La carta abierta: diplomacia en tiempos de guerra

And Trump's message is aimed at all three of them simultaneously.

That 'finish the job' line plus the two-to-three week ultimatum.

That's a pressure play, but it's also leaving a door open.

He's saying we're winning, and here's how you can stop us from winning harder.

Bueno, lo que describes es una técnica muy específica de negociación que en inglés se llama 'coercive diplomacy'.

What you're describing is a very specific negotiating technique called 'coercive diplomacy.' You show force precisely so you don't have to fully use it.

Muestras la fuerza precisamente para no tener que usarla del todo.

Nixon and Kissinger did it in Vietnam.

Nixon y Kissinger lo hicieron en Vietnam.

Reagan did it with the Soviet Union.

Reagan lo hizo con la Unión Soviética.

It's classic.

Es clásico.

Right, and Nixon's 'madman theory' is the extreme version of that.

You make your adversary think you're crazy enough to do anything.

The problem is it only works if the adversary believes you.

Y en este caso, la verdad es que es difícil no creerle.

And in this case, it's hard not to believe him.

Los estadounidenses ya están golpeando Teherán.

The Americans are already hitting Tehran.

Ya han dañado instalaciones nucleares.

They've already damaged nuclear facilities, already killed commanders.

Ya han matado comandantes.

The threat to do something 'extremely hard' isn't empty rhetoric when you've spent weeks proving you can do it.

La amenaza de hacer algo 'extremadamente duro' no es retórica vacía cuando llevas semanas demostrando que lo puedes hacer.

Here's what gets me, though.

The open letter format specifically.

Pezeshkian addresses the American people, not the American government.

That's a choice loaded with meaning.

Let's talk about what that tradition actually looks like historically.

Mira, el precedente más interesante quizás sea el de 1962.

The most interesting precedent is probably 1962.

Durante la Crisis de los Misiles, Khrushchev publicó una carta abierta en el Pravda dirigida al pueblo americano explicando la posición soviética.

During the Missile Crisis, Khrushchev published an open letter in Pravda addressed to the American people explaining the Soviet position.

Era una forma de presionar a Kennedy desde abajo, de crear opinión pública.

A way to pressure Kennedy from below, to shape public opinion.

And it had a complicated effect.

It wasn't purely a peace gesture.

It also put Kennedy in a bind, because now any escalation looked like he was ignoring a peace offer.

The letter was both sincere and a trap.

Exactamente.

Exactly.

Y Pezeshkian, o quien esté detrás de esta decisión, lo sabe perfectamente.

And Pezeshkian, or whoever is behind this decision, knows that perfectly well.

Si Trump escala después de la carta, Trump parece el agresor ante la opinión pública internacional.

If Trump escalates after the letter, Trump looks like the aggressor to international public opinion.

Es un movimiento de relaciones públicas además de ser diplomático.

It's a PR move as much as a diplomatic one.

I mean, I've seen this pattern so many times.

Beirut in the eighties, Kabul in the early 2000s.

There's always a moment in a war when one side starts talking about talking, and that moment is almost always when the military balance has shifted enough that talking becomes useful.

La verdad es que tienes razón en eso.

And here the military question is critical: how badly damaged is Iran's military apparatus really?

Y aquí la pregunta militar es crítica: ¿qué tan dañado está realmente el aparato militar iraní?

The Israelis say they've completed strikes on vital nuclear and military targets.

Las fuerzas israelíes dicen que han completado strikes contra objetivos nucleares y militares vitales.

The Americans say objectives are 'nearing completion.' But Iranians are still firing missiles at Israel and drones into the Gulf.

Los americanos dicen que los objetivos están 'cerca de completarse'.

Pero los iraníes siguen disparando misiles a Israel y drones al Golfo.

Which is the fundamental tension in the story.

If the objectives are nearly complete, why the two-to-three week ultimatum?

That suggests there's still something left to do, or someone left to pressure.

No, no, espera, porque creo que estás mezclando dos cosas distintas.

Wait, because I think you're mixing two different things.

El discurso de Trump tiene dos audiencias: una audiencia internacional, que es Irán, a quien le está diciendo 'negocia o te golpeo más'.

Trump's speech has two audiences: an international audience, which is Iran, to whom he's saying 'negotiate or I hit harder,' and a domestic audience, which is Americans, to whom he's saying 'we're almost done, trust me.'

Y una audiencia doméstica, que son los americanos, a quienes les está diciendo 'casi hemos terminado, confiad en mí'.

No, you're absolutely right about that.

The polls must be a factor here.

His popularity is reportedly dipping.

'We're almost done' is also a domestic political message.

And it creates its own pressure.

Claro, y eso crea un problema real para él.

And that creates a real problem for him.

Si en tres semanas no hay acuerdo y no ha terminado el trabajo, ¿qué hace?

