B1 · Intermediate
14 min
african historyauthoritarianismpostcolonial politicsdemocracy
The Man Who Never Left: Uganda and Forty Years of Museveni
El hombre que nunca se fue: Uganda y cuarenta años de Museveni
Ugandan president Yoweri Museveni was inaugurated for a seventh term. Behind that news is an extraordinary story: from Idi Amin to the present, Uganda reflects the promises and tragedies of postcolonial Africa. Fletcher and Octavio go deep.
El presidente de Uganda, Yoweri Museveni, tomó posesión por séptima vez. Detrás de esa noticia hay una historia extraordinaria: desde Idi Amín hasta el presente, Uganda refleja las promesas y las tragedias del África poscolonial. Fletcher y Octavio van al fondo.
6 essential B1-level terms from this episode, with translations and example sentences in Spanish.
| Spanish | English | Example |
|---|---|---|
| golpe de estado | coup d'état | En 1971, Idi Amín tomó el poder con un golpe de estado. |
| mandato | term (in office) | Museveni tomó posesión por séptima vez para un nuevo mandato. |
| llevar + gerundio | to have been doing something (duration up to now) | Llevo tres años estudiando español y todavía cometo muchos errores. |
| represión | repression | La campaña electoral tuvo mucha violencia y represión. |
| límite | limit | La constitución tenía un límite de dos mandatos para el presidente. |
| desigualdad | inequality | Bobi Wine escribió canciones sobre la desigualdad y la corrupción en Uganda. |
Forty years.
Yoweri Museveni was inaugurated yesterday for his seventh term as president of Uganda, and I keep turning that number over.
Forty years in power.
That's longer than most of our listeners have been alive.
Sí, y lo interesante es que cuando Museveni llegó al poder en 1986, muchos africanos pensaron que era diferente.
Yes, and the interesting thing is that when Museveni came to power in 1986, many Africans thought he was different.
Era un hombre nuevo, un líder diferente.
He was a new man, a different kind of leader.
Pero cuarenta años después, es el símbolo de algo muy distinto.
But forty years later, he's become the symbol of something very different.
That gap, between the promise and the reality, is exactly what I want to dig into today.
Because you can't understand what Museveni has become without understanding what Uganda was before him.
Para entender Uganda, tienes que empezar con la historia colonial.
To understand Uganda, you have to start with colonial history.
Los británicos crearon Uganda como país en 1894, pero juntaron muchos grupos diferentes: los baganda, los acholi, los langi.
The British created Uganda as a country in 1894, but they joined together many different groups: the Baganda, the Acholi, the Langi.
Grupos con historias muy distintas.
Groups with very different histories.
Right, and that's the original sin of a lot of these borders, isn't it.
Lines drawn in Berlin in 1884 by men who had never set foot on the continent.
Uganda gets independence in 1962 and immediately inherits a country that was never designed to be a country.
Exacto.
Exactly.
Y los primeros años de independencia fueron difíciles.
And the first years of independence were difficult.
El primer ministro Milton Obote gobernó, pero había muchos conflictos políticos.
Prime Minister Milton Obote governed, but there were many political conflicts.
En 1971, un militar llamado Idi Amín tomó el poder con un golpe de estado.
In 1971, a military man named Idi Amin seized power in a coup.
And this is where the story gets genuinely dark.
I covered some of the aftermath of that era much later, and the numbers are almost impossible to absorb.
Amin's regime killed somewhere between 100,000 and 500,000 people between 1971 and 1979.
Amín fue terrible.
Amin was terrible.
Expulsó a todos los asiáticos del país, destruyó la economía, y mató a sus enemigos políticos, a periodistas, a jueces.
He expelled all the Asians from the country, destroyed the economy, and killed his political enemies, journalists, judges.
Era un régimen de terror.
It was a reign of terror.
En 1979, Tanzania invadió Uganda y Amín huyó.
In 1979, Tanzania invaded Uganda and Amin fled.
He fled to Saudi Arabia, where he died in 2003, reportedly never expressing any remorse.
But here's what matters for our story: after Amin, Obote came back.
