El General Presidente: Myanmar y la Legitimidad del Poder

Y eso le costó una reputación que había tardado décadas en construir.

That cost her a reputation that had taken decades to build.

Hoy está condenada a más de veinte años de prisión.

Today she is serving more than twenty years in prison.

The 2021 coup came on the night before the new parliament was supposed to be seated, after elections in November 2020 that Suu Kyi's party won by a landslide.

The military claimed fraud.

Independent observers said that was nonsense.

And Min Aung Hlaing had a very personal motive that doesn't get discussed enough.

Es crucial y no se dice suficiente.

That is crucial and it doesn't get said often enough.

Min Aung Hlaing tenía que retirarse en julio de 2021.

Min Aung Hlaing was due to retire in July 2021.

Si el parlamento democrático tomaba el poder, él perdía no solo el cargo sino también la impunidad.

If the democratic parliament took power, he would lose not only his position but also his impunity.

Hay una Corte Penal Internacional que lleva años investigando crímenes en Myanmar.

The International Criminal Court had been investigating crimes in Myanmar for years.

El golpe no fue solo ideológico;

The coup was not only ideological.

fue, en parte, una estrategia de supervivencia personal.

It was, in part, a personal survival strategy.

And it didn't go the way he expected.

The assumption seemed to be that people would be stunned, there'd be protests for a few weeks, and then they'd accept it, the way previous generations had accepted military rule.

That didn't happen.

Mira, la respuesta popular fue extraordinaria.

Look, the popular response was extraordinary.

Surgió un Gobierno de Unidad Nacional en el exilio, formado por parlamentarios electos y representantes de grupos étnicos.

A National Unity Government formed in exile, made up of elected parliamentarians and ethnic group representatives.

Y crearon las Fuerzas de Defensa del Pueblo, la PDF, que empezaron a combatir al ejército.

They created the People's Defence Force, the PDF, which began fighting the military.

No era exactamente un ejército convencional al principio, pero con el tiempo se convirtió en una fuerza real y sorprendentemente efectiva.

It was not exactly a conventional army at first, but over time it became a real and surprisingly effective fighting force.

This is where it gets genuinely complex, because the PDF wasn't operating alone.

Myanmar has something like twenty or more ethnic armed organizations that have been fighting the central government for decades: the Karen, the Kachin, the Shan.

When the coup happened, some of those groups decided to coordinate with the resistance, and that changed the military balance significantly.

Exacto.

Exactly.

Y en octubre de 2023, con la Operación 1027, tres grandes organizaciones étnicas armadas lanzaron una ofensiva coordinada que tomó al ejército completamente por sorpresa.

And in October 2023, with Operation 1027, three major ethnic armed organizations launched a coordinated offensive that caught the military completely off guard.

Capturaron ciudades, puestos fronterizos, rutas comerciales con China.

They captured towns, border posts, and trade routes with China.

Fue la mayor derrota militar de la Tatmadaw en décadas.

It was the Tatmadaw's greatest military defeat in decades.

El ejército que se suponía invencible dentro del país demostró ser mucho más vulnerable de lo que parecía.

The army that was supposed to be invincible within its own country turned out to be far more vulnerable than it appeared.

So here we are in 2026, and the military controls what, maybe half the country?

Less in some assessments.

And Min Aung Hlaing just got himself elected president of this shrinking territory.

There's something almost surreal about the timing of this move.

Es que eso es exactamente lo que hace que este movimiento sea tan interesante políticamente.

That is exactly what makes this move so politically interesting.

Cuando un régimen está perdiendo en el campo de batalla, a veces busca ganar en el terreno de la legitimidad.

When a regime is losing on the battlefield, it sometimes tries to win on the terrain of legitimacy.

Si puede construir una narrativa de estado funcional, con presidente, vicepresidentes e instituciones, entonces puede presentarse ante la comunidad internacional como un interlocutor válido.

If it can construct a narrative of a functioning state, with a president, vice presidents, and institutions, then it can present itself to the international community as a valid partner.

Es una estrategia clásica.

It is a classic strategy.

Which brings us to the Rohingya, because you cannot talk about Myanmar's international standing without talking about what happened to that population.

Over 700,000 people fled to Bangladesh in 2017 alone.

The International Court of Justice has a case against Myanmar for genocide.

And Suu Kyi sat in front of that court and defended the military.

It was one of the most extraordinary things I have ever watched.

Bueno, fue un momento que muchos de sus admiradores encontraron indefendible.

It was a moment that many of her admirers found indefensible.

Pero también hay que entender el contexto: en Myanmar, la cuestión rohinyá es profundamente impopular entre la mayoría budista birmana.

But you also have to understand the context: in Myanmar, the Rohingya issue is deeply unpopular among the Buddhist Burmese majority.

Suu Kyi estaba haciendo política interna al mismo tiempo que representaba al país en La Haya.

Suu Kyi was playing domestic politics at the same time as representing the country at The Hague.

No la excusa, pero explica la lógica.

That does not excuse her, but it explains the logic.

Una lógica que resultó ser completamente autodestructiva, claro.

