El precio de los fuegos artificiales

I mean, that's the fundamental tension, isn't it.

From a pure occupational health standpoint, you should not be mixing gunpowder in a small shed.

But from a livelihood standpoint, for a family in rural Kerala or Tamil Nadu, this is income, this is the festival season, this is how you pay for school fees.

La verdad es que en Kerala la situación es un poco diferente de Tamil Nadu.

The truth is that in Kerala the situation is a little different from Tamil Nadu.

Kerala tiene más educación, más protecciones sociales.

Kerala has more education, more social protections.

Pero la industria de los fuegos artificiales todavía tiene muchos problemas de seguridad.

But the fireworks industry still has many safety problems.

That's a really important point.

Kerala's human development numbers are extraordinary for an Indian state.

High literacy, relatively strong public health infrastructure, lower infant mortality than much of the developing world.

And yet this industry, specifically, seems to exist in a different universe from those achievements.

Sí, y eso es muy interesante.

Yes, and that's very interesting.

Es que las tradiciones culturales son muy fuertes.

Cultural traditions are very strong.

La gente quiere los fuegos artificiales para sus festivales.

People want fireworks for their festivals.

Y nadie quiere admitir que la producción de esos fuegos cuesta vidas humanas.

And nobody wants to admit that the production of those fireworks costs human lives.

Look, there's a parallel I keep thinking about.

In Spain, and you can tell me if I'm wrong, there are festivals where safety has evolved significantly over time, where traditions have been modified without disappearing entirely.

Is that a useful comparison, or am I reaching?

No, no, espera, es un ejemplo muy bueno.

No, no, wait, that's a very good example.

En Valencia tenemos las Fallas.

In Valencia we have the Fallas.

Usamos muchísimo fuego y pólvora.

We use enormous amounts of fire and gunpowder.

En los años ochenta y noventa, había muchos más accidentes.

In the eighties and nineties, there were many more accidents.

Pero cambiamos las reglas y ahora es más seguro.

But we changed the rules and now it's safer.

So what changed in Valencia?

Because I'd imagine there was resistance, people saying you're ruining the tradition, you're making it too sanitized.

Por supuesto.

Of course.

Mucha gente protestó al principio.

Many people protested at first.

Pero después de accidentes muy graves, la gente aceptó que los cambios eran necesarios.

But after very serious accidents, people accepted that the changes were necessary.

También es importante que los fabricantes de pólvora en España tienen licencias y formación profesional.

It's also important that gunpowder manufacturers in Spain have licenses and professional training.

The training piece is crucial.

Because when you look at what actually kills people in these explosions, it's often not the fireworks themselves, it's the conditions under which they're being made.

Temperature, humidity, the mixing of compounds, sparks from friction.

Things that trained workers can manage and untrained workers cannot.

Exactamente.

Exactly.

Y hay otro problema: el calor.

And there's another problem: the heat.

En Kerala, las temperaturas son muy altas.

In Kerala, temperatures are very high.

El calor hace que los materiales explosivos sean más inestables.

The heat makes explosive materials more unstable.

Trabajar en esas condiciones sin formación es muy peligroso.

Working in those conditions without training is very dangerous.

The extraordinary thing is that the health consequences of these accidents extend well beyond the immediate casualties.

Survivors of fireworks explosions often face decades of complications.

Burns, respiratory damage from smoke inhalation, hearing loss, loss of vision, loss of limbs.

The twenty-three injured in Thrissur, some of those people's lives have been fundamentally altered.

Sí, y hay que pensar en los hospitales también.

Yes, and you have to think about the hospitals too.

En zonas rurales de India, los hospitales no siempre tienen los recursos para tratar quemaduras graves.

In rural areas of India, hospitals don't always have the resources to treat serious burns.

Muchas veces, los heridos necesitan ir a hospitales en ciudades grandes, pero esto cuesta mucho dinero.

Often, the injured need to go to hospitals in large cities, but this costs a lot of money.

And for workers who are already economically precarious, the cost of treatment can be ruinous.

There's a cruel paradox here: you take a dangerous job to earn money, you get injured in that job, and the medical costs wipe out everything you've saved and more.

La verdad es que en India hay un seguro de salud para trabajadores, pero muchos trabajadores informales no tienen acceso a él.

The truth is that in India there is health insurance for workers, but many informal workers don't have access to it.

Porque si trabajas en un taller ilegal o sin contrato, no tienes protección.

Because if you work in an illegal workshop or without a contract, you have no protection.

So the informality of the sector directly produces the vulnerability.

And I'd guess that in Thrissur, as in Sivakasi, a significant proportion of the workforce is informal.

Which means these thirteen people who died almost certainly had no meaningful insurance, no workers' compensation.

Sí.

Yes.

Y sus familias tampoco.

And their families either.

Es un problema estructural muy profundo.

It's a very deep structural problem.

Cuando hay un accidente, el gobierno da a veces una pequeña compensación, pero no es suficiente para una familia que pierde a su padre o a su madre.

When there's an accident, the government sometimes gives a small compensation, but it's not enough for a family that loses its father or mother.

