This week, two senior Russian politicians visited Pyongyang to inaugurate a memorial to North Korean soldiers killed in Ukraine and sign a new defense cooperation agreement running until 2031. Fletcher and Octavio explore what technology is being exchanged, what it means for global security, and why this alliance is more dangerous than it looks.
Esta semana, dos políticos rusos visitaron Pyongyang para inaugurar un memorial a los soldados norcoreanos muertos en Ucrania y firmar un nuevo acuerdo de cooperación militar hasta 2031. Fletcher y Octavio exploran qué tecnología se está intercambiando, qué significa para la seguridad global, y por qué esta alianza es más peligrosa de lo que parece.
5 essential B1-level terms from this episode, with translations and example sentences in Spanish.
| Spanish | English | Example |
|---|---|---|
| intercambio | exchange (mutual trade of things, formal or informal) | El acuerdo incluye un intercambio de tecnología militar entre los dos países. |
| acuerdo | agreement, deal | Los dos países firmaron un acuerdo de cooperación que dura hasta 2031. |
| capacidad | capability, capacity | Corea del Norte quiere mejorar su capacidad militar con ayuda rusa. |
| reconocimiento | reconnaissance; also: recognition, acknowledgment | El satélite de reconocimiento puede fotografiar bases militares desde el espacio. |
| proliferación | proliferation (spread of weapons or technology) | Los países occidentales están muy preocupados por la proliferación de armas nucleares. |
Here's a thing I keep turning over in my head.
Two senior Russian politicians flew to Pyongyang this weekend, stood at a brand-new memorial to North Korean soldiers killed fighting in Ukraine, and then signed a defense cooperation agreement that runs until 2031.
That's five more years.
Five years of whatever this relationship is becoming.
Sí, y la parte más importante para mí no es el memorial, aunque es muy simbólico.
Yes, and the most important part for me isn't the memorial, even though it's very symbolic.
Es el intercambio que hay detrás del acuerdo.
It's the exchange behind the agreement.
Corea del Norte da soldados y munición a Rusia.
North Korea gives soldiers and ammunition to Russia.
Y Rusia da tecnología militar a Corea del Norte.
And Russia gives military technology to North Korea.
Es una relación muy práctica.
It's a very practical relationship.
And that's the part that doesn't get enough attention, right?
Everyone talks about the troops, the artillery shells, the North Korean soldiers fighting and dying in Kursk Oblast.
But the technology flowing the other direction, from Moscow to Pyongyang, that's the story with the longer tail.
Exactamente.
Exactly.
Según los analistas y los servicios de inteligencia occidentales, Rusia ya ayudó a Corea del Norte con tecnología de satélites militares.
According to analysts and Western intelligence services, Russia already helped North Korea with military satellite technology.
El satélite 'Malligyong-1' de 2023, muchos expertos dicen que Rusia contribuyó con partes importantes de la tecnología.
The 'Malligyong-1' satellite from 2023, many experts say Russia contributed important parts of the technology.
Walk me through what that satellite actually does.
Because I think people hear 'military satellite' and think of spy movies, when the real implications are maybe more unsettling than that.
Es un satélite de reconocimiento.
It's a reconnaissance satellite.
Puede tomar fotografías de bases militares, de barcos, de movimientos de tropas.
It can take photographs of military bases, of ships, of troop movements.
Antes, Corea del Norte no tenía esta capacidad.
Before, North Korea didn't have this capability.
Tenía misiles, tenía bombas nucleares, pero no podía ver bien el territorio del enemigo desde el espacio.
It had missiles, it had nuclear bombs, but it couldn't see the enemy's territory well from space.
So what they had before was essentially a blind archer.
Enormous destructive power, no ability to precisely target it.
And now they can see.
Eso es una descripción perfecta.
That's a perfect description.
Y hay más.
And there's more.
Corea del Norte también necesita ayuda con la tecnología de reentrada atmosférica para sus misiles balísticos intercontinentales.
North Korea also needs help with atmospheric reentry technology for its intercontinental ballistic missiles.
Es una de las partes más difíciles de construir un misil nuclear real.
It's one of the hardest parts of building a real nuclear missile.
Cuando un misil vuelve a la atmósfera, el calor es enorme, y si la tecnología no es buena, el misil se destruye antes de llegar.
When a missile re-enters the atmosphere, the heat is enormous, and if the technology isn't good, the missile destroys itself before arriving.
I spent time in Seoul in 2009, reporting on nuclear talks that went nowhere, and the American and South Korean officials I talked to then were already worried about this exact gap in North Korea's capabilities.
Reentry technology was the missing piece.
