The Strait and the Memory: A Century of Power in the Gulf

Eso dice mucho sobre cómo Irán piensa estratégicamente.

That says a lot about how Iran thinks strategically.

There's a pattern there that I find genuinely fascinating.

Iran absorbs a devastating blow, retreats, regroups, and then ten years later it's back, with a navy rebuilt and a doctrine refined.

The patience is almost geological.

Sí, y eso tiene que ver con la forma en que Irán concibe el conflicto.

Yes, and that has to do with how Iran conceives of conflict.

No busca victorias rápidas ni decisivas.

It doesn't seek quick or decisive victories.

Su estrategia es lo que los expertos llaman «guerra asimétrica»: usar fuerzas irregulares, minas, misiles de precisión, drones, para compensar su inferioridad en armamento convencional.

Its strategy is what experts call 'asymmetric warfare': using irregular forces, mines, precision missiles, drones, to compensate for its inferiority in conventional weapons.

Which is exactly what we saw Wednesday.

You don't take on three Arleigh Burke destroyers expecting to win a conventional naval fight.

You hit them, you create an incident, and then you watch what the political fallout does.

Exactamente.

Exactly.

Pero hay algo más que me parece importante subrayar.

But there's something else I think is important to emphasize.

El Estrecho de Ormuz no es simplemente un canal estratégico para los Estados Unidos e Irán.

The Strait of Hormuz isn't simply a strategic channel for the United States and Iran.

Es el cuello de botella más importante del planeta en términos de energía.

It's the most important energy chokepoint on the planet.

Por él pasa aproximadamente el veinte por ciento del petróleo que se consume en el mundo.

Roughly twenty percent of the world's oil consumption passes through it.

Twenty percent.

And at its narrowest point, it's only about 33 kilometers wide.

The navigable channel is even tighter than that.

I covered a piece once, back in 2007, about the geometry of that place, and you realize how absurdly small a margin separates normal commerce from catastrophe.

Y eso lo sabe Irán perfectamente.

And Iran knows that perfectly.

Uno de los grandes instrumentos de poder que tiene Teherán no es su ejército, sino su capacidad de amenazar ese canal.

One of Tehran's great instruments of power is not its army, but its ability to threaten that channel.

No necesitan cerrarlo de verdad.

They don't actually need to close it.

Solo con la amenaza de cerrarlo, los mercados entran en pánico.

Just with the threat of closing it, markets go into panic.

Let's go back further.

Because the American presence in the Gulf didn't begin in 1987.

It didn't begin in 1979 with the revolution.

It goes back to something that I think most people have completely forgotten.

¿Estás pensando en la retirada británica al este de Suez?

Are you thinking of the British withdrawal east of Suez?

That's exactly it.

January 1968.

Harold Wilson's government announces that Britain will withdraw all its military forces from east of Suez by 1971.

It's the formal end of British imperial reach in the Gulf, East Africa, Southeast Asia.

And it creates an immediate vacuum.

Un vacío que alguien tenía que llenar.

A vacuum that someone had to fill.

Y la administración Nixon tomó una decisión que definiría la política exterior estadounidense durante décadas: apoyar al Sah de Irán como el principal garante de la estabilidad regional.

And the Nixon administration made a decision that would define U.S.

Irán sería el «gendarme del Golfo».

foreign policy for decades: support the Shah of Iran as the primary guarantor of regional stability.

The twin pillars policy.

Iran and Saudi Arabia as the two anchors of Gulf security, underwritten by American arms and American backing.

Nixon and Kissinger essentially handed the Shah a blank check for military hardware.

And he spent it.

Y luego llegó 1979, y todo ese sistema se derrumbó de la noche a la mañana.

And then 1979 arrived, and the entire system collapsed overnight.

El aliado principal se convirtió en el enemigo principal.

The primary ally became the primary enemy.

Las armas que los Estados Unidos habían vendido al Sah pasaron a manos del nuevo régimen islámico.

The weapons the United States had sold to the Shah passed into the hands of the new Islamic regime.

Fue un desastre estratégico monumental.

It was a monumental strategic disaster.

And here's what strikes me about that moment: the hostage crisis, the 444 days, the failed rescue mission, Carter's presidency destroyed by it.

The United States never really recovered its psychological footing in the Gulf after 1979.

Every decision since has had that original trauma running underneath it.

Eso es muy cierto.

That's very true.

Y desde el lado iraní, la perspectiva es completamente diferente.

And from the Iranian side, the perspective is completely different.

Para Irán, los Estados Unidos son el país que apoyó al Sah durante décadas, el país que respaldó a Saddam Hussein cuando usaba armas químicas contra tropas iraníes en los años ochenta, el país que derribó el vuelo 655 de Iran Air en 1988.

For Iran, the United States is the country that backed the Shah for decades, the country that supported Saddam Hussein when he used chemical weapons against Iranian troops in the 1980s, the country that shot down Iran Air Flight 655 in 1988.

