Renania-Palatinado: el fin de una era socialdemócrata

Right, 1863 or thereabouts.

Bismarck actually tried to crush them.

They survived that, they survived the Nazis, they rebuilt after the war.

So when a party with that kind of deep roots loses a stronghold like this, it's not just a bad night.

It signals something.

Señala que la clase trabajadora ya no se identifica automáticamente con la socialdemocracia.

It signals that the working class no longer automatically identifies with social democracy.

Eso es lo fundamental.

That's the fundamental thing.

Durante décadas, si eras obrero en Alemania, votabas SPD.

For decades, if you were a worker in Germany, you voted SPD.

Era casi una identidad.

It was almost an identity.

Tu padre votaba SPD, tu abuelo votaba SPD.

Your father voted SPD, your grandfather voted SPD.

And now those voters are going where?

To the CDU?

Or to the AfD?

A los dos.

To both.

Y eso es lo preocupante.

And that's what's worrying.

La CDU recoge a los votantes que quieren estabilidad, orden, un centro conservador serio.

The CDU picks up voters who want stability, order, a serious conservative center.

Pero la AfD recoge a los que están enfadados.

But the AfD picks up those who are angry.

Los que sienten que nadie les escucha.

Those who feel nobody listens to them.

Los que creen que la inmigración ha cambiado su país sin que nadie les pidiera permiso.

Those who believe immigration has changed their country without anyone asking their permission.

Here's what gets me about the AfD's advance specifically in this state.

Rhineland-Palatinate isn't eastern Germany.

It's not Saxony or Thuringia, where the AfD has been strong for years.

This is a western, relatively prosperous state.

Vineyards and chemical companies.

Exactamente.

Exactly.

Y ese es el punto clave.

And that's the key point.

Durante años, los analistas decían que la AfD era un fenómeno del este.

For years, analysts said the AfD was an eastern phenomenon.

Que se explicaba por la reunificación, por el desempleo, por la sensación de ser ciudadanos de segunda clase.

That it was explained by reunification, by unemployment, by the feeling of being second-class citizens.

Pero ahora vemos que ese análisis era incompleto.

But now we see that analysis was incomplete.

So what's driving it in the west, in your view?

Because I've spent time in those eastern states, and the dynamics there are very specific.

The resentment has particular roots.

What's the story in a place like Rhineland-Palatinate?

Mira, creo que hay tres factores.

Look, I think there are three factors.

Primero, la crisis de los refugiados de 2015 nunca se resolvió realmente en la mente de muchos alemanes.

First, the 2015 refugee crisis was never truly resolved in the minds of many Germans.

Segundo, la inflación y el coste de la vida han golpeado muy fuerte.

Second, inflation and the cost of living have hit very hard.

Y tercero, hay una sensación general de que el gobierno federal, sea del partido que sea, no funciona.

And third, there's a general feeling that the federal government, from whatever party, doesn't work.

That third point is interesting.

Because Friedrich Merz is now chancellor, leading the CDU at the federal level.

So you'd think his party winning in Rhineland-Palatinate would be a straightforward vote of confidence.

But is it?

Or are people voting CDU locally while still being frustrated with Berlin?

La verdad es que es complicado.

The truth is it's complicated.

Para Merz es una buena noticia, sin duda.

For Merz it's good news, no doubt.

Demuestra que la CDU puede ganar en territorios que no controlaba.

It shows the CDU can win in territories it didn't control.

Pero también tiene que preocuparse por el avance de la AfD.

But he also has to worry about the AfD's advance.

Porque si la AfD crece demasiado, se hace imposible formar coaliciones estables.

Because if the AfD grows too much, it becomes impossible to form stable coalitions.

And that's the arithmetic problem, right?

In German politics, there's this firewall, this agreement among the mainstream parties not to form coalitions with the AfD.

But the bigger the AfD gets, the fewer combinations are left for everyone else.

Es que es exactamente lo que pasó en otros estados.

That's exactly what happened in other states.

En Turingia, por ejemplo, la AfD sacó tantos escaños que formar gobierno sin ellos fue casi imposible.

In Thuringia, for example, the AfD won so many seats that forming government without them was almost impossible.

Necesitaron una coalición muy extraña con partidos que normalmente no trabajan juntos.

They needed a very strange coalition with parties that don't normally work together.

Look, I covered the rise of populist parties in Latin America in the early 2000s.

And one thing I learned is that the firewall strategy only works for so long.