If Russia fills that piece, the calculus for the entire Korean peninsula changes.
Y no olvidemos la tecnología de submarinos nucleares.
And let's not forget nuclear submarine technology.
En 2023, Kim Jong-un visitó un submarino nuclear ruso.
In 2023, Kim Jong-un visited a Russian nuclear submarine.
Fue una visita muy inusual.
It was a very unusual visit.
Corea del Norte quiere construir submarinos con capacidad nuclear.
North Korea wants to build submarines with nuclear capability.
Con un submarino, puedes lanzar misiles desde el océano, y es mucho más difícil detectarlos.
With a submarine, you can launch missiles from the ocean, and they're much harder to detect.
That's the second-strike capability problem.
The thing that makes deterrence actually work isn't just having a nuclear weapon.
It's being able to guarantee you can still fire back after absorbing a first strike.
Land-based missiles can be preemptively destroyed.
Submarines can't.
It's what kept the Cold War from going hot.
Sí, y por eso los países occidentales están muy nerviosos con este acuerdo.
Yes, and that's why Western countries are very nervous about this agreement.
No es solo la guerra en Ucrania.
It's not just the war in Ukraine.
Es lo que Corea del Norte va a tener dentro de cinco o diez años gracias a este intercambio tecnológico.
It's what North Korea is going to have in five or ten years thanks to this technological exchange.
Let's pull back for a second, because I think there's a history here that's worth understanding.
North Korea's weapons program didn't come from nowhere.
Where does it actually start?
La historia es muy interesante.
The history is very interesting.
Después de la Guerra de Corea, en los años cincuenta, la Unión Soviética y China ayudaron a Corea del Norte a construir su ejército.
After the Korean War, in the 1950s, the Soviet Union and China helped North Korea build its army.
Pero Kim Il-sung, el abuelo del dictador actual, quería independencia.
But Kim Il-sung, the grandfather of the current dictator, wanted independence.
Desarrolló una filosofía que se llama 'Juche': la idea de que Corea del Norte debe depender solo de sí misma.
He developed a philosophy called 'Juche': the idea that North Korea must depend only on itself.
Juche.
Self-reliance as ideology.
The paradox being, of course, that North Korea has never actually been self-reliant.
They've always needed outside support, whether it's Soviet grain in the 1970s or Chinese oil today.
But the ideology gave the program a kind of nationalist engine.
Exacto.
Exactly.
Y cuando la Unión Soviética terminó en 1991, Corea del Norte perdió mucho apoyo económico y técnico.
And when the Soviet Union ended in 1991, North Korea lost a lot of economic and technical support.
Hubo una gran hambre en los años noventa.
There was a great famine in the 1990s.
Pero el programa nuclear continuó, porque para el régimen, las armas nucleares son la garantía de su supervivencia.
But the nuclear program continued, because for the regime, nuclear weapons are the guarantee of its survival.
Sin bombas, no existe el régimen.
Without bombs, the regime doesn't exist.
And they've watched what happened to regimes that gave up their programs.
Gaddafi gave up his nuclear ambitions in 2003, negotiated with the West, got sanctions relief.
Eight years later, NATO planes were circling Tripoli.
I'm not saying the lesson is right, but I understand completely why Pyongyang drew it.
Sí, y también Irak.
Yes, and also Iraq.
Saddam Hussein no tenía armas de destrucción masiva cuando lo invadieron.
Saddam Hussein didn't have weapons of mass destruction when they invaded him.
Corea del Norte vio estos ejemplos y decidió: nosotros sí vamos a tener la bomba, y nadie nos va a invadir.
North Korea saw these examples and decided: we are going to have the bomb, and nobody is going to invade us.
Es una lógica terrible, pero es una lógica.
It's a terrible logic, but it is a logic.
Okay, so bring us back to the current exchange.
Because what North Korea is giving Russia isn't nothing.
We're talking about an enormous contribution to Russia's war effort in Ukraine.
What are the actual numbers?
Los estimados de los servicios de inteligencia de Corea del Sur y de la OTAN dicen que Corea del Norte envió más de un millón de proyectiles de artillería a Rusia.
The estimates from South Korean and NATO intelligence services say North Korea sent more than one million artillery shells to Russia.
También enviaron misiles balísticos de corto alcance.
They also sent short-range ballistic missiles.
Y enviaron tropas, quizás diez mil o más soldados, que lucharon en la región de Kursk.
And they sent troops, perhaps ten thousand or more soldiers, who fought in the Kursk region.
One million shells.
That is not a footnote.
Russia's own domestic production was struggling to keep pace with the consumption rate on the front.
North Korea essentially became Russia's arsenal, and in exchange, Russia is offering something North Korea could never develop quickly on its own, the advanced end of the technology curve.
Y para los soldados norcoreanos que murieron en Ucrania, el memorial en Pyongyang es una señal muy importante.
And for the North Korean soldiers who died in Ukraine, the memorial in Pyongyang is a very important signal.
Kim Jong-un quiere mostrar que sus soldados son héroes.
Kim Jong-un wants to show that his soldiers are heroes.
Pero también es un mensaje para Rusia: pagamos un precio muy alto.
But it's also a message to Russia: we paid a very high price.
Ahora ustedes nos deben más tecnología.
Now you owe us more technology.
That's a grim accounting.
Though I'd note that the families of those soldiers almost certainly have no idea their sons died in a war in eastern Europe.
The North Korean state has barely acknowledged their involvement publicly.
Correcto.
Correct.
El régimen controla todo.
The regime controls everything.
La información, las noticias, la historia.
Information, news, history.
Pero el memorial existe.
But the memorial exists.
Y en la política interna de Corea del Norte, ese memorial tiene un mensaje: el ejército de Kim Jong-un lucha y gana junto a los rusos.
And in North Korea's internal politics, that memorial has a message: Kim Jong-un's army fights and wins alongside the Russians.
Es propaganda muy efectiva.
It's very effective propaganda.
What worries me more right now, honestly, is the proliferation angle.
Because Russia and North Korea aren't the only players here.
Where does Iran fit into this triangle?
Es una buena pregunta.
That's a good question.
Irán también envió drones a Rusia, los famosos drones Shahed.
Iran also sent drones to Russia, the famous Shahed drones.
Y Irán tiene su propio programa nuclear.
And Iran has its own nuclear program.
Hay indicaciones, no confirmadas, de que hay comunicación técnica entre Corea del Norte e Irán también.
There are indications, unconfirmed, that there is also technical communication between North Korea and Iran.
Los tres países comparten un interés: debilitar el sistema de control de armas internacional.
The three countries share an interest: weakening the international arms control system.
The architecture of arms control, the NPT, the missile technology control regime, all of it was built on the assumption that major powers had an interest in limiting proliferation.
What we're watching now is a counter-coalition actively dismantling that assumption.
And they're doing it through technology transfer.
Y la tecnología de drones es un buen ejemplo.
And drone technology is a good example.
Hace diez años, los drones militares avanzados eran solo para los países más ricos: Estados Unidos, Israel.
Ten years ago, advanced military drones were only for the richest countries: the United States, Israel.
Ahora Irán los fabrica, Corea del Norte los copia, grupos terroristas en el Medio Oriente los usan.
Now Iran manufactures them, North Korea copies them, terrorist groups in the Middle East use them.
La tecnología se mueve muy rápido cuando hay dinero y motivación.
Technology moves very fast when there is money and motivation.
The commoditization of sophisticated weapons.
I remember sitting in a briefing in Kabul in 2007 and being told that IEDs were becoming more complex because the technical instructions were circulating freely on the internet.
That was the beginning of this trend.
What we're seeing now is just the next chapter.
Sí.
Yes.
Y ahora no es solo instrucciones en internet.
And now it's not just instructions on the internet.
Es un gobierno, Rusia, que transfiere directamente tecnología de primer nivel a otro gobierno, Corea del Norte, con capacidad nuclear.
It's a government, Russia, directly transferring first-rate technology to another government, North Korea, with nuclear capability.
Eso es mucho más serio.
That is much more serious.
What's the Western response been?
Because I've seen the statements, the condemnations.
But is there actually a lever anyone can pull here?
Honestamente, las opciones son muy limitadas.
Honestly, the options are very limited.
Corea del Norte ya tiene las sanciones más fuertes del mundo.
North Korea already has the strongest sanctions in the world.
No hay mucho más que se puede hacer económicamente.
There isn't much more that can be done economically.
Y militarmente, nadie quiere un conflicto directo con un país que tiene bombas nucleares.
And militarily, nobody wants a direct conflict with a country that has nuclear bombs.
Por eso Kim Jong-un se siente seguro para hacer estos acuerdos.
That's why Kim Jong-un feels safe to make these agreements.
The sanctions argument has always frustrated me a little.
Not because sanctions are wrong in principle, but because the theory of the case, that economic pain produces political change in Pyongyang, has been tested for thirty years and failed every single time.
The regime tolerates extraordinary suffering among its own people.
Totalmente de acuerdo.
Totally agreed.
Las sanciones no cambian el comportamiento del régimen porque el régimen no representa los intereses del pueblo.
The sanctions don't change the regime's behavior because the regime doesn't represent the people's interests.
El pueblo sufre, pero Kim Jong-un y la élite militar no sufren.
The people suffer, but Kim Jong-un and the military elite don't suffer.
Ellos tienen acceso a todo lo que necesitan.
They have access to everything they need.
Es un sistema muy injusto.
It's a very unjust system.
So where does this go?
Five more years of this agreement.
Russia consolidates its military position, North Korea advances its technology, and the gap between what deterrence theory assumes and what actually exists on the peninsula keeps widening.
La preocupación más grande para mí es Corea del Sur y Japón.
The biggest concern for me is South Korea and Japan.
Los dos países están muy cerca de Corea del Norte, y los dos tienen tecnología industrial avanzada.
Both countries are very close to North Korea, and both have advanced industrial technology.
Cuando Corea del Norte mejora su capacidad de apuntar con precisión, gracias a los satélites y a la tecnología rusa, el riesgo para Seúl y Tokio aumenta directamente.
When North Korea improves its precision targeting capability, thanks to satellites and Russian technology, the risk for Seoul and Tokyo increases directly.
And South Korea has been flirting with the idea of developing its own nuclear deterrent.
Public polling there has actually supported it.
Which would unravel sixty years of nonproliferation work in northeast Asia almost overnight.
Exactamente.
Exactly.
Y si Corea del Sur desarrolla armas nucleares, Japón también va a considerar hacerlo.
And if South Korea develops nuclear weapons, Japan will also consider doing it.
Y si Japón lo hace...
And if Japan does...
Mira, la historia de Asia en el siglo veinte hace que esa conversación sea muy, muy complicada.
Look, the history of Asia in the twentieth century makes that conversation very, very complicated.
That's the cascade problem.
And it's the direct consequence of this technology exchange we started with.
Two politicians fly to Pyongyang, stand at a memorial, sign a document.
Somewhere downstream, that document reshapes the security architecture of an entire region.
[gasp] And most people won't connect those dots.
Y por eso es importante hablar de estas cosas.
And that's why it's important to talk about these things.
La gente ve las noticias y piensa: 'otra reunión en Pyongyang.' Pero detrás de esa reunión hay una transferencia de tecnología que puede cambiar el equilibrio militar de toda la región del Pacífico.
People see the news and think: 'another meeting in Pyongyang.' But behind that meeting is a technology transfer that can change the military balance of the entire Pacific region.
Actually, you used a word earlier I want to come back to.
You said 'intercambio', exchange.
I know that word, but I feel like in Spanish it does more work than just 'exchange.' Like, you used it for a trade of missiles for technology, but I've also heard it for a language exchange program, a cultural exchange.
Is it the same word doing all that?
Sí, es la misma palabra para todo.
Yes, it's the same word for everything.
'Un intercambio de prisioneros' es cuando dos países intercambian presos.
'An exchange of prisoners' is when two countries swap prisoners.
'Un intercambio de estudiantes' es cuando un estudiante va a vivir a otro país.
'A student exchange' is when a student goes to live in another country.
'Un intercambio de tecnología' es cuando un país da tecnología a otro.
'A technology exchange' is when one country gives technology to another.
El concepto es el mismo: das algo y recibes algo.
The concept is the same: you give something and you receive something.
So the Spanish word carries both the diplomatic weight and the everyday meaning, the same way English does with 'exchange.' The verb would be 'intercambiar'?
And when I want to say two people swapped something between themselves, is there a different word, or do I just use 'intercambiar'?
Puedes usar 'intercambiar', sí.
You can use 'intercambiar', yes.
También puedes usar 'cambiar' en contextos más informales.
You can also use 'cambiar' in more informal contexts.
Por ejemplo, 'cambiamos de tema' significa 'we changed the subject' o 'we switched topics.' Y 'intercambiar' tiene un sentido más formal, más simétrico.
For example, 'cambiamos de tema' means 'we changed the subject' or 'we switched topics.' And 'intercambiar' has a more formal, more symmetrical sense.
Los dos lados dan algo.
Both sides give something.
Si solo una persona da, no es un intercambio, es un regalo.
If only one person gives, it's not an exchange, it's a gift.
So Russia and North Korea are doing an 'intercambio.' Whereas when I attempt Spanish and you correct me, that's...
probably not an intercambio.
That's just me making deposits into a loss account.
No, no.
No, no.
Es un intercambio.
It's an exchange.
Tú me das entretenimiento, yo te doy gramática correcta.
You give me entertainment, I give you correct grammar.
Es un sistema muy equitativo.
It's a very equitable system.
Todos ganamos.
We all win.