B2 · Upper Intermediate
14 min
geopoliticshistorydiplomacysouth asia
The Country of Balance: Pakistan and the Art of Not Choosing Sides
El País del Equilibrio: Pakistán y el Arte de No Elegir Bando
This week, Donald Trump paused Operation Project Freedom in the Strait of Hormuz after Pakistan asked him to. Fletcher and Octavio dig into why that detail matters, tracing the extraordinary history of a nuclear-armed country that has spent decades walking a tightrope between the world's great powers.
Esta semana, Donald Trump pausó la Operación Project Freedom en el Estrecho de Ormuz después de que Pakistán se lo pidiera. Fletcher y Octavio exploran por qué ese detalle importa: la historia extraordinaria de un país nuclear que lleva décadas caminando por una cuerda floja entre las grandes potencias.
5 essential B2-level terms from this episode, with translations and example sentences in Spanish.
| Spanish | English | Example |
|---|---|---|
| ambigüedad calculada | calculated ambiguity | La política exterior de Pakistán se basa en una ambigüedad calculada que le permite mantener relaciones con potencias rivales. |
| disuasión nuclear | nuclear deterrence | La disuasión nuclear cambia la manera en que las grandes potencias tratan con países más pequeños. |
| desconfianza mutua | mutual distrust | Entre Pakistán y Estados Unidos existe una relación de desconfianza mutua que ninguno de los dos puede abandonar. |
| corredor económico | economic corridor | El corredor económico China-Pakistán es uno de los proyectos de infraestructura más grandes del mundo. |
| lo que | what / that which | Lo que me parece más interesante es la manera en que Pakistán usa su posición geográfica como herramienta diplomática. |
Buried in the Iran ceasefire news this week, almost a footnote, was a line that I genuinely could not stop thinking about.
Trump paused a military operation in the Strait of Hormuz.
The reason given: Pakistan asked him to.
Sí, y para mucha gente eso suena raro.
Yes, and for a lot of people that sounds strange.
Pakistán no está cerca del Estrecho de Ormuz.
Pakistan isn't near the Strait of Hormuz.
No tiene petróleo en el Golfo Pérsico.
It has no oil in the Persian Gulf.
¿Por qué le importaría?
Why would it care?
Pero cuando entiendes la posición de Pakistán en el mundo, tiene todo el sentido.
But when you understand Pakistan's position in the world, it makes complete sense.
Pakistan shares a border with Iran.
It also shares a border with Afghanistan, with India, and it has a deep strategic relationship with China.
That's a neighborhood that would give anyone a headache.
Es un país que vive entre mundos.
It's a country that lives between worlds.
Tiene una alianza histórica con Estados Unidos, pero también necesita mantener relaciones con Irán, con China, y con el mundo árabe.
It has a historic alliance with the United States, but it also needs to maintain relations with Iran, with China, and with the Arab world.
Y lo ha conseguido durante décadas sin romper completamente con ninguno.
And it has managed this for decades without completely breaking with any of them.
Let's go back to the beginning, because I think most listeners, myself included until I started really digging, have a pretty shallow picture of how Pakistan came to exist and why its position in the world is so structurally strange.
Pakistán nació en 1947 como consecuencia directa de la partición del Imperio Británico en la India.
Pakistan was born in 1947 as a direct consequence of the partition of the British Empire in India.
Fue creado como un estado para los musulmanes del subcontinente, aunque desde el principio hubo una pregunta difícil: ¿qué significa exactamente un estado islámico moderno?
It was created as a state for the Muslims of the subcontinent, though from the very beginning there was a difficult question: what exactly does a modern Islamic state mean?
And that question has never really been settled.
The founder, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, was actually a fairly secular lawyer.
He died fourteen months after independence.
What followed was decades of argument about what kind of country Pakistan was supposed to be.
Exactamente.
Exactly.
Y mientras esa pregunta interna no tenía respuesta, el mundo exterior seguía llamando a la puerta.
And while that internal question went unanswered, the outside world kept knocking at the door.
Durante la Guerra Fría, Estados Unidos necesitaba a Pakistán como aliado frente a la Unión Soviética.
During the Cold War, the United States needed Pakistan as an ally against the Soviet Union.
Pakistán estaba en una posición geográfica perfecta para eso.
Pakistan was in a geographically perfect position for that.
Kissinger flew through Islamabad in 1971 on his secret trip to Beijing.