And Obote in his second term turned out to be nearly as brutal.
Sí, el régimen de Obote en los años ochenta fue muy violento, especialmente en la región de Luwero.
Yes, Obote's regime in the eighties was very violent, especially in the Luwero region.
Murieron decenas de miles de personas.
Tens of thousands of people died.
Y fue en ese contexto donde Museveni empezó su guerra.
And it was in that context that Museveni started his war.
The Bush War.
Museveni had 27 fighters when he started.
Twenty-seven.
He built the National Resistance Army from scratch in the forests north of Kampala and fought a five-year guerrilla campaign.
That's not nothing, tactically or morally.
He earned that victory.
Museveni tomó Kampala en enero de 1986.
Museveni took Kampala in January 1986.
Y su discurso ese día fue famoso.
And his speech that day was famous.
Dijo: 'En África, el problema no son las personas.
He said: 'In Africa, the problem is not the people.
El problema son los líderes que no quieren irse.' Era una promesa directa al pueblo.
The problem is the leaders who don't want to leave.' It was a direct promise to the people.
He said that.
He actually said that.
And then he stayed for forty years.
Sí, la ironía es enorme.
Yes, the irony is enormous.
Pero hay que ser justos: los primeros años de Museveni fueron buenos para Uganda.
But to be fair: Museveni's early years were genuinely good for Uganda.
La economía creció, la seguridad mejoró, y Uganda fue uno de los primeros países africanos en combatir el SIDA de forma efectiva.
The economy grew, security improved, and Uganda was one of the first African countries to fight AIDS effectively.
The AIDS response is actually a remarkable chapter.
In the late eighties, Uganda had infection rates of around 30 percent in some urban areas.
Museveni launched a national campaign, talked about it openly when most African leaders were in denial, and the rates dropped dramatically through the nineties.
Exactamente.
Exactly.
Y en los años noventa, muchos economistas y periodistas llamaron a Uganda un 'milagro africano'.
And in the nineties, many economists and journalists called Uganda an 'African miracle'.
La pobreza bajó mucho.
Poverty fell significantly.
Pero también en esa época, Museveni empezó a cambiar.
But also in that era, Museveni began to change.
El poder empezó a cambiarlo.
Power began to change him.
This is a pattern I've watched play out in country after country.
The liberator who can't release power.
Mugabe in Zimbabwe.
Kagame in Rwanda.
There's something about the experience of building a movement from nothing that makes it almost psychologically impossible to hand it over.
Tienes razón.
You're right.
Y en Uganda, el momento clave fue en 2005.
And in Uganda, the key moment was in 2005.
La constitución original decía que el presidente solo podía gobernar por dos mandatos.
The original constitution said a president could only govern for two terms.
En 2005, Museveni eliminó ese límite.
In 2005, Museveni removed that limit.
Con mucho dinero y mucha presión para los parlamentarios.
With a lot of money and a lot of pressure on members of parliament.
Reports at the time said members of parliament were handed cash payments equivalent to about five thousand dollars each to vote yes.
In a country where the average annual income was around three hundred dollars.
That's not persuasion, that's purchase.
Y después, en 2017, hubo otro cambio más importante.
And then in 2017, there was another even more significant change.
La constitución también decía que el presidente no podía tener más de 75 años.
The constitution also said a president could not be older than 75.
Museveni tenía 73 años.
Museveni was 73.
El parlamento eliminó ese límite también.
Parliament removed that limit too.
Para muchos ugandeses, fue un insulto.
For many Ugandans, it was an insult.
And this is where the story gets a new character.
Because by 2017, a young pop star named Robert Kyagulanyi, who went by Bobi Wine, had become the voice of the opposition.
He was in parliament, he was writing songs about inequality and corruption, and he was connecting with young Ugandans in a way that clearly terrified Museveni.
Bobi Wine fue muy valiente.
Bobi Wine was very brave.
En 2018, la policía lo arrestó y lo torturó.
In 2018, the police arrested him and tortured him.
Pero él no paró.
But he didn't stop.