The USS Vincennes.

July 1988.

An American warship shot down a civilian Iranian airliner over the Gulf, killing all 290 people on board, because the crew misidentified it as a military aircraft.

And the U.S.

never formally apologized.

Nunca se disculparon.

They never apologized.

Pagaron una indemnización años después, pero nunca admitieron responsabilidad directa.

They paid compensation years later, but never admitted direct responsibility.

Y ese hecho vive en la memoria colectiva iraní de una manera que los americanos, en general, no comprenden.

And that fact lives in Iranian collective memory in a way that Americans, in general, don't understand.

Para los iranís, el USS Vincennes no es historia antigua.

For Iranians, the USS Vincennes isn't ancient history.

Es parte de la narrativa actual.

It's part of the current narrative.

Which is something I've thought about a lot since those days reporting out of the region.

The asymmetry of historical memory is one of the most dangerous things in international relations.

Two countries occupying the same present but carrying completely different pasts.

Completamente de acuerdo.

Completely agree.

Y eso me lleva a la pregunta que me parece más importante: ¿por qué, a pesar de toda esa historia de confrontación, los dos países siempre han evitado la guerra total?

And that brings me to what I think is the most important question: why, despite all that history of confrontation, have the two countries always avoided total war?

Desde 1979, han estado al borde del precipicio varias veces, y siempre han retrocedido.

Since 1979, they've been on the edge of the cliff several times, and they've always pulled back.

Mutual calculation.

Iran knows it can't win a conventional war against the United States.

The U.S.

knows that a full-scale war with Iran would close the Strait and detonate the global economy.

So you get this strange equilibrium of permanent low-level confrontation that neither side actually wants to end completely.

Es lo que algunos analistas llaman una «paz caliente».

It's what some analysts call a 'hot peace.' Not war, not peace.

No es guerra, no es paz.

It's managed tension.

Es una tensión gestionada.

And what happened Wednesday fits that pattern perfectly: real attacks, limited damage, and both sides declaring the ceasefire still stands.

Y lo que ocurrió el miércoles encaja perfectamente en ese patrón: ataques reales, daños limitados, y las dos partes declarando que el alto el fuego sigue vigente.

It's almost a choreography.

Es casi una coreografía.

Choreography.

That's a good word for it.

And yet choreographies go wrong.

Someone miscalculates, or a commander on the ground acts without authorization, and suddenly you're somewhere nobody intended to be.

Exacto.

Exactly.

Mira lo que pasó en 1988 con el USS Samuel B.

Look at what happened in 1988 with the USS Samuel B.

Roberts.

Roberts.

Nadie planificó ese incidente.

Nobody planned that incident.

El barco chocó con una mina y eso desencadenó la mayor operación naval de los Estados Unidos desde la Segunda Guerra Mundial.

The ship hit a mine and that triggered the largest U.S.

Las crisis en el Golfo rara vez empiezan con una decisión deliberada de escalar.

naval operation since World War II.

And that's the thing that keeps me up at night about this current situation.

You've got a ceasefire that's supposedly holding, you've got active strikes on both sides, you've got destroyers being hit, and everyone's calling it de-escalation.

At some point the language and the reality diverge so completely that you lose the ability to understand what's actually happening.

Tienes razón en eso.

You're right about that.

Aunque yo diría que el lenguaje diplomático siempre ha estado disociado de la realidad militar en el Golfo.

Though I'd say diplomatic language has always been disconnected from military reality in the Gulf.

Eso no es nuevo.

That's not new.

Lo que sí es nuevo es la velocidad a la que se difunde la información.

What is new is the speed at which information spreads.

En 1988, la gente tardaba días en saber lo que había pasado en el Estrecho.

In 1988, it took people days to know what had happened in the Strait.

Now it's minutes.

And the problem with minutes is that decision-makers feel pressure to respond before they understand.

The speed of information doesn't necessarily improve the quality of judgment.

Sometimes it just accelerates the mistakes.

Es un argumento interesante, Fletcher.

That's an interesting argument, Fletcher.

Aunque también hay que reconocer que la información rápida puede servir como elemento disuasorio.

Though you also have to acknowledge that fast information can serve as a deterrent.

Si todo el mundo ve inmediatamente lo que está pasando, hay menos espacio para las versiones falsas de los hechos.

If everyone immediately sees what's happening, there's less room for false versions of events.

Al menos en teoría.

At least in theory.

In theory.

But what we actually saw was Trump calling it a love tap while CENTCOM was confirming retaliatory strikes.

Those two messages went out simultaneously.

I'm not sure that's the disuasory clarity you have in mind.

Vale, tienes un punto ahí.

Okay, you have a point there.

La contradicción entre el lenguaje político y la realidad militar es, en este caso, bastante llamativa.

The contradiction between political language and military reality is, in this case, pretty striking.

Dicho esto, creo que lo importante es que Irán ha recibido el mensaje que los Estados Unidos quería enviar: podemos atacar y seguimos controlando el canal.