At some point, if a party keeps growing, the other parties either have to engage with them or watch the system become ungovernable.

No, tienes razón en eso.

No, you're right about that.

Y en Europa ya hemos visto cómo se rompen esos muros.

And in Europe we've already seen how those walls break down.

En Austria, el FPÖ gobernó en coalición.

In Austria, the FPÖ governed in coalition.

En Italia, la Liga de Salvini estuvo en el gobierno.

In Italy, Salvini's League was in government.

En Suecia, los Demócratas de Suecia apoyan al gobierno aunque no están formalmente en la coalición.

In Sweden, the Sweden Democrats support the government even though they're not formally in the coalition.

So the question becomes: is Germany the exception, or is it just behind schedule?

Because Germany has taken this more seriously than almost anyone, for obvious historical reasons.

Bueno, esas razones históricas pesan mucho.

Well, those historical reasons weigh heavily.

Y con razón.

And rightly so.

Alemania tiene una responsabilidad especial con su pasado.

Germany has a special responsibility with its past.

Pero también hay que ser honesto: excluir a un partido del juego político no hace que desaparezca.

But you also have to be honest: excluding a party from the political game doesn't make it disappear.

A veces lo hace más fuerte, porque puede decir que el sistema está en su contra.

Sometimes it makes it stronger, because it can say the system is against it.

The martyr narrative.

I've seen that play out a dozen times.

The party gets stronger precisely because it can claim persecution.

Exacto.

Exactly.

Pero volvamos a Renania-Palatinado un momento, porque hay algo que no hemos mencionado.

But let's go back to Rhineland-Palatinate for a moment, because there's something we haven't mentioned.

Este estado tiene una economía bastante diversa.

This state has a quite diverse economy.

Tiene a BASF, una de las empresas químicas más grandes del mundo, en Ludwigshafen.

It has BASF, one of the largest chemical companies in the world, in Ludwigshafen.

Tiene la industria del vino.

It has the wine industry.

Tiene una presencia militar importante, con bases americanas.

It has a significant military presence, with American bases.

Ramstein.

I've been to Ramstein Air Base.

It's enormous.

One of the biggest American military installations outside the US.

And that whole region has a complicated relationship with the American presence.

Some people love the economic boost.

Others resent it.

Y con todo lo que está pasando ahora con Irán, con las guerras en Oriente Medio, esa presencia militar se vuelve más visible y más controvertida.

And with everything that's happening now with Iran, with the wars in the Middle East, that military presence becomes more visible and more controversial.

La gente se pregunta: ¿estamos siendo arrastrados a conflictos que no son nuestros?

People ask themselves: are we being dragged into conflicts that aren't ours?

That connects to something I wanted to ask you about.

There's this broader European debate about sovereignty and defense.

Germany just passed that massive defense spending package.

How does that play into these regional elections?

A ver, es un tema que divide a la población.

Well, it's a topic that divides the population.

Muchos alemanes aceptan que hay que gastar más en defensa después de Ucrania.

Many Germans accept that they need to spend more on defense after Ukraine.

Pero al mismo tiempo, cuando ven que los servicios públicos empeoran y los impuestos suben, se preguntan: ¿por qué hay dinero para tanques pero no para hospitales?

But at the same time, when they see public services deteriorating and taxes rising, they ask: why is there money for tanks but not for hospitals?

That's the guns and butter question.

It's as old as politics itself.

And it always, always hurts the governing party when people feel the trade-off in their daily lives.

Totalmente.

Totally.

Y aquí hay que hablar de otro elemento importante.

And here we need to talk about another important element.

La CDU ganó, sí, pero ¿con qué programa?

The CDU won, yes, but with what program?

Porque Merz ha movido a la CDU hacia la derecha en temas de inmigración.

Because Merz has moved the CDU to the right on immigration issues.

Ha adoptado un discurso más duro.

He's adopted a tougher discourse.

Y eso funciona electoralmente, pero tiene un coste.

And that works electorally, but it has a cost.

You're talking about the normalization problem.

When the center-right adopts the language of the far right, it might win votes in the short term, but it validates the far right's framing of the issue.

Es que hemos visto esto en España también.

We've seen this in Spain too.

Cuando el Partido Popular empieza a hablar como Vox, no debilita a Vox.

When the Popular Party starts talking like Vox, it doesn't weaken Vox.

Lo que hace es decirle a la gente que Vox tenía razón desde el principio.

What it does is tell people that Vox was right from the beginning.

No, you're absolutely right about that.