Pakistan was literally the back channel that opened China to the West.
That's not a footnote, that's one of the most consequential diplomatic moments of the twentieth century.
Y a cambio de esa utilidad estratégica, Estados Unidos cerró los ojos ante muchas cosas que pasaban en Pakistán.
And in exchange for that strategic usefulness, the United States turned a blind eye to many things happening in Pakistan.
Incluyendo el programa nuclear, que la comunidad internacional sabía que existía mucho antes de que Pakistán lo admitiera oficialmente en 1998.
Including the nuclear program, which the international community knew existed long before Pakistan officially admitted it in 1998.
The nuclear thing is crucial and I want to stay there for a moment.
Pakistan tested its bombs in May 1998, two weeks after India did.
And the fact that a country of two hundred and forty million people, with a history of military coups and serious internal instability, has nuclear weapons, changes the entire logic of how anyone deals with it.
Es lo que los analistas llaman el problema del «Estado demasiado grande para caer».
It's what analysts call the 'too big to fail state' problem.
Pakistán es tan grande, tan complicado, y tiene tantas armas nucleares, que ninguna potencia mundial puede permitirse que colapse completamente.
Pakistan is so large, so complicated, and has so many nuclear weapons, that no world power can afford for it to completely collapse.
Eso le da un poder de negociación enorme.
That gives it enormous negotiating power.
Which brings us back to this week.
When Pakistan picks up the phone and asks the United States to pause a military operation, it's not a small country asking for a favor.
It's a nuclear power with two hundred and forty million people saying: this is affecting our region, and we have interests here.
Y hay algo más específico.
And there's something more specific.
Pakistán tiene una frontera de casi novecientos kilómetros con Irán.
Pakistan has a border of nearly nine hundred kilometers with Iran.
Esa frontera es muy difícil de controlar y es una ruta importante para el comercio y, lamentablemente, también para el tráfico de drogas y armas.
That border is very difficult to control and is an important route for trade and, unfortunately, also for drug and arms trafficking.
Una escalada en Irán afecta directamente a Pakistán.
An escalation in Iran directly affects Pakistan.
And yet Pakistan and Iran are not natural friends.
Pakistan is majority Sunni, Iran is the world's leading Shia power.
During the 1990s, Pakistani and Iranian proxies were literally shooting at each other in Afghanistan, backing opposite sides of that civil war.
Pero incluso entre vecinos que desconfían el uno del otro, hay una lógica pragmática.
But even between neighbors who distrust each other, there is a pragmatic logic.
Pakistán no quiere inestabilidad en su frontera occidental mientras ya tiene suficiente presión en su frontera oriental con India.
Pakistan does not want instability on its western border while it already has enough pressure on its eastern border with India.
Es una cuestión de supervivencia estratégica.
It's a matter of strategic survival.
The India factor.
Let's talk about that.
Because the whole architecture of Pakistani foreign policy, from the nuclear program to the alliances with China to the relationships in the Gulf, all of it is downstream of one central fear: India.
Han peleado cuatro guerras desde 1947.
They have fought four wars since 1947.
Han estado al borde de la guerra nuclear varias veces, sobre todo en 1999, durante el conflicto de Kargil.
They have been on the brink of nuclear war several times, most notably in 1999 during the Kargil conflict.
La India tiene diez veces más población y una economía mucho más grande.
India has ten times the population and a much larger economy.
Para Pakistán, equilibrar esa amenaza es la primera prioridad de cualquier gobierno.
For Pakistan, balancing that threat is the first priority of any government.
And so China becomes the counterweight.
Pakistan and China have this relationship they call an 'all-weather friendship,' which is diplomatic language for: we need each other too much to ever fall out.
China gets a land corridor to the Arabian Sea.
Pakistan gets security guarantees and infrastructure money.
El Corredor Económico China-Pakistán, lo que llaman CPEC, es uno de los proyectos de infraestructura más grandes del mundo.
The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, what they call CPEC, is one of the largest infrastructure projects in the world.
Hay autopistas, centrales eléctricas, un puerto enorme en Gwadar.
There are highways, power plants, an enormous port in Gwadar.
China ha invertido decenas de miles de millones de dólares.
China has invested tens of billions of dollars.
Eso no es solo dinero, eso es influencia política profunda.
That is not just money, that is deep political influence.
So you have a country that is simultaneously a long-term US ally, a deep strategic partner of China, a neighbor of Iran it can't afford to antagonize, a rival of India it's terrified of, and a member of the Islamic world it needs for moral and financial support.