I want to zoom out for a second, because this isn't only an Indian problem.

China is the world's largest fireworks manufacturer.

The industry there employs hundreds of thousands of people, and the accident rate has historically been very high.

Bangladesh, the Philippines, parts of Latin America, all have versions of this same story.

Bueno, en China hubo cambios muy importantes después de accidentes graves.

Well, in China there were very important changes after serious accidents.

El gobierno cerró muchas fábricas pequeñas y obligó a las empresas grandes a seguir normas de seguridad más estrictas.

The government closed many small factories and forced large companies to follow stricter safety standards.

Pero el problema no desapareció completamente.

But the problem didn't disappear completely.

Right.

And there's a global supply chain dimension here too.

When we in the West buy fireworks for our celebrations, a lot of those products come from exactly these conditions.

The Fourth of July in America, Guy Fawkes Night in England, New Year's everywhere.

There's a supply chain behind that spectacle that most consumers never think about.

Es que eso es muy importante, Fletcher.

That's a really important point, Fletcher.

Nosotros miramos los fuegos artificiales en el cielo y pensamos que son bonitos.

We watch fireworks in the sky and think they're beautiful.

Pero no pensamos en las personas que los fabricaron, en las condiciones en que trabajaron.

But we don't think about the people who made them, about the conditions in which they worked.

No, you're absolutely right about that.

And I think the distance, the physical and psychological distance between the consumer and the production, is part of what allows the problem to persist.

It's the same dynamic as fast fashion, or cobalt mining for phone batteries.

The hazard is real, it's documented, and it's essentially invisible to the end user.

A ver, pero también hay que decir que en India muchos fuegos artificiales son para el mercado local.

Well, but you also have to say that in India many fireworks are for the local market.

No todo es exportación.

Not everything is for export.

Las fiestas religiosas son muy importantes, y la demanda interna es enorme.

Religious festivals are very important, and domestic demand is enormous.

Which complicates the solution, because you can't simply say: stop making fireworks and people will stop dying.

The demand is internal, the cultural weight is enormous, Diwali alone generates extraordinary demand.

So what's the actual path forward from a public health perspective?

Mira, creo que hay tres cosas necesarias.

Look, I think there are three necessary things.

Primero, más inspecciones reales en las fábricas.

First, more real inspections in factories.

Segundo, formación obligatoria para los trabajadores.

Second, mandatory training for workers.

Y tercero, compensación real para las familias de los trabajadores que mueren o sufren accidentes.

And third, real compensation for the families of workers who die or are injured.

Three things that are, in principle, completely achievable.

And yet they haven't happened at scale.

I wonder, and this is a genuine question, whether the political will is there when the victims are poor, informal, often lower caste workers.

There's a class dimension to who bears this risk that I don't think we should sidestep.

No, tienes razón completamente.

No, you're completely right.

Los trabajadores que mueren en estas explosiones normalmente son personas pobres, sin mucho poder político.

The workers who die in these explosions are normally poor people, without much political power.

Las personas que disfrutan de los fuegos artificiales en los festivales son a veces de clases más altas.

The people who enjoy the fireworks at festivals are sometimes from higher classes.

Esa diferencia es muy importante.

That difference is very important.

The thing is, India does have labor unions in this sector.

There are organizations that have been pushing for better conditions for decades.

And occasionally, after a particularly bad accident, there's a burst of political activity.

But the momentum tends to dissipate once the news cycle moves on.

Es que eso pasa en muchos países.

That happens in many countries.

Después de un accidente grave, los políticos hablan mucho.

After a serious accident, politicians talk a lot.

Pero un mes después, todo vuelve a ser igual.

But a month later, everything goes back to the same.

Los trabajadores siguen en peligro y nadie hace nada diferente.

Workers are still in danger and nobody does anything different.

So here we are, April 2026, thirteen people dead in Thrissur.

And the grim probability, if history is any guide, is that in a year, maybe two, there will be another explosion somewhere in India, another set of casualties, another cycle of brief attention followed by forgetting.

La verdad es que soy pesimista a corto plazo.

The truth is I'm pessimistic in the short term.

Pero a largo plazo, las cosas pueden cambiar.

But in the long term, things can change.

En España tardamos muchos años en mejorar la seguridad en los festivales.

In Spain it took us many years to improve safety at festivals.

No fue rápido, pero cambió.

It wasn't quick, but it changed.

India puede hacer lo mismo.

India can do the same.

I'll hold onto that.

Slow progress is still progress.

And I think the deeper lesson here is that occupational health isn't just a workplace issue.

It connects to poverty, to tradition, to enforcement capacity, to class.

You can't fix one without engaging with all of them.

That's what makes it hard.

That's also what makes it worth paying attention to.

Bueno, y la próxima vez que miramos fuegos artificiales en el cielo, pensemos en las personas que los fabricaron.

Well, and the next time we watch fireworks in the sky, let's think about the people who made them.

Eso es lo mínimo que podemos hacer por ellas.

That's the least we can do for them.