If in three weeks there's no deal and he hasn't finished the job, what does he do?

Escalar es costoso política y militarmente.

Escalating is costly politically and militarily.

No escalar parece una capitulación.

Not escalating looks like capitulation.

Es la trampa clásica del ultimátum.

It's the classic ultimatum trap.

The extraordinary thing is this has happened so many times.

Johnson in Vietnam.

Bush in Iraq.

You declare something nearly finished and then you're trapped by your own rhetoric.

The war doesn't cooperate with your timeline.

Bueno, y no olvidemos el famoso 'Mission Accomplished' de Bush en 2003 sobre el portaaviones Abraham Lincoln.

And let's not forget Bush's famous 'Mission Accomplished' in 2003 on the USS Abraham Lincoln.

Declaró la victoria y después vinieron ocho años más de guerra.

He declared victory and then eight more years of war followed.

Los titulares militares no son nunca la realidad militar.

Military headlines are never the military reality.

I was in Baghdad three weeks after that banner went up.

It was not accomplished.

At all.

But let's go back to Iran's internal politics, because I think that's where this actually gets resolved or doesn't get resolved.

A ver, el problema central es que Pezeshkian no puede firmar un acuerdo él solo aunque quisiera.

The central problem is that Pezeshkian can't sign a deal alone even if he wanted to.

Necesita el respaldo de Khamenei.

He needs Khamenei's backing.

Y Khamenei lleva décadas construyendo su legitimidad sobre la idea de que no se cede ante la presión americana.

And Khamenei has spent decades building his legitimacy on the idea that you don't yield to American pressure.

Un acuerdo ahora, bajo bombardeo, sería un golpe enorme a esa narrativa.

A deal now, under bombardment, would be an enormous blow to that narrative.

This is the paradox of coercive diplomacy, right.

The more effective your military pressure, the harder it is for the other side to make a deal without looking like they surrendered.

Es que es exactamente así.

It's exactly like that.

Y es el mismo problema que tuvo Nixon con Vietnam.

And it's the same problem Nixon had with Vietnam.

Los estadounidenses bombardearon Hanói en Navidad de 1972, 'el gran golpe' que iba a forzar la negociación, y técnicamente funcionó, los vietnamitas volvieron a la mesa, pero los términos del acuerdo de París fueron casi idénticos a los que se habían propuesto meses antes del bombardeo.

The Americans bombed Hanoi at Christmas 1972, the big blow that was going to force negotiation, and technically it worked, the Vietnamese came back to the table, but the terms of the Paris agreement were almost identical to what had been proposed months before the bombing.

Kissinger won the Nobel Peace Prize for that agreement.

The Vietnamese negotiator, Lê Đức Thọ, refused to accept his.

Said there was no peace.

He was right.

La verdad es que ese es uno de los momentos más surrealistas de la diplomacia del siglo XX.

That's one of the most surreal moments in twentieth-century diplomacy.

Pero volviendo a hoy, lo que hay que entender es que cualquier acuerdo con Irán necesita darle a Khamenei algo que pueda vender como una victoria en casa.

But coming back to today, what you have to understand is that any deal with Iran needs to give Khamenei something he can sell as a victory at home.

Y eso complica enormemente lo que Trump puede ofrecer.

And that enormously complicates what Trump can offer.

Look, when I was reporting on the 2015 nuclear deal, the JCPOA, what struck me was how much of the diplomacy was about optics.

Each side needed language that let them tell their domestic audience they'd won.

The deal almost collapsed twice over the phrasing of a single sentence.

Claro, y eso es negociación real, no es hipocresía.

And that's real negotiation, not hypocrisy.

Es simplemente que los líderes políticos tienen que vender los acuerdos en casa antes de poder aplicarlos.

Political leaders have to sell agreements at home before they can implement them.

Si no pueden venderlos, no duran.

If they can't sell them, they don't last.

El JCPOA no duró porque Trump se salió en 2018 y los halcones iraníes aprovecharon para decir 'ya os lo dijimos, no podéis fiaros de los americanos'.

The JCPOA didn't last because Trump withdrew in 2018 and Iranian hawks said 'we told you, you can't trust the Americans.'

Which is the deep irony here.

The reason Iran doesn't trust American commitments is partly because of what happened with the JCPOA.

And the man who killed the JCPOA is now the one making the ultimatum.

Mira, eso es un punto que no puedo refutar.

That's a point I can't refute.

Y los iraníes lo saben y lo dicen constantemente.

And Iranians know it and say it constantly.

Cualquier garantía que dé Trump, ¿qué vale?

Any guarantee Trump gives, what is it worth?

Porque en cuatro años puede venir otro presidente y romperla.

In four years another president could break it.

O puede romperse él mismo si cambia de opinión la semana que viene.