Se presentó como candidato en las elecciones de 2021.
He ran as a candidate in the 2021 elections.
Fue una campaña muy difícil, con mucha violencia y represión.
It was a very difficult campaign, with a lot of violence and repression.
I watched those 2021 elections closely.
The internet was shut down for days.
His campaign team was arrested, beaten, some were killed.
The official result gave Museveni 58 percent of the vote.
Most independent observers considered that number, let's say, implausible.
Y ahora Museveni lleva cuarenta años en el poder.
And now Museveni has been in power for forty years.
Para los jóvenes de Uganda, y el 70 por ciento de la población tiene menos de 30 años, Museveni es el único presidente que conocen.
For Uganda's young people, and 70 percent of the population is under 30, Museveni is the only president they have ever known.
Es el único mundo que existe.
He is the only world that exists.
That demographic fact is staggering when you sit with it.
Imagine growing up, your entire life, with one face on every government building.
One voice on state radio.
It's not just political, it's psychological.
It shapes what people believe is possible.
Y no es solo Uganda.
And it's not just Uganda.
En África oriental, hay una tradición, muy triste, de presidentes que no se van.
In East Africa, there is a tradition, a very sad one, of presidents who don't leave.
Museveni, Paul Kagame en Ruanda, Isaias Afwerki en Eritrea.
Museveni, Paul Kagame in Rwanda, Isaias Afwerki in Eritrea.
Para ellos, el estado y su persona son la misma cosa.
For them, the state and their person are the same thing.
Although, and I'll push back on the framing slightly, Kagame's Rwanda is genuinely complicated.
The country came out of genocide.
The development numbers are real.
The authoritarianism is real too.
They coexist and that makes easy judgment difficult.
Sí, tienes razón, hay diferencias.
Yes, you're right, there are differences.
Pero el problema central es el mismo: cuando un líder elimina los controles del poder, el resultado casi siempre es malo para el pueblo.
But the central problem is the same: when a leader removes the checks on power, the result is almost always bad for the people.
La historia lo demuestra una y otra vez.
History demonstrates this again and again.
And Uganda has a specific historical layer here that's easy to miss from the outside.
The Buganda kingdom, the traditional monarchy at the heart of the country, has its own palace, its own cultural authority, its own relationship with the Ugandan state.
Museveni has managed that tension for four decades.
That's not simple.
Es verdad.
That's true.
Uganda es un país muy complejo.
Uganda is a very complex country.
Los baganda, el grupo más grande, tienen una monarquía antigua y muy respetada.
The Baganda, the largest group, have an ancient and very respected monarchy.
El rey de Buganda, el Kabaka, tiene mucha importancia cultural.
The King of Buganda, the Kabaka, carries enormous cultural weight.
Museveni tuvo que negociar con esa tradición siempre.
Museveni always had to negotiate with that tradition.
What does the international community do with a Museveni?
That's the question I keep coming back to.
He's a Western ally.
He sent troops to Somalia to fight al-Shabaab.
The US, the EU, they've continued working with him even while criticizing the elections.
Y eso es el problema del realismo político, ¿no?
And that is the problem with political realism, isn't it?
Occidente critica la democracia en Uganda con palabras, pero con acciones apoya al régimen.
The West criticizes the lack of democracy in Uganda with words, but with actions supports the regime.
Museveni sabe que es útil para la estabilidad regional, y usa eso muy bien.
Museveni knows he is useful for regional stability, and he uses that very well.
He's been playing that game a long time.
After 9/11, Uganda's cooperation on counterterrorism gave Museveni a new card to play.
Every time Western governments started making noise about elections or press freedom, he could point to the security partnership.
It's a lever and he's never stopped using it.
Y ahora hay otro tema muy importante: la ley contra los homosexuales.
And now there is another very important issue: the anti-gay law.
En 2023, Uganda aprobó una ley muy brutal contra las personas LGBTQ.
In 2023, Uganda passed a very brutal law against LGBTQ people.
Algunos crímenes podían recibir la pena de muerte.
Some crimes could receive the death penalty.
Fue un escándalo internacional.
