This week, Pakistan commissioned its first Hangor-class submarine, built by China, in a ceremony in Sanya. Fletcher and Octavio dig into what this moment means for the balance of power in the Indian Ocean, modern submarine technology, and the future of Asia.
Esta semana, Pakistán recibió su primer submarino de clase Hangor, construido por China, en una ceremonia en Sanya. Fletcher y Octavio exploran qué significa este momento para el equilibrio de poder en el océano Índico, la tecnología submarina moderna y el futuro de Asia.
8 essential B1-level terms from this episode, with translations and example sentences in Spanish.
| Spanish | English | Example |
|---|---|---|
| sumergido | submerged | El submarino estuvo sumergido durante dos semanas sin subir a la superficie. |
| disuasión | deterrence | La disuasión nuclear es la idea de que tener armas nucleares evita una guerra. |
| estrecho | strait (narrow sea passage) | El Estrecho de Malaca es uno de los pasos marítimos más importantes del mundo. |
| armada | navy | La Armada de Pakistán recibió su primer submarino moderno esta semana. |
| prácticamente | virtually / almost | Estos submarinos son prácticamente invisibles para los sistemas de detección modernos. |
| dependencia | dependence / reliance | La dependencia de Pakistán en la tecnología china creció mucho en los últimos años. |
| propulsión | propulsion | El sistema de propulsión independiente del aire hace al submarino muy silencioso. |
| transferencia tecnológica | technology transfer | La transferencia tecnológica permite a Pakistán aprender a construir sus propios submarinos. |
There was a ceremony last week in Sanya, China, that lasted maybe an hour, involved a lot of flags and white uniforms, and will almost certainly reshape how the Indian Ocean works for the next thirty years.
And almost nobody covered it.
Sí.
Yes.
La Armada de Pakistán recibió su primer submarino de clase Hangor.
The Pakistani Navy received its first Hangor-class submarine.
Lo construyó China.
China built it.
El nombre del submarino es PNS/M Hangor, que en urdu significa 'tiburón'.
The submarine's name is PNS/M Hangor, which in Urdu means 'shark.'
And the name is not accidental.
The original PNS Hangor was the submarine that sank an Indian frigate in 1971, during the Bangladesh war.
It was the first submarine kill in Asia since World War II.
They know exactly what they're doing with that name.
Exactamente.
Exactly.
Y Pakistán no recibió solo un submarino.
And Pakistan didn't receive just one submarine.
Va a recibir ocho en total.
It's going to receive eight in total.
Los primeros cuatro los construyó China, en Sanya.
China built the first four, in Sanya.
Los otros cuatro los van a construir en Pakistán, con tecnología china.
The other four will be built in Pakistan, with Chinese technology.
Eight submarines.
That is not a modest purchase.
That is a fleet.
For context, the entire Royal Navy currently operates around ten attack submarines.
This is Pakistan announcing something with real strategic weight.
Y la tecnología es muy importante.
And the technology is very important.
Estos submarinos tienen un sistema que se llama AIP, propulsión independiente del aire.
These submarines have a system called AIP, air-independent propulsion.
No necesitan subir a la superficie para usar los motores.
They don't need to surface to run their engines.
Son muy silenciosos.
They are very quiet.
That silence point is huge.
Traditional diesel-electric submarines have to come up and run their diesel engines to recharge batteries, and when they do that, they are loud and detectable.
AIP submarines can stay submerged for weeks at a time, virtually invisible to sonar.
Y esto es un problema enorme para India.
And this is a huge problem for India.
India tiene una armada muy grande y muy moderna.
India has a very large and very modern navy.
Pero detectar estos submarinos en el océano Índico va a ser muy difícil.
But detecting these submarines in the Indian Ocean is going to be very difficult.
I spent a week in Delhi in 2009, writing about India's naval expansion, and even then the strategists I talked to were fixated on one thing: the underwater dimension.
They called it the 'silent service problem.' And now that problem just got eight times larger.
El océano Índico es muy importante para toda la economía del mundo.
The Indian Ocean is very important for the whole world economy.
Por allí pasan barcos con petróleo, con gas, con productos de todo tipo.
Ships pass through there carrying oil, gas, all kinds of goods.
Si alguien controla ese océano bajo el agua, controla mucho poder.
If someone controls that ocean underwater, they control a great deal of power.
Something like eighty percent of global oil trade passes through the Indian Ocean, and specifically through two chokepoints: the Strait of Malacca in the east and the Strait of Hormuz in the west.
You put submarines capable of threatening shipping in those lanes, and suddenly you have leverage over the entire global economy.
Y aquí hay que hablar de China.
And here we need to talk about China.
China le vendió estos submarinos a Pakistán.
China sold these submarines to Pakistan.
Pero China también necesita esas rutas marítimas para importar petróleo.
But China also needs those maritime routes to import oil.
Entonces, ¿por qué ayuda a Pakistán a tener control en esa zona?
So why does it help Pakistan gain control in that area?
That is the right question, and the answer is uncomfortable if you are in Washington or New Delhi.
China's calculation is not purely commercial.
Pakistan with a powerful submarine fleet complicates India's strategic planning enormously, which is exactly what Beijing wants.
India tied down worrying about its western flank is India not focused on the South China Sea.
Es como un juego de ajedrez muy largo.
It's like a very long chess game.
China mueve una pieza en el océano Índico, y al mismo tiempo tiene más libertad en el océano Pacífico.
China moves a piece in the Indian Ocean, and at the same time has more freedom in the Pacific.
Y Pakistán recibe submarinos modernos.
And Pakistan gets modern submarines.
Los dos ganan algo.
Both gain something.
The Cold War parallel that keeps pushing into my mind is the Soviet Union supplying Egypt and Syria before 1973.
The Soviets were not trying to control the Middle East directly.
They were trying to keep the Americans busy.
This feels structurally similar.
Sí, la comparación es buena.
Yes, the comparison is good.
Pero hay una diferencia importante: Pakistán e India tienen armas nucleares.
But there is an important difference: Pakistan and India have nuclear weapons.
Antes, en 1973, Egipto y la Unión Soviética no tenían ese problema entre ellos directamente.
Before, in 1973, Egypt and the Soviet Union didn't have that problem directly between them.
And there is the thing that keeps me up at night about this story.
When you put nuclear-armed nations and submarine fleets in the same sentence, you are in a very different risk category.
The question that nobody wants to answer publicly is whether these Hangor-class submarines will eventually carry nuclear-tipped cruise missiles.
Pakistán no confirmó nada sobre armas nucleares en estos submarinos.
Pakistan confirmed nothing about nuclear weapons on these submarines.
Pero los expertos militares dijeron que el diseño de los submarinos permite esa posibilidad en el futuro.
But military experts said the submarine design allows for that possibility in the future.
Es técnicamente posible.
It is technically feasible.
A sea-based nuclear deterrent is the most destabilizing thing a country can add to its arsenal, and I mean that in a very specific technical sense.
Land-based missiles can be located, monitored, and in theory targeted in a crisis.
A submarine carrying nuclear weapons is invisible.
It changes the entire calculus of deterrence.
India ya tiene un submarino nuclear.
India already has a nuclear submarine.
Se llama el INS Arihant.
It's called the INS Arihant.
Lo construyeron los indios con ayuda de Rusia.
The Indians built it with Russian help.
Y ahora Pakistán quiere tener la misma capacidad.
And now Pakistan wants to have the same capability.
Es una carrera.
It is a race.
The INS Arihant story is remarkable on its own.
India spent decades building that submarine largely in secret, under a program called the Advanced Technology Vessel.
They tested it for years.
It became operational in 2016.
And the moment it did, Pakistan's strategic planners started losing sleep.
Y entonces Pakistán buscó a China.
And then Pakistan turned to China.
Porque China también quería debilitar a India.
Because China also wanted to weaken India.
El acuerdo de los ocho submarinos empezó en 2015, poco después.
The deal for the eight submarines started in 2015, shortly after.
No fue una coincidencia.
It was not a coincidence.
The timing fits.
And the price tag was around five billion dollars, which is enormous for Pakistan's defense budget.
That signals how seriously Islamabad takes this.
You don't spend five billion dollars on a contingency plan.
Cinco mil millones de dólares.
Five billion dollars.
Y China le dio a Pakistán condiciones de crédito muy buenas para pagar.
And China gave Pakistan very favorable credit terms to pay.
Algunos analistas dijeron que fue casi un regalo.
Some analysts said it was almost a gift.
China quería que Pakistán tuviera estos submarinos.
China wanted Pakistan to have these submarines.
Which tells you something about what China considers a strategic investment versus a commercial transaction.
And it raises a question I kept asking people in Asia during my reporting years: at what point does Pakistan stop being China's partner and start being China's client?
Es una pregunta muy buena.
That is a very good question.
Y muchos pakistaníes también la hacen.
And many Pakistanis ask it too.
La relación con China es importante para Pakistán, pero también crea una dependencia muy grande.
The relationship with China is important for Pakistan, but it also creates a very large dependency.
Antes, Pakistán dependía de los Estados Unidos.
Before, Pakistan depended on the United States.
Ahora depende de China.
Now it depends on China.
That shift is one of the most significant geopolitical pivots of the last fifteen years and it happened gradually, almost without anyone declaring it.
Pakistan was a cornerstone of US strategy in the region for decades.
After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, after 9/11.
And then, slowly, that relationship curdled.
Y ahora los Estados Unidos tienen una relación muy difícil con Pakistán.
And now the United States has a very difficult relationship with Pakistan.
La ceremonia de los submarinos fue en China, no en Pakistán.
The submarine ceremony was in China, not in Pakistan.
Y los Estados Unidos no dijeron casi nada.
And the United States said almost nothing.
Eso es muy significativo.
That is very significant.
The silence from Washington was deafening.
And I think part of that silence is because the US doesn't have a clean answer.
You can't sanction Pakistan the way you might sanction an adversary.
You can't fully embrace them either.
So you say nothing and hope the story doesn't get too big.
Y la ceremonia fue en Sanya, que es también la base principal de la Armada china en el mar del sur de China.
And the ceremony was in Sanya, which is also the main base of the Chinese Navy in the South China Sea.
No fue en un puerto normal.
It wasn't an ordinary port.
Fue un mensaje muy claro sobre quién tiene el control de la tecnología.
It was a very clear message about who controls the technology.
Sanya is worth pausing on.
That base houses China's most advanced nuclear submarines, including the Jin-class.
Commissioning the Hangor there is almost theatrical in its symbolism.
China is saying: look what we built, look where we built it, look who we gave it to.
Y China mejoró mucho su tecnología de submarinos en los últimos veinte años.
And China improved its submarine technology a great deal in the last twenty years.
En los años noventa, los submarinos chinos eran muy viejos y muy ruidosos.
In the nineties, Chinese submarines were very old and very noisy.
Ahora son modernos y muy difíciles de detectar.
Now they are modern and very difficult to detect.
China learned, partly by buying Russian submarines and reverse-engineering them, partly through sheer investment.
They went from operating a fleet that the US Navy basically dismissed in the 1990s to operating one of the most capable submarine fleets in the world.
In under three decades.
That is a remarkable industrial and scientific achievement, whatever you think of the geopolitics.
Y ahora China exporta esa tecnología.
And now China exports that technology.
Le vendió submarinos a Pakistán.
It sold submarines to Pakistan.
También le vendió a Bangladesh y a Tailandia.
It also sold to Bangladesh and Thailand.
China quiere ser el gran proveedor de tecnología militar en Asia.
China wants to be the great provider of military technology in Asia.
Es un negocio, pero también es una estrategia.
It is a business, but it is also a strategy.
That export strategy is one of the less-discussed dimensions of China's rise.
We talk a lot about Belt and Road, about trade, about technology.
We talk less about China becoming a tier-one arms exporter.
But that is what is happening, and submarines are at the top of that portfolio now.
Para India, esta semana fue una mala semana.
For India, this was a bad week.
India tiene que responder.
India has to respond.
Probablemente va a comprar más submarinos también, o va a construir más.
It will probably buy more submarines too, or build more.
La armada india ya anunció planes para tener veinticuatro submarinos en el futuro.
The Indian Navy already announced plans to have twenty-four submarines in the future.
Twenty-four.
And the thing about submarine programs is the timeline.
You don't build twenty-four submarines in five years.
You are talking about a fifteen to twenty-year industrial commitment.
These decisions being made right now will shape what the Indian Ocean looks like in 2045.
Y hay otro elemento importante: los submarinos necesitan entrenamiento.
And there is another important element: submarines require training.
La tecnología es difícil.
The technology is difficult.
Pakistán necesita oficiales muy bien preparados para usar estos submarinos correctamente.
Pakistan needs very well-prepared officers to use these submarines correctly.
China también va a ayudar con el entrenamiento.
China will also help with the training.
Training is where the relationship gets really close, and really opaque.
When Chinese instructors are training Pakistani submarine officers for extended periods, the intelligence sharing that goes with that is significant.
You are not just teaching someone how to operate a machine.
You are integrating two militaries at a very deep level.
Sí.
Yes.
Y para los próximos años, va a ser muy interesante ver qué pasa.
And for the coming years, it will be very interesting to see what happens.
Cuatro submarinos más van a llegar después de estos primeros.
Four more submarines will arrive after these first ones.
Y los cuatro últimos los van a construir en Pakistán.
And the last four will be built in Pakistan.
Eso significa que Pakistán aprende a construir estos submarinos también.
That means Pakistan also learns to build these submarines.
That technology transfer element is enormous.
A country that can build its own submarines is in a completely different category from a country that can only buy them.
Pakistan is being walked up the ladder of submarine industrial capability, rung by rung, deliberately.
Twenty years from now, they may not need China for this at all.
Oye, Fletcher.
Hey, Fletcher.
Antes dijiste que estos submarinos son 'prácticamente invisibles.' Quiero hablar de esa palabra un momento.
Earlier you said these submarines are 'practically invisible.' I want to talk about that word for a moment.
Dijiste 'prácticamente.' En español tenemos dos palabras que suenan muy similares: 'prácticamente' y 'en la práctica.' No son exactamente lo mismo.
You said 'practically.' In Spanish we have two phrases that sound very similar: 'prácticamente' and 'en la práctica.' They are not exactly the same.
Oh, I heard you use both at different points and I was going to ask about that.
What's the actual difference?
Because in English 'practically' and 'in practice' can sometimes mean the same thing, but I suspect Spanish is more precise about it.
'Prácticamente' significa 'casi' o 'casi totalmente.' Por ejemplo: 'prácticamente invisible' quiere decir 'casi invisible, pero no completamente.' 'En la práctica' significa 'en la realidad, cuando lo usas en la vida real.' Por ejemplo: 'en la práctica, detectar estos submarinos es muy difícil.' Son casi sinónimos, pero no completamente.
'Prácticamente' means 'almost' or 'nearly.' For example: 'prácticamente invisible' means 'almost invisible, but not completely.' 'En la práctica' means 'in reality, when you use it in real life.' For example: 'in practice, detecting these submarines is very difficult.' They are almost synonyms, but not completely.
So 'prácticamente' is about degree, like 'nearly' or 'virtually,' while 'en la práctica' is about the gap between theory and reality.
English actually makes the same distinction, we just do it lazily.
We use 'practically' for both and rely on context to sort it out.
Sí, eso es muy típico del inglés.
Yes, that is very typical of English.
En español, si confundes esas dos frases, la gente te entiende, pero suena un poco raro.
In Spanish, if you mix up those two phrases, people understand you, but it sounds a little odd.
Como cuando tú dices que estás 'muy embarazado' en vez de 'muy avergonzado.'
Like when you say you are 'very pregnant' instead of 'very embarrassed.'
You were never going to let an entire episode go by without bringing that up, were you.
Never.
Not once in our lives.