Or Trump himself could break it if he changes his mind next week.

So you'd need structural guarantees.

Congressional approval, maybe.

Something harder to unilaterally reverse.

Which is exactly what's politically difficult to get in Washington right now.

Y ese es el callejón sin salida, Fletcher.

And that's the dead end.

Irán necesita garantías que Estados Unidos no puede constitucionalmente dar de forma duradera, y Estados Unidos necesita concesiones que Irán no puede hacer sin desestabilizar su propio sistema político.

Iran needs guarantees the U.S.

Es el cuadrado que nadie ha conseguido cerrar desde 1979.

can't constitutionally give in a lasting way, and the U.S.

And yet here we are with an open letter and an ultimatum on the same day, which means both sides are at least having the conversation about having a conversation.

That's not nothing.

No, no es nada.

No, it's not nothing.

Tienes razón.

You're right.

A ver, la historia de la diplomacia está llena de guerras que terminaron de formas que nadie habría predicho dos semanas antes.

The history of diplomacy is full of wars that ended in ways nobody would have predicted two weeks earlier.

El conflicto entre Corea del Norte y Corea del Sur técnicamente todavía no ha terminado, pero llevan décadas sin guerras activas.

The conflict between North and South Korea technically hasn't ended, but they've had decades without active war.

A veces el armisticio es lo que hay.

Sometimes an armistice is what there is.

The thing is, what does the best possible outcome actually look like here?

Because 'finish the job' and 'diplomacy is possible' can both be true at the same time only if there's a shared definition of what the job is.

Bueno, para Israel el trabajo es eliminar la capacidad nuclear iraní, punto.

For Israel the job is eliminating Iran's nuclear capability, period.

Para Estados Unidos probablemente sea eso más un cambio de comportamiento regional, que Irán deje de financiar a Hezbolá, a Hamas, a los Houthis.

For the U.S.

Para Irán, el trabajo aceptable es parar la guerra sin parecer que han capitulado.

it's probably that plus a change in regional behavior, Iran stopping funding of Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis.

I mean, those are almost incompatible.

You can see why Pezeshkian chose a letter instead of a press conference.

A letter lets you be vague enough that everyone can project onto it what they want to hear.

Es que esa es la naturaleza de la diplomacia en sus primeras fases.

That's the nature of diplomacy in its early stages.

La ambigüedad es un recurso, no un defecto.

Ambiguity is a resource, not a flaw.

Cuando Kissinger estaba abriendo China en 1971, pasaron meses de mensajes deliberadamente ambiguos enviados a través de Pakistán antes de que Nixon pudiera anunciar que iría a Pekín.

When Kissinger was opening China in 1971, months of deliberately ambiguous messages passed through Pakistan before Nixon could announce he'd go to Beijing.

So what are we actually watching in real time here?

An endgame?

A face-saving exercise?

Or just two sides probing each other's pain thresholds?

Mira, creo que es lo tercero, principalmente.

I think it's mainly the third.

Todavía no hay ninguna señal de que se hayan establecido canales secretos de negociación serios, que es lo que realmente necesitas antes de que un acuerdo sea posible.

There's still no sign that serious secret negotiating channels have been established, which is what you really need before a deal is possible.

Hasta ahora estamos en la fase de declaraciones públicas, que es la fase menos seria de toda negociación.

Right now we're in the phase of public statements, which is the least serious phase of any negotiation.

The most important conversations are never the ones you can hear.

I've reported on enough of these to know that by the time something appears in the news, the real decision was made three weeks earlier in a room nobody was writing about.

A ver, y en ese sentido lo que hay que mirar no es lo que dice Pezeshkian en su carta ni lo que dice Trump en su discurso.

And in that sense what you have to watch is not what Pezeshkian says in his letter or Trump in his speech.

Lo que hay que mirar es si hay movimiento en los canales que no vemos: Omán, que históricamente ha servido de intermediario, Qatar, Suiza.

You have to watch for movement in the channels we can't see: Oman, which has historically served as intermediary, Qatar, Switzerland.

Cuando empieces a ver señales de actividad diplomática discreta en esos países, sabrás que algo real está pasando.

When you start seeing signs of quiet diplomatic activity in those countries, you'll know something real is happening.

That's a genuinely useful framework for anyone following this.

Watch the intermediaries, not the headlines.

I think that's a good place to land.

Two messages, one day, neither of them meaning quite what they appear to mean on the surface.

La verdad es que eso resume bastante bien cuarenta y siete años de política exterior iraní.

That pretty well summarizes forty-seven years of Iranian foreign policy.

Y probablemente otros cuarenta y siete por venir.

And probably forty-seven more to come.

La ambigüedad no es un bug del sistema.

Ambiguity isn't a bug in the system.

Es el sistema.

It is the system.