Noruega y el dilema del petróleo verde

Las personas con menos dinero tienen coches más viejos y no pueden comprar un coche eléctrico nuevo.

People with less money have older cars and can't afford a new electric vehicle.

Cuando suben los precios de la gasolina, estas personas sufren más.

When petrol prices go up, these people suffer more.

And this is not unique to Norway.

This is the yellow vest problem, right?

France tried to raise fuel taxes in 2018 as part of its climate commitments, and you got massive street protests.

The gilets jaunes.

Rural and working-class people saying: you're making us pay for a transition we can't afford to participate in.

Sí, los chalecos amarillos.

Yes, the yellow vests.

Fue una crisis política muy grande en Francia.

That was a huge political crisis in France.

Y en España también vimos protestas similares.

And in Spain we saw similar protests too.

Los agricultores y los transportistas salieron a las calles porque los precios del combustible eran muy altos.

Farmers and truck drivers took to the streets because fuel prices were so high.

Tell me more about the Spanish experience, because I think a lot of our listeners in Spain felt this very directly.

Mira, España importa mucho petróleo y gas.

Spain imports a lot of oil and gas.

Cuando sube el precio del petróleo en los mercados internacionales, los españoles lo sienten muy rápido en la factura de la luz y en la gasolinera.

When international oil prices go up, Spaniards feel it very quickly in their electricity bills and at the pump.

En 2022, con la guerra de Ucrania, el gobierno español también redujo impuestos a los combustibles.

In 2022, during the Ukraine war, the Spanish government also cut fuel taxes.

Right, so there's actually a pattern here.

Every time there's an energy shock, European governments, regardless of their stated climate commitments, reach for the same lever: they cut the cost of fossil fuels to ease the pain.

Which tells you something important about how fragile those commitments are.

La verdad es que sí.

And that's a structural problem.

Y es un problema estructural.

European countries made big promises in the Paris Agreement in 2015.

Los países europeos hicieron grandes promesas en el Acuerdo de París en 2015.

But when there's a crisis, day-to-day politics wins.

Pero cuando hay una crisis, la política del día a día gana.

Governments don't want to lose votes.

Los gobiernos no quieren perder votos.

The extraordinary thing is that this is almost exactly what happened in 2022.

When Russia cut off gas to Europe after the Ukraine invasion, governments across the continent scrambled for coal, LNG from the U.S., anything.

Germany restarted coal plants it had just closed.

And everyone said it was temporary.

Sí, y ahora tenemos otra crisis energética, con el Estrecho de Ormuz bloqueado.

And now we have another energy crisis, with the Strait of Hormuz blocked.

Y otra vez los gobiernos hacen lo mismo.

And again governments are doing the same thing.

Es un ciclo.

It's a cycle.

Cada crisis energética interrumpe los planes climáticos.

Every energy crisis interrupts climate plans.

But I want to push on the Norwegian case specifically, because Norway isn't Germany.

Norway doesn't need to cut fuel taxes because it's running out of money.

It's sitting on one and a half trillion dollars.

This is a choice, not a necessity.

Exacto, y eso es lo que criticaron muchos expertos en clima.

Exactly, and that's what many climate experts criticised.

Noruega puede ayudar a sus ciudadanos de otras maneras.

Norway can help its citizens in other ways.

Puede dar dinero directamente a las familias que tienen menos dinero, sin reducir los impuestos al combustible para todo el mundo.

It can give money directly to lower-income families without cutting fuel taxes for everyone.

Targeted transfers versus blanket tax cuts.

It's a classic policy debate, and the economists are almost universally on the side of targeted transfers if your goal is to protect the vulnerable without undermining the carbon price signal.

Pero la política no funciona así.

But politics doesn't work that way.

Un recorte de impuestos es simple y todo el mundo lo entiende.

A tax cut is simple and everyone understands it.

Una transferencia directa de dinero parece más complicada.

A direct cash transfer seems more complicated.

Los políticos prefieren las soluciones que la gente puede ver inmediatamente.

Politicians prefer solutions that people can see immediately.

Look, I've covered enough elections to know that's true.

You can't put a targeted transfer on a campaign poster.

But what you can do is point to cheaper petrol at the pump.

It's tangible.

A ver, pero hay algo más importante aquí.

But there's something more important here.

El precio del carbono, el impuesto al combustible, es la herramienta más eficaz que tienen los gobiernos para reducir las emisiones.

Carbon pricing, the fuel tax, is the most effective tool governments have for reducing emissions.

Cuando reduces ese precio, mandas una señal muy negativa al mercado.

When you cut that price, you send a very bad signal to the market.

You're saying you're telling investors, telling carmakers, telling energy companies: don't bet too hard on the transition, because when things get tough, we'll subsidize the old system again.

Exactamente.

Exactly.

Y eso es muy peligroso para la transición energética.

And that's very dangerous for the energy transition.

Las empresas necesitan seguridad para invertir en energías renovables.

Companies need certainty to invest in renewables.

Si los gobiernos cambian las reglas constantemente, las empresas no invierten.

If governments keep changing the rules, companies won't invest.

Here's what I find genuinely interesting about Norway's position, though.

Because Norway doesn't just produce oil.

It's also one of the biggest producers of hydroelectric power in the world.

Almost all of Norway's domestic electricity comes from hydro.

So Norwegians are already living in a low-carbon electricity system.

Sí, y eso explica en parte por qué los coches eléctricos funcionan tan bien en Noruega.

And that explains in part why electric cars work so well in Norway.

La electricidad es barata y limpia.

Electricity is cheap and clean.

Cargar un coche eléctrico en Noruega es mucho más barato que llenar un depósito de gasolina.