A logic that turned out to be completely self-destructive, of course.

And now the junta has inherited all of that international legal exposure, on top of everything else.

The ICC, the ICJ, sanctions from the United States, the EU, the UK.

Which raises the real question: who actually recognizes this new president?

A ver, Rusia reconoce a la junta, claro.

Look, Russia recognizes the junta, of course.

China mantiene relaciones pragmáticas, sin reconocerlos explícitamente pero sin condenarlos, y sigue siendo el principal socio comercial y proveedor de armas.

China maintains pragmatic relations, neither explicitly recognizing them nor condemning them, and remains the main trading partner and arms supplier.

Dentro de la ASEAN hay divisiones: Tailandia y Camboya han sido más permisivas con el régimen;

Within ASEAN there are divisions: Thailand and Cambodia have been more permissive with the regime;

Indonesia y Malasia más críticos.

Indonesia and Malaysia more critical.

Pero ninguno ha adoptado sanciones reales.

But none of them have imposed real sanctions.

ASEAN is such a frustrating story in this context.

They came up with this Five-Point Consensus in 2021, calling for a ceasefire, dialogue, humanitarian access.

And essentially nothing came of it.

Myanmar kept its seat at the table, and the principle of non-interference that ASEAN practically worships made any real pressure impossible.

La verdad es que la ASEAN está construida sobre un principio que en teoría suena razonable y en la práctica puede ser una coartada para la complicidad.

The truth is that ASEAN is built on a principle that sounds reasonable in theory and in practice can serve as cover for complicity.

No interferencia en los asuntos internos.

Non-interference in internal affairs.

Pero cuando esos asuntos internos incluyen masacres de civiles, ¿en qué punto la no interferencia se convierte en complicidad pasiva?

But when those internal affairs include the massacre of civilians, at what point does non-interference become passive complicity?

Es una pregunta que los propios miembros de la ASEAN no han querido responder.

That is a question that ASEAN's own members have refused to answer.

China's role is really the critical variable here.

Beijing has been investing heavily in Myanmar for years: pipelines, ports, infrastructure under the Belt and Road Initiative.

They need stability on that border.

But they've also maintained contacts with some of the ethnic armed groups near the Chinese frontier, as leverage.

They're playing multiple sides simultaneously.

Sí, China juega a varios tableros en Myanmar y lo hace con una habilidad que hay que reconocer aunque no te guste la estrategia.

Yes, China plays on multiple boards in Myanmar, and does so with a skill you have to acknowledge even if you dislike the strategy.

Necesita que los oleoductos y gasoductos que van desde el golfo de Bengala hasta Yunnan sigan funcionando.

It needs the oil and gas pipelines running from the Bay of Bengal to Yunnan to keep functioning.

Por eso presionó para que hubiera ceses del fuego en ciertas zonas, pero sin comprometerse definitivamente con ningún bando.

That is why it pushed for ceasefires in certain areas, without committing definitively to any side.

Es pragmatismo puro, sin ilusiones ideológicas.

It is pure pragmatism, with no ideological illusions.

Look, here's where I'd push back on a purely geopolitical reading.

There are roughly eighteen million people internally displaced or severely affected by this conflict right now.

Myanmar has become one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world, and it barely makes the front page because other wars are competing for attention.

Mira, tienes razón, y es un problema real de invisibilidad.

You are right, and the invisibility is a real problem.

Pero también quiero señalar algo: la resistencia birmana ha mostrado una resiliencia que nadie esperaba.

But I also want to point something out: the Burmese resistance has shown a resilience that nobody expected.

Hay jóvenes que hace cinco años eran estudiantes de informática o diseñadores gráficos que ahora están combatiendo en la selva.

There are young people who five years ago were computer science students or graphic designers who are now fighting in the jungle.

El Gobierno de Unidad Nacional ha logrado recaudar fondos, mantener una estructura política y conservar el reconocimiento de algunos países, aunque no del suficiente.

The National Unity Government has managed to raise funds, maintain a political structure, and retain the recognition of some countries, though not enough of them.

I spent time in Southeast Asia in the late nineties, and Burma, as it was still called then, had this reputation as a sealed, frozen place.

And the thing that struck me, even then, was how politically aware ordinary people were despite everything.

They weren't passive.

They just had no way to act.

Es que eso es exactamente lo que explotó en 2021.

That is exactly what exploded in 2021.

Toda esa conciencia política que había estado comprimida durante décadas.

All of that political awareness that had been compressed for decades.

La generación que había crecido con internet y con la apertura económica de los años 2010, que había viajado, que hablaba inglés, que tenía expectativas completamente distintas a las de sus padres.

The generation that grew up with the internet and the economic opening of the 2010s, that had traveled, that spoke English, that had completely different expectations from their parents.

Cuando llegó el golpe, esa generación no se resignó.

When the coup came, that generation did not accept it.

So when we ask what this election of Min Aung Hlaing actually means, I think the honest answer is: very little on the ground, but potentially something in terms of diplomatic theater.

It's a play for respectability.

The question is whether anