The Broken Truce: When a Ceasefire Is Not Peace

Entonces volvamos a la pregunta que hiciste al principio: ¿qué significa una violación del alto el fuego?

So let's return to the question you asked at the start: what does a ceasefire violation mean?

Históricamente, hay tres posibilidades.

Historically, there are three possibilities.

Una: es una provocación deliberada para ver cómo responde el otro lado.

One: it's a deliberate provocation to test how the other side responds.

Dos: es un error o una decisión local que los líderes no controlaron.

Two: it's a mistake or a local decision the leaders didn't control.

Tres: es una señal de que el acuerdo ya no existe.

Three: it's a signal that the agreement no longer exists.

Three categories.

And the terrifying part is that from the outside, all three can look identical on the first day.

Completamente.

Completely.

Y los historiadores debaten esto mucho sobre la Segunda Guerra Mundial, sobre la Guerra de Corea, sobre el conflicto Israel-Palestina.

And historians debate this a great deal about World War Two, the Korean War, the Israel-Palestine conflict.

A veces pasaron años antes de saber cuál de las tres posibilidades era la correcta.

Sometimes it took years before anyone knew which of the three possibilities was correct.

There's a famous case from the Korean War armistice in 1953, where both sides accused each other of violations within hours of signing.

The ink was literally not dry.

Y Corea es un ejemplo perfecto porque ese armisticio todavía existe.

And Korea is a perfect example because that armistice still exists.

Técnicamente, la guerra nunca terminó.

Technically, the war never ended.

Después de setenta años, los dos países todavía están en un estado de guerra suspendida.

After seventy years, the two countries are still in a state of suspended war.

¿Eso es la paz?

Is that peace?

No sé.

I don't know.

It's what the diplomats call a 'frozen conflict.' And the Gulf right now has all the hallmarks of one in the making.

Sí.

Yes.

Y hay otro factor importante: Turquía.

And there's another important factor: Turkey.

El ministro de Exteriores turco, Hakan Fidan, habló por teléfono con el ministro iraní Abbas Araghchi para revisar el estado de las negociaciones.

Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan spoke by phone with Iranian Minister Abbas Araghchi to review the state of negotiations.

Turquía está tratando de ser el mediador.

Turkey is trying to be the mediator.

Turkey as mediator.

That's not a new role for Ankara.

They brokered the Black Sea grain deal in 2022, they've got working relationships with both Tehran and Washington.

But it also means Erdogan gets to present himself as the man who ended a war.

There's a domestic political calculation in there too.

Claro.

Of course.

Y eso es algo que la gente a veces olvida sobre la diplomacia: los mediadores también tienen intereses propios.

And that's something people sometimes forget about diplomacy: mediators also have their own interests.

No son árbitros neutrales.

They're not neutral arbiters.

Turquía quiere influencia en la región, quiere mostrar que puede hacer cosas que la Unión Europea no puede.

Turkey wants influence in the region, wants to show it can do things the European Union cannot.

I interviewed Fidan once, back when he was head of Turkish intelligence.

Sharp, careful, completely aware of every word he was saying.

The kind of diplomat who never answers the question you asked, but answers it in a way that makes you think you got what you came for.

Eso es un elogio muy específico para un político.

That's a very specific compliment for a politician.

Pero sí, Fidan es muy hábil.

But yes, Fidan is very skilled.

Y Turquía tiene algo que otros mediadores no tienen: relaciones comerciales con Irán que sobrevivieron a las sanciones americanas durante años.

And Turkey has something other mediators don't: commercial relations with Iran that survived American sanctions for years.

Which cuts both ways.

Iran trusts Turkey because Turkey kept trading with them.

But Washington trusts Turkey less for exactly the same reason.

Exactamente.

Exactly.

Es la paradoja del mediador: para ser útil, tienes que tener confianza de los dos lados.

It's the mediator's paradox: to be useful, you need the trust of both sides.

Pero si los dos lados confían en ti completamente, probablemente significa que los dos lados creen que eres su aliado.

But if both sides trust you completely, it probably means both sides believe you're their ally.

Y eso no puede ser verdad al mismo tiempo.

And that can't be true at the same time.

That's well put, actually.

The best mediators are trusted by both sides and fully trusted by neither.

Henry Kissinger understood this.

He was essentially operating the same principle in 1973 between Egypt and Israel.

Sí, y hay otra cosa importante en este momento: las conversaciones en Islamabad.

Yes, and there's another important thing right now: the Islamabad talks.

El Wall Street Journal dice que Irán y Estados Unidos pueden reunirse la semana que viene.

The Wall Street Journal says Iran and the United States may meet next week.

Pero después de estos ataques, ¿los dos lados todavía van a sentarse en la misma mesa?

But after these attacks, will both sides still sit at the same table?

This is actually where I'd push back on the framing a little.

Historically, military incidents during ceasefire negotiations don't always kill the talks.

Sometimes they accelerate them.

Both sides suddenly have a reason to move faster before things spiral.

Tienes razón, y hay un ejemplo muy claro: las negociaciones de paz de Vietnam en 1972.

You're right, and there's a very clear example: the Vietnam peace negotiations in 1972.

Nixon ordenó los bombardeos de diciembre sobre Hanói, el famoso 'Linebacker II', y después de eso, las dos partes firmaron el acuerdo de París en enero.

Nixon ordered the December bombings over Hanoi, the famous 'Linebacker II', and after that, both parties signed the Paris Agreement in January.

Los historiadores todavía debaten si los bombardeos ayudaron o no.

Historians still debate whether the bombings helped or not.

I covered the thirtieth anniversary of the Paris Accords.

And the Vietnamese historians I spoke to were very clear: what ended the war wasn't the bombing.

It was exhaustion.

Both sides simply ran out of something, whether that was men or money or political will.

El agotamiento.

Exhaustion.

Sí.

Yes.

Y creo que eso es lo que pasa también ahora con Irán y Estados Unidos.

And I think that's what's happening now with Iran and the United States too.

Los dos países tienen razones económicas muy fuertes para parar.

Both countries have very strong economic reasons to stop.

Las sanciones, el precio del petróleo, la presión interna.

The sanctions, the oil price, the domestic pressure.

A veces la mejor razón para la paz es simplemente que la guerra es muy cara.

Sometimes the best reason for peace is simply that the war is too expensive.

The economic argument for peace is often more durable than the moral argument.

Which is cynical, but history seems to back it up.

Completamente cínico.

Completely cynical.

Y completamente verdad.

And completely true.

Mira el caso de los altos el fuego en Bosnia en 1995.

Look at the Bosnian ceasefires in 1995.

El Acuerdo de Dayton llegó después de que la economía yugoslava ya estaba destruida y todos los lados necesitaban dinero del exterior.

The Dayton Agreement came after the Yugoslav economy was already destroyed and all sides needed outside money.

I was in Sarajevo twice during that period.

The second time, a few months after Dayton.

And there was this peculiar mood in the city, not joy, not relief exactly, more like people cautiously testing whether reality had actually changed.

The buildings were still destroyed.

People were still watching the streets from old habits.

Ese es el problema psicológico de los altos el fuego.

That's the psychological problem with ceasefires.

La mente tarda más en aceptar la paz que los políticos en firmarla.

The mind takes longer to accept peace than politicians take to sign it.

Y mientras tanto, cualquier incidente puede reiniciar el ciclo de violencia.

And in the meantime, any incident can restart the cycle of violence.

So where does that leave us with the Gulf?

Iran is still firing at the UAE, the U.S.

is still hitting Iranian tankers, and somewhere in Islamabad next week, diplomats might sit down and try to build a ladder out of this hole.

It's a lot to hold in your head at once.

Y creo que la clave está en Pakistán.

And I think the key is Pakistan.

Islamabad es un lugar muy simbólico para estas conversaciones.

Islamabad is a very symbolic place for these talks.

Pakistán es un país musulmán, tiene relaciones con Irán, y al mismo tiempo recibe ayuda militar de Estados Unidos.

Pakistan is a Muslim country, has relations with Iran, and at the same time receives military aid from the United States.

Si las dos partes aceptaron esa ciudad como lugar de reunión, ya es una señal de que las dos partes quieren seguir hablando.

If both parties accepted that city as the meeting place, it's already a signal that both want to keep talking.

The choice of venue always means something.

Neutral ground says something about the temperature of the relationship.

The fact that both sides could agree on Islamabad, in the middle of this, is genuinely notable.

Oye, Fletcher, una cosa que dijiste antes: 'una pausa negociada.' Esa expresión me gustó, pero en español diríamos algo diferente.

Hey, Fletcher, something you said earlier: 'a negotiated pause.' I liked that phrase, but in Spanish we'd say something different.

Diríamos 'una tregua.' No es exactamente lo mismo que 'alto el fuego.'

We'd say 'una tregua.' It's not exactly the same as 'alto el fuego.'

Okay, wait.

'Alto el fuego' is literally 'stop the fire,' which I can figure out.

But 'tregua,' what's the difference?

Is it just a synonym or is there a real distinction in how Spanish speakers use them?

'Alto el fuego' es técnico, militar.

'Alto el fuego' is technical, military.

Describe el momento en que los dos lados dejan de disparar.

It describes the moment when both sides stop shooting.

'Tregua' es más político, más informal.

'Tregua' is more political, more informal.

Una 'tregua' puede existir incluso sin un acuerdo formal.

A 'tregua' can exist even without a formal agreement.

Por ejemplo, puedes decir 'hubo una tregua entre los dos políticos durante la campaña', y eso no tiene nada que ver con armas.

For example, you can say 'there was a truce between the two politicians during the campaign,' and that has nothing to do with weapons.

So 'tregua' is the broader concept, and 'alto el fuego' is the specific military act.

Like the difference in English between 'truce' and 'ceasefire.' A truce can be informal, even unspoken.

A ceasefire is a formal declaration.

Exactamente.

Exactly.

Y la palabra 'tregua' viene del alemán antiguo, del gótico 'triggwa', que significa 'confianza' o 'fidelidad.' Es la misma raíz que la palabra inglesa 'true.' Entonces una tregua, en su origen, era un acuerdo basado en la confianza entre los dos lados.

And the word 'tregua' comes from Old Germanic, from Gothic 'triggwa', meaning 'trust' or 'fidelity.' It's the same root as the English word 'true.' So a truce, at its origin, was an agreement based on trust between both sides.

Lo cual, mirando el Golfo de Omán hoy, es bastante irónico.

Which, looking at the Gulf of Oman today, is pretty ironic.

A truce built on trust.

And here we are watching two navies shoot at each other inside one.

The word has aged better than the concept.