Charging an electric car in Norway is much cheaper than filling a tank with petrol.

Por eso la gente compró tantos coches eléctricos.

That's why people bought so many electric cars.

So the model actually worked, domestically.

Norway used oil revenues to subsidize EVs, built a clean electricity grid from hydro, and essentially decarbonized its own transport sector.

The contradiction is that while doing all this at home, they kept pumping oil for export.

La verdad es que esa es la pregunta moral más difícil.

That's the hardest moral question.

Noruega dice: nosotros ya somos muy verdes en casa.

Norway says: we're already very green at home.

Pero vendemos el petróleo a otros países que todavía lo necesitan.

But we sell oil to other countries that still need it.

¿Es eso responsable o es hipócrita?

Is that responsible or is it hypocritical?

I've thought about this a lot, and I keep going back and forth.

The steel-man version of Norway's position is: global demand for oil exists whether or not Norway pumps it.

If Norway stops, Saudi Arabia or Russia or someone else fills that gap.

And at least Norway uses the profits responsibly.

Es que ese argumento tiene problemas.

That argument has problems.

Si todos los países productores de petróleo piensan así, nadie va a dejar de producir petróleo.

If every oil-producing country thinks that way, nobody will ever stop producing oil.

Alguien tiene que ser el primero en decir: vamos a parar.

Someone has to be first to say: we're going to stop.

Y Noruega, con todo su dinero, podría ser ese país.

And Norway, with all its money, could be that country.

No, you're absolutely right about that.

And there's actually a Norwegian political party, the Greens, the Miljøpartiet De Grønne, that has been making exactly that argument for years.

Stop drilling.

Use the fund to fund the global transition.

They remain a minority, but the argument is not crazy.

Bueno, y ahora volvemos al tema de hoy.

And now we come back to today's topic.

Noruega redujo los impuestos al combustible porque los precios subieron con la crisis del Estrecho de Ormuz.

Norway cut fuel taxes because prices rose with the Strait of Hormuz crisis.

Pero esto demuestra algo más profundo.

But this shows something deeper.

La transición energética es muy frágil cuando hay una crisis.

The energy transition is very fragile when a crisis hits.

The thing is, and this is what I keep coming back to, the energy transition was always going to be tested by exactly this kind of shock.

A war in the Middle East disrupting oil supply.

A cold winter.

A drought hitting hydroelectric capacity.

These aren't surprises.

They're predictable.

The question is whether we build a system resilient enough to absorb them without retreating.

Y Europa todavía no construyó ese sistema.

And Europe still hasn't built that system.

Después de la crisis de 2022 con Rusia, Europa habló mucho de independencia energética, de más energías renovables.

After the 2022 crisis with Russia, Europe talked a lot about energy independence and more renewables.

Pero la inversión no fue suficiente.

But the investment wasn't enough.

Y ahora, con otra crisis, volvemos a los problemas de siempre.

And now, with another crisis, we're back to the same old problems.

Right.

And I think that's actually the headline here, more than Norway specifically.

The Strait of Hormuz crisis, the Iran war, whatever you want to call it, is revealing that Europe's energy vulnerability was never really fixed.

It just changed shape.

From Russian gas to Gulf oil.

Mira, y eso tiene consecuencias directas para el clima.

And that has direct consequences for the climate.

Cuando los precios de la energía suben, los gobiernos tienen presión política para hacer la energía más barata.

When energy prices rise, governments face political pressure to make energy cheaper.

Y la energía más barata, a corto plazo, muchas veces significa más combustibles fósiles.

And cheaper energy, in the short term, very often means more fossil fuels.

So what would a more resilient system look like?

If you had to sketch it out, not as a politician but as someone who just thinks clearly about this.

A ver, creo que necesitamos tres cosas.

I think we need three things.

Primero, mucha más energía solar y eólica en Europa, para no depender del petróleo de otros países.

First, much more solar and wind power in Europe, to stop depending on other countries' oil.

Segundo, baterías y almacenamiento de energía, para usar la energía renovable cuando no hay sol ni viento.

Second, batteries and energy storage, to use renewable energy when there's no sun or wind.

Y tercero, conexiones eléctricas mejores entre los países de Europa.

And third, better electricity connections between European countries.

The interconnection piece is fascinating and underappreciated.

Spain actually has an extraordinary amount of solar capacity, but it's been hampered by insufficient connection to the rest of Europe through the Pyrenees.

There's a story there about politics and infrastructure getting in the way of the obvious solution.

Sí, España produce mucha energía solar y eólica.

Spain produces a lot of solar and wind energy.

Pero no podemos exportar suficiente al resto de Europa porque las conexiones eléctricas con Francia son muy limitadas.

But we can't export enough to the rest of Europe because the electrical connections with France are very limited.

Es un problema político y técnico al mismo tiempo.

It's a political and technical problem at the same time.

Y mientras tanto, otros países queman más carbón.

And meanwhile, other countries burn more coal.

So to bring this back to where we started.

Norway cutting fuel taxes is a symptom.

The disease is that Europe built a green energy ambition on top of a fossil fuel infrastructure that it never fully replaced, and every time there's a shock, the old infrastructure reasserts itself.

Norway just made it visible this week.

Bueno, y quizás eso es lo más importante de esta historia.

And maybe that's the most important thing about this story.

No es solo Noruega.

It's not just Norway.

Es una señal de que la transición energética necesita más urgencia, más inversión, y más valentía política.

It's a signal that the energy transition needs more urgency, more investment, and more political courage.

Porque las crisis no van a parar.

Because crises aren't going to stop.

El mundo es inestable.

The world is unstable.