La Paz que Tiene Precio: China, Afganistán y el Corredor del Dinero

Es una posición muy práctica.

It's a very pragmatic position.

Pragmatic is the word.

And look, I've been in rooms with Chinese diplomats and the phrase they use is 'non-interference in internal affairs.' Which in practice means, we don't care what your government does to its own people, we care about business.

Es que eso es muy diferente a la política de los Estados Unidos o de Europa, que siempre hablan de democracia y derechos humanos antes de invertir.

That's very different from the policy of the United States or Europe, which always talk about democracy and human rights before investing.

And you can argue about which approach is more effective, and I have strong views on it.

But the point is that China's model gives it access to places Western capital simply won't go.

And that's a real competitive advantage.

Mira, ahora el conflicto entre Afganistán y Pakistán es un problema grande para China.

Look, the conflict between Afghanistan and Pakistan is now a major problem for China.

Porque si los dos países están en guerra, las rutas comerciales no funcionan bien.

Because if both countries are at war, trade routes don't function properly.

Here's what gets me about this.

The conflict itself, between Afghanistan and Pakistan, is partly rooted in something that predates both countries as modern states.

The Durand Line.

This border drawn by a British colonial official in 1893 that split Pashtun communities in two.

Sí, la línea Durand.

Yes, the Durand Line.

Afganistán nunca la reconoció como una frontera oficial.

Afghanistan never recognized it as an official border.

Es un problema histórico muy antiguo.

It's a very old historical problem.

Y los talibanes tampoco la reconocen, igual que los gobiernos afganos anteriores.

And the Taliban don't recognize it either, just like previous Afghan governments.

So you have a colonial-era border dispute at the root of this, which is also true of half the conflicts on earth.

And China is now trying to paper over a 130-year-old problem because it needs a stable corridor for its exports.

That's quite a business proposition.

Bueno, China ya hizo algo similar con Arabia Saudí e Irán en 2023.

Well, China did something similar with Saudi Arabia and Iran in 2023.

Los dos países eran enemigos, y China organizó un acuerdo de paz.

The two countries were enemies, and China organized a peace agreement.

Fue una sorpresa para todo el mundo.

It surprised everyone.

The Saudi-Iran deal.

Right.

And that was genuinely historic, it caught Washington completely flat-footed.

The U.S.

had been trying to manage that relationship for decades and China brokered a normalization agreement in a matter of months.

It was a signal.

Y ahora con Afganistán y Pakistán, China quiere repetir eso.

And now with Afghanistan and Pakistan, China wants to repeat that.

Quiere ser el mediador importante en Asia.

It wants to be the important mediator in Asia.

Es un mensaje político, pero también es un mensaje económico.

It's a political message, but it's also an economic message.

The extraordinary thing is how openly transactional this all is.

There's very little pretense.

China wants peace in this corridor because instability costs money.

And both Afghanistan and Pakistan know that, and they're still sitting at the table.

Es que a veces el dinero funciona mejor que los discursos sobre la paz.

Sometimes money works better than speeches about peace.

Si los dos países reciben inversión china, tienen un incentivo económico para no luchar.

If both countries receive Chinese investment, they have an economic incentive not to fight.

Look, I don't entirely disagree with that.

There's a whole school of thought in international relations, goes back to Norman Angell before the First World War, arguing that economic interdependence prevents conflict.

Angell was wrong about 1914 but the logic has merit.

Sí, pero Afganistán es muy diferente.

Yes, but Afghanistan is very different.

Es un país donde la guerra fue normal durante cincuenta años.

It's a country where war was normal for fifty years.

La economía funcionó durante la guerra.

The economy functioned during conflict.

Mucha gente ganó dinero con el conflicto.

Many people made money from the fighting.

The war economy point is critical.

I spent time in Afghanistan as a correspondent and there are entire supply chains built around conflict.

There are businessmen, transporters, arms dealers, fuel suppliers, whose entire livelihood depends on the fighting continuing.

Exacto.

Exactly.

Entonces para que la paz funcione, China no solo necesita convencer a los gobiernos.

So for peace to work, China doesn't just need to convince governments.

Necesita crear una economía alternativa para esa gente.

It needs to create an alternative economy for those people.

Eso es mucho más difícil.

That's much harder.

Right, so you could bring the leaders to a table in Beijing, sign a beautiful piece of paper, and then nothing changes on the ground because the incentive structures haven't shifted for the people actually doing the fighting.

La verdad es que China sabe esto.

Honestly, China knows this.

Por eso las conversaciones de esta semana son solo el principio.

That's why this week's talks are only the beginning.

No son el final.

They're not the end.

Son una primera señal de que hay interés en hablar.

They're a first signal that there's interest in talking.

And what does Pakistan get out of this, beyond peace?

Pakistan's economy is in serious trouble.

It had an IMF bailout recently, its currency has been hammered.