That said, I think what matters is that Iran received the message the United States wanted to send: we can strike and we still control the channel.

And Iran sent its own message back.

Three Arleigh Burkes transiting a strait they were supposed to control.

That's not nothing.

The whole point of an Arleigh Burke is that it's one of the most capable surface combatants ever built.

Hitting three of them, whatever the damage level, is a statement.

Y eso es exactamente el corazón de la cuestión histórica.

And that is exactly the heart of the historical question.

El Estrecho de Ormuz no es simplemente una ruta marítima.

The Strait of Hormuz isn't simply a shipping route.

Es el lugar donde Irán demuestra que existe como potencia regional, que no puede ser ignorada, que cualquier acuerdo en el Golfo tiene que pasar por Teherán.

It's the place where Iran demonstrates that it exists as a regional power, that it cannot be ignored, that any arrangement in the Gulf has to go through Tehran.

Eso no ha cambiado desde 1979.

That hasn't changed since 1979.

Fifty years of American foreign policy trying to manage that fact, and here we are on a Wednesday morning with three destroyers under fire in the same 33 kilometers of water.

Something about that feels like it deserves more than a love tap as a characterization.

Muy de acuerdo.

Totally agree.

Bueno, oye, hay algo que dijiste antes que me quedé pensando, cuando hablaste de la «paz caliente».

Hey, there's something you said earlier that I've been thinking about, when you talked about the 'hot peace.' You used an English phrase that in Spanish would be said differently, and I think it's worth talking about.

Usaste una frase en inglés que en español se diría de otra manera, y creo que vale la pena hablar de ello.

You said 'Iran can't win a conventional war' and I said 'that hasn't changed since 1979.' That structure in Spanish reminds me of something students find quite difficult.

Dijiste «Irán no puede ganar una guerra convencional» y yo dije «eso no ha cambiado desde 1979».

Esa estructura en español me recuerda algo que a los estudiantes les cuesta bastante.

What structure?

The 'hasn't changed' one?

Sí.

Yes.

En español dije «eso no ha cambiado desde 1979».

In Spanish I said 'that hasn't changed since 1979.' The present perfect with 'desde.' In English you'd say 'it hasn't changed since 1979.' The logic is similar, but the problem arises when English-speaking students want to talk about an action that started in the past and still continues.

El presente perfecto con «desde».

In English you almost always use the present perfect.

En inglés dirías «it hasn't changed since 1979».

In Spanish you also do, but there are contexts where Spanish speakers prefer the simple present.

La lógica es similar, pero el problema surge cuando los estudiantes ingleses quieren hablar de una acción que empezó en el pasado y todavía continúa.

En inglés usas el presente perfecto casi siempre.

En español también, pero hay contextos en que los hispanohablantes prefieren el presente simple.

Give me an example.

Because I've definitely gotten this wrong.

I once said something like 'espero aquí desde una hora' when I meant I'd been waiting for an hour, and Octavio's face told me everything I needed to know.

Eso fue memorable, Fletcher.

That was memorable, Fletcher.

Lo correcto sería «llevo una hora esperando» o «hace una hora que espero».

The correct form would be 'I've been waiting for an hour' in the llevar construction: 'llevo una hora esperando' or 'hace una hora que espero.' With 'desde' you use a time reference point, not a duration.

Con «desde» usarías un punto de referencia temporal, no una duración.

For example: 'since 1979, Iran and the United States have not gotten along.' There 'desde' marks the starting point.

Por ejemplo: «desde 1979, Irán y los Estados Unidos no se han entendido».

But to say how long you've been doing something, in Spanish we use 'llevar' plus the gerund.

Ahí «desde» indica el punto de inicio.

Pero para decir cuánto tiempo llevas haciendo algo, en español usamos «llevar» más el gerundio.

So 'llevo cuarenta años reportando desde zonas de guerra' would be right?

That's 'I've been reporting from war zones for forty years,' basically.

Perfecto.

Perfect.

Eso es exactamente correcto.

That's exactly right.

Y nota que «desde» aparece ahí también, pero con un significado diferente: «desde zonas de guerra» indica lugar, no tiempo.

And note that 'desde' appears there too, but with a different meaning: 'from war zones' indicates place, not time.

Con el tiempo usas «llevar» más gerundio.

With time you use 'llevar' plus gerund.

Es una distinción pequeña pero importante, y es la clase de cosa que separa el español que suena natural del que suena a traducción directa del inglés.

It's a small but important distinction, and it's the kind of thing that separates Spanish that sounds natural from Spanish that sounds like a direct translation from English.

Llevo ocho años intentando aprender español and I'm still getting ambushed by the small things.

Though I'll take 'that was perfect' from you, Octavio.

That doesn't happen often.

No, no pasa con frecuencia.

No, it doesn't happen often.

Disfrútalo mientras dura.

Enjoy it while it lasts.