That is an extraordinary position to hold.
Y para mantener esa posición, Pakistán ha desarrollado algo que podríamos llamar una política exterior de ambigüedad calculada.
And to maintain that position, Pakistan has developed what we might call a policy of calculated ambiguity.
Nunca se compromete completamente con nadie.
It never fully commits to anyone.
Siempre mantiene una salida.
It always keeps a way out.
Es un arte que los diplomáticos pakistaníes han perfeccionado durante décadas.
It is an art that Pakistani diplomats have perfected over decades.
Which is a polite way of saying: they've played everyone.
And I mean that with some admiration, actually.
I covered the region in the early 2000s.
Pakistani intelligence was simultaneously helping the CIA track Al-Qaeda and, according to many people I spoke to, maintaining back channels to the Taliban.
Both things, at the same time.
Eso es exactamente correcto.
That is exactly right.
Y eso explica la frustración americana con Pakistán que ha existido siempre.
And that explains the American frustration with Pakistan that has always existed.
Estados Unidos le da miles de millones en ayuda militar y luego descubre que Osama bin Laden vivía en Abbottabad, a pocos kilómetros de la academia militar más importante del país.
The United States gives billions in military aid and then discovers that Osama bin Laden was living in Abbottabad, a few kilometers from the country's most important military academy.
Es una relación de desconfianza mutua que ninguno de los dos puede abandonar.
It is a relationship of mutual distrust that neither side can abandon.
The bin Laden moment.
I remember exactly where I was.
The silence from Islamabad in those first hours after the raid was telling.
Nobody knew whether to be embarrassed, angry, or relieved.
Y sin embargo, la relación continuó.
And yet the relationship continued.
Eso es lo que quiero que los oyentes entiendan: cuando tienes armas nucleares, cuando tu inestabilidad afecta a toda una región, cuando controlas rutas estratégicas, el mundo no puede simplemente ignorarte aunque quiera.
That is what I want listeners to understand: when you have nuclear weapons, when your instability affects an entire region, when you control strategic routes, the world cannot simply ignore you even if it wants to.
Pakistán sabe eso muy bien.
Pakistan knows that very well.
Let me push on something, because there's a version of this story where Pakistan's strategic ambiguity isn't clever diplomacy, it's actually a trap.
The country has been through four military coups.
The civilian government and the military have never really resolved who's actually in charge.
Imran Khan is in prison.
The economy is in chronic crisis.
At some point, doesn't the tightrope break?
Es la pregunta correcta.
That is the right question.
Y la respuesta honesta es: puede ser.
And the honest answer is: possibly.
Hay analistas que llevan treinta años advirtiendo que Pakistán está al borde del colapso.
There are analysts who have spent thirty years warning that Pakistan is on the verge of collapse.
Y sin embargo, sigue ahí.
And yet it is still there.
Pero la diferencia ahora es que las tensiones internas son más serias que en décadas anteriores.
But the difference now is that the internal tensions are more serious than in previous decades.
The Imran Khan situation is something I want to linger on.
Because for listeners who've been following Pakistani politics, the pattern there is almost textbook.
A charismatic outsider takes power, threatens the establishment, the military turns against him, he ends up in court on charges that his supporters call fabricated.
It has happened before.
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto fue ejecutado en 1979 después de que el general Zia ul-Haq lo derrocara.
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was executed in 1979 after General Zia ul-Haq overthrew him.
Su hija Benazir Bhutto fue asesinada en 2007.
His daughter Benazir Bhutto was assassinated in 2007.
La política pakistaní tiene un nivel de violencia y de inestabilidad que hace muy difícil construir instituciones democráticas duraderas.
Pakistani politics has a level of violence and instability that makes it very difficult to build lasting democratic institutions.
Eso no es culpa del pueblo pakistaní, es el resultado de décadas de interferencia militar e internacional.
That is not the fault of the Pakistani people;
Benazir Bhutto.
I interviewed her twice.
Once in London, once in Karachi.
She was extraordinarily sharp, completely aware of the risks she was taking.
She knew.
When she came back to Pakistan in 2007, she knew what might happen.
Lo cual nos dice algo importante sobre Pakistán: es un país donde la política requiere un coraje físico que en otros lugares no se pide.
Which tells us something important about Pakistan: it is a country where politics requires a physical courage that is not demanded in other places.