It was an international scandal.
The World Bank suspended loans over it.
The US imposed visa restrictions.
And Museveni signed it anyway, playing to domestic religious conservatism while accepting the international cost.
It told you something about how secure he felt.
He calculated that the blowback was manageable.
Y probablemente tenía razón.
And he was probably right.
Después de un año, las sanciones eran pequeñas y la relación con Occidente continuó casi normal.
After a year, the sanctions were minor and the relationship with the West continued almost normally.
Cuando hay intereses estratégicos, los valores democráticos son secundarios.
When there are strategic interests, democratic values are secondary.
Eso no es nuevo en la política internacional.
That is nothing new in international politics.
So where does Uganda go from here?
He's 81.
There's no publicly named successor.
His son Muhoozi Kainerugaba is a general and has been publicly positioning himself for years, posting things on social media that would get most officers court-martialed.
There's a dynasty question hanging over all of this.
Muhoozi es un problema serio.
Muhoozi is a serious problem.
Publicó mensajes en Twitter muy agresivos, incluso contra países vecinos.
He posted very aggressive messages on Twitter, even against neighboring countries.
Habló de invadir Kenia, por ejemplo.
He talked about invading Kenya, for example.
Y Museveni no lo castigó de verdad.
And Museveni didn't genuinely punish him.
Eso dice mucho sobre la dinámica del poder dentro del régimen.
That says a lot about the dynamics of power within the regime.
The deeper historical lesson, I think, is about institutions.
Uganda has never really built institutions that are stronger than individuals.
Amin destroyed whatever colonial-era structures existed.
Museveni rebuilt the army, rebuilt some governance, but always made sure everything ran through him personally.
Y eso es el problema de África en general, no solo de Uganda.
And that is the problem in Africa more broadly, not just Uganda.
Las fronteras coloniales, las etnias artificiales, las instituciones débiles.
Colonial borders, artificial ethnicities, weak institutions.
Y después, líderes que llegan con buenas intenciones pero que se quedan cuarenta años.
And then leaders who arrive with good intentions but stay forty years.
Es un ciclo muy difícil de romper.
It is a very difficult cycle to break.
And yet there are examples of it breaking.
Botswana, for years, managed regular peaceful transitions.
Senegal just had one.
The cycle isn't inevitable.
Which is maybe what makes the Museveni story feel not just sad but like a specific kind of waste.
Bueno, el hombre que dijo 'el problema en África son los líderes que no se van' lleva cuarenta años sin irse.
Well, the man who said 'the problem in Africa is leaders who don't leave' has spent forty years not leaving.
La historia tiene mucho sentido del humor, pero no siempre es un humor simpático.
History has a strong sense of humor, but it's not always a kind one.
Octavio, you said something earlier that I want to come back to.
You said Museveni lleva cuarenta años en el poder.
I know what it means, but that word, llevar, used that way, is one that trips me up constantly.
It doesn't translate cleanly into English.
Ah, sí.
Ah, yes.
'Llevar' con tiempo es muy útil.
'Llevar' with time is very useful.
Se usa para decir cuánto tiempo continúa una acción hasta ahora.
It's used to say how long an action has been continuing up to now.
'Museveni lleva cuarenta años en el poder' significa que empezó hace cuarenta años y todavía continúa.
'Museveni lleva cuarenta años en el poder' means he started forty years ago and it's still continuing.
Es diferente a decir 'hace cuarenta años que...'
It's different from saying 'hace cuarenta años que...'
So if I wanted to say I've been learning Spanish for three years, badly, I'd say...
llevo tres años aprendiendo español?
With the gerund at the end?
Exacto, perfecto.
Exactly, perfect.
'Llevo tres años aprendiendo español.' Y el 'mal' no es necesario decirlo, Fletcher, porque ya lo sabemos todos.
'I've been learning Spanish for three years.' And you don't need to say the 'badly', Fletcher, because we all already know that.
Forty years of Museveni, three years of my Spanish.
Both ongoing situations, both causing some suffering.
Llevo tres años aprendiendo español.
I'll take that as a win.