It's the original versus the copy problem.

If voters want tough immigration policy, eventually they'll go with the party that was saying it first.

Pero mira, también hay que reconocer algo.

But look, we also have to recognize something.

La gente tiene preocupaciones legítimas sobre la integración, sobre los servicios públicos, sobre la identidad cultural.

People have legitimate concerns about integration, about public services, about cultural identity.

Y si los partidos del centro no abordan esas preocupaciones con seriedad, dejan un espacio enorme para los populistas.

And if centrist parties don't address those concerns seriously, they leave an enormous space for populists.

Here's the thing though.

There's a difference between addressing concerns and exploiting fears.

And that line gets blurry very fast in an election campaign.

Sin duda.

Without a doubt.

Pero volviendo a los resultados, quiero que hablemos del contexto europeo más amplio.

But going back to the results, I want us to talk about the broader European context.

Porque este mismo fin de semana hubo elecciones municipales en Francia, un referéndum constitucional en Italia y elecciones parlamentarias en Eslovenia.

Because this very same weekend there were municipal elections in France, a constitutional referendum in Italy, and parliamentary elections in Slovenia.

It's like a Super Saturday for European democracy.

And the patterns are remarkably similar across all of them.

Traditional parties under pressure, populists gaining ground, voters fragmented.

La verdad es que lo que estamos viendo es una crisis de representación.

The truth is that what we're seeing is a crisis of representation.

La gente no siente que los partidos tradicionales la representen.

People don't feel that traditional parties represent them.

Y no es solo un problema de izquierda o derecha.

And it's not just a left or right problem.

Es un problema de toda la política institucional.

It's a problem of all institutional politics.

I spent twenty-five years covering countries where institutions failed.

And the one thing I can tell you is, when people lose faith in the system, they don't just switch parties.

They start questioning the system itself.

Y eso es precisamente lo peligroso.

And that's precisely what's dangerous.

Porque Alemania tiene una democracia fuerte, con instituciones sólidas.

Because Germany has a strong democracy, with solid institutions.

Pero ninguna democracia es invulnerable.

But no democracy is invulnerable.

Y cuando un partido como la AfD, que tiene elementos que han coqueteado con el extremismo, consigue un tercio de los votos en algunos lugares, hay que tomárselo en serio.

And when a party like the AfD, which has elements that have flirted with extremism, gets a third of the votes in some places, you have to take it seriously.

So looking forward, what does this mean practically?

The CDU won Rhineland-Palatinate.

They now need to form a coalition government.

Who do they govern with?

Bueno, eso depende de los números exactos.

Well, that depends on the exact numbers.

Probablemente necesitarán a los Verdes o al SPD como socio de coalición.

They'll probably need the Greens or the SPD as a coalition partner.

Lo irónico es que el SPD podría terminar como socio menor en un estado que gobernó durante treinta años.

The ironic thing is that the SPD could end up as a junior partner in a state it governed for thirty years.

Eso sería una humillación enorme.

That would be an enormous humiliation.

From the driver's seat to the back seat.

That's brutal in politics.

And it changes a party psychologically too.

Being the junior coalition partner is a thankless job.

You get blamed for everything and credit for nothing.

Es que es lo que le pasó al SPD a nivel federal durante los años de Merkel.

That's what happened to the SPD at the federal level during the Merkel years.

Fueron socios de coalición tantas veces que la gente ya no sabía qué representaba el partido.

They were coalition partners so many times that people no longer knew what the party stood for.

Perdieron su identidad.

They lost their identity.

And that brings us full circle, doesn't it?

The SPD's crisis isn't just about one election in one state.

It's a decades-long erosion.

The party kept governing but stopped standing for anything clear.

And voters eventually noticed.

Mira, yo creo que la socialdemocracia todavía tiene futuro, pero solo si se reinventa.

Look, I believe social democracy still has a future, but only if it reinvents itself.

Necesita encontrar respuestas nuevas para problemas nuevos.

It needs to find new answers for new problems.

La automatización, la inteligencia artificial, la transición energética.

Automation, artificial intelligence, the energy transition.

Esos son los temas del siglo veintiuno.

Those are the issues of the twenty-first century.

Y los socialdemócratas todavía hablan como si fuera 1995.

And the social democrats still talk as if it were 1995.

That's a sharp diagnosis.

And it reminds me of something a political scientist told me years ago in Buenos Aires.

She said parties don't die from external attacks.

They die from internal irrelevance.

They stop being useful, and people move on.