Y aun así, la gente lo hace.
And yet people do it.
Hay una vitalidad democrática en ese país que sus enemigos siempre subestiman.
There is a democratic vitality in that country that its enemies always underestimate.
So where does this week's story leave us.
Pakistan asks the United States to pause a military operation.
The United States pauses it.
That is not a normal interaction between those two countries.
That is Pakistan using its leverage at a moment when the US clearly wants to de-escalate with Iran and needs regional partners to help sell that de-escalation as a win.
Y eso es exactamente lo que Pakistán hace bien: encontrar el momento en el que su posición geográfica y su red de relaciones le dan una influencia que ningún otro país tiene.
And that is exactly what Pakistan does well: finding the moment when its geographic position and its network of relationships give it an influence that no other country has.
No es el más poderoso, no es el más rico, pero en ciertos momentos es el más necesario.
It is not the most powerful, nor the richest, but at certain moments it is the most necessary.
The most necessary.
That's a phrase worth sitting with.
A country of two hundred and forty million people, a nuclear arsenal, borders with Iran, Afghanistan, India, and China, deep ties with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, and a history of being, as you put it, the world's most indispensable uncomfortable ally.
Y lo que me parece más interesante históricamente es esto: cada vez que el mundo trata de ignorar a Pakistán, algo pasa que lo hace completamente imposible.
And what I find most interesting historically is this: every time the world tries to ignore Pakistan, something happens that makes that completely impossible.
La invasión soviética de Afganistán en 1979, el 11 de septiembre, ahora la guerra con Irán.
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, September 11th, now the war with Iran.
Pakistán vuelve siempre al centro del mapa.
Pakistan always returns to the center of the map.
And I think that's the lesson for listeners.
When you see a line like 'Trump paused the operation because Pakistan asked him to,' that's not a curiosity.
That's geography, history, and nuclear deterrence working in real time.
Everything in that sentence has a hundred years of context behind it.
Exacto.
Exactly.
Y la próxima vez que alguien diga que Pakistán es solo un país complicado del que no merece la pena hablar, recuerda esta semana.
And the next time someone says Pakistan is just a complicated country not worth talking about, remember this week.
Un país que no aparece en los titulares principales consiguió que el presidente de Estados Unidos cambiara una operación militar activa.
A country that didn't appear in the main headlines managed to get the President of the United States to change an active military operation.
Eso no es poca cosa.
That is no small thing.
Alright.
One thing I noticed you did earlier, which I want to ask about, because I've heard it a few times and I'm not sure I'm reading it right.
You said 'lo que llaman,' meaning 'what they call.' And then separately 'lo que me parece.' Those feel like they're doing different work.
Buena observación.
Good observation.
'Lo que' es básicamente un relativo que nominaliza una frase entera.
'Lo que' is essentially a relative pronoun that turns a whole phrase into a noun.
'Lo que llaman CPEC' significa 'la cosa que llaman CPEC', es una manera de introducir un nombre o concepto con cierta distancia.
'Lo que llaman CPEC' means 'the thing they call CPEC';
'Lo que me parece interesante' significa 'la cosa que me parece interesante'.
it's a way of introducing a name or concept with a certain distance.
Es el mismo mecanismo pero aplicado a tu propia opinión.
'Lo que me parece interesante' means 'the thing that seems interesting to me'.
So it's like 'what' functioning as 'that which.' In English we'd say 'what they call' or 'what strikes me' and it works the same way.
The difference is Spanish seems to use it more naturally in spoken conversation than English does.
Sí, en español oral 'lo que' es muy frecuente como estructura para organizar ideas.
Yes, in spoken Spanish 'lo que' is very common as a structure for organizing ideas.
'Lo que pasa es que', 'lo que me sorprende es', 'lo que no entiende la gente es'.
'Lo que pasa es que', 'lo que me sorprende es', 'lo que no entiende la gente es'.
Es una forma elegante de introducir el punto principal de lo que quieres decir.
It is an elegant way to introduce the main point of what you want to say.
Si la usas bien, suenas muy natural.
If you use it well, you sound very natural.
Lo que me parece difícil es usarlo sin thinking about it.
I'll get there eventually.
Lo que me sorprende es que no hayas cometido ningún error de gramática en los últimos tres minutos.
What surprises me is that you haven't made a single grammar mistake in the last three minutes.
Eso es un récord, Fletcher.
That is a record, Fletcher.