all this, assuming a deal holds.
The Strait goes back to being the artery of global energy.
And that dependency, a fifth of the world's oil through 33 kilometers of water, that's not going away anytime soon.
No.
No.
Y cada vez que el mundo habla de energía verde y de independencia del petróleo, recuerdo que esa transición lleva décadas.
And every time the world talks about green energy and oil independence, I remember that transition takes decades.
Mientras tanto, el Estrecho de Ormuz sigue siendo lo que ha sido durante siglos: el punto donde el mundo contiene la respiración.
Meanwhile, the Strait of Hormuz remains what it has been for centuries: the point where the world holds its breath.
Holds its breath.
That's the right phrase.
Can I ask you something about the Spanish you just used there?
You said «contiene la respiración» and I almost caught a word I didn't expect.
«Contener la respiración» significa literalmente «to hold your breath», pero en español se dice así, con «contener», que también significa «to contain» o «to hold back».
'Contener la respiración' literally means 'to hold your breath,' but in Spanish you say it this way, with 'contener,' which also means 'to contain' or 'to hold back.' It is the same verb you use for 'holding back water' or 'holding back emotions.'
Es el mismo verbo que usas para «contener el agua» o «contener las emociones».
So the physical act of holding your breath and the idea of restraining yourself emotionally, or restraining water in a dam, all of that lives in the same verb.
That's actually a beautiful overlap.
Sí, y tiene un uso muy natural en español para expresar tensión o anticipación.
Yes, and it has a very natural use in Spanish to express tension or anticipation.
«El mundo contiene la respiración» es casi una metáfora política, porque mezcla lo físico con lo colectivo.
'The world holds its breath' is almost a political metaphor, because it blends the physical with the collective.
Puedes sentir el peso de la frase.
You can feel the weight of the phrase.
The world holds its breath over 33 kilometers of water.
Two thousand five hundred years of history compressed into a passage you could drive across in five minutes.
Pretty good reason to keep learning Spanish, if only to describe things with that kind of weight.