CPEC investments are genuinely important for Islamabad's economic survival at this point.

Sí, Pakistán necesita la inversión china.

Yes, Pakistan needs Chinese investment.

Pero también tiene problemas con los ataques de grupos militantes que vienen de Afganistán.

But it also has problems with militant attacks coming from Afghanistan.

Los talibanes no controlan todo el territorio afgano.

The Taliban don't control all Afghan territory.

Specifically the TTP, the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, a separate group from the Afghan Taliban, operating out of Afghan territory, conducting attacks inside Pakistan.

Islamabad blames Kabul, Kabul says it can't control them.

And China is caught in the middle of that argument.

Mira, los ataques del TTP también afectaron a trabajadores chinos en Pakistán.

Look, TTP attacks also targeted Chinese workers in Pakistan.

Hubo ataques contra ingenieros chinos que trabajaban en proyectos del CPEC.

There were attacks against Chinese engineers working on CPEC projects.

Entonces China también tiene un problema de seguridad.

So China also has a security problem.

Which means China's motivation here is even more direct than just protecting trade routes.

Chinese nationals are being killed on projects that are supposed to be China's great Belt and Road showcase.

That's politically and economically unacceptable to Beijing.

A ver, entonces tenemos una situación interesante.

So we have an interesting situation.

China quiere la paz porque necesita proteger su inversión.

China wants peace because it needs to protect its investment.

Y usa esa inversión como un instrumento para conseguir la paz.

And it uses that investment as a tool to achieve peace.

Es un círculo.

It's a circle.

It's a circle, and historically it's not a new idea.

The British Empire built railways across India partly for the same reason, you build infrastructure, you create economic dependency, and that dependency is supposed to produce stability.

It worked sometimes.

It spectacularly failed other times.

Bueno, pero la diferencia es que China no quiere colonizar nada.

But the difference is that China doesn't want to colonize anything.

China quiere acceso comercial.

China wants commercial access.

Quiere que los países sean estables para poder hacer negocios.

It wants countries to be stable so it can do business.

Eso es diferente al imperialismo clásico.

That's different from classic imperialism.

I'll push back on that, gently.

The distinction between 'we want to colonize you' and 'we want you to be so economically dependent on us that you can never say no' is real but it's also a narrow one.

Debt-trap diplomacy is the phrase that gets thrown around, and there's genuine debate about whether CPEC falls into that category.

La verdad es que algunos países tuvieron problemas con las deudas chinas.

Honestly, some countries did have problems with Chinese debt.

Sri Lanka perdió el control de un puerto por veintinueve años porque no pagó.

Sri Lanka lost control of a port for ninety-nine years because it couldn't repay.

Eso fue una señal muy importante para otros países.

That was a very important signal for other countries.

The Hambantota port, yes.

Sri Lanka signed over that port on a ninety-nine year lease to a Chinese state company when it couldn't service its debt.

Critics pointed to that as exhibit A for debt-trap diplomacy.

China says it was a purely commercial negotiation.

The truth is probably somewhere in between, but the optics were terrible.

Entonces cuando China dice que quiere ayudar a Afganistán y Pakistán, esos países también piensan en Sri Lanka.

So when China says it wants to help Afghanistan and Pakistan, those countries also think about Sri Lanka.

Aceptan el dinero, pero saben que hay riesgos.

They accept the money, but they know there are risks.

Es una relación complicada.

It's a complicated relationship.

So what do we actually think happens next?

These talks are happening, there's no deal yet.

But China clearly has the leverage and the motivation to push hard.

My instinct from years covering this region is that any deal will be fragile, full of vague language, and immediately contested by someone who wasn't at the table.

Sí, yo creo que el acuerdo va a ser lento.

Yes, I think any agreement will be slow.

Pero mira, lo importante es que los dos países están hablando.

But look, what matters is that the two countries are talking.

Eso no pasó mucho antes.

That didn't happen much before.

Y eso es gracias al dinero chino, no a los discursos sobre la paz.

And that's thanks to Chinese money, not speeches about peace.

No, you're absolutely right about that.

And maybe that's the lesson here for our listeners thinking about this from a business angle.

Money creates conversations that ideology never could.

Sixty billion dollars gets people into a room.

Whether they stay in the room, that's the harder question.

Bueno, y para los estudiantes de español, recuerden la frase: 'el dinero habla.' El dinero habla en todos los idiomas.

And for Spanish learners, remember the phrase: 'el dinero habla.' Money talks.

En chino, en pastún, en urdu.

In Chinese, in Pashto, in Urdu.

Siempre.

Always.

El dinero habla.

That I understood perfectly, Octavio, and I didn't even mispronounce it.

Progress.

La verdad es que sí, Fletcher.

Honestly, yes, Fletcher.

Eso fue perfecto.

That was perfect.

No dijiste que eras embarazado.

You didn't say you were pregnant.

Hoy fue un buen día.

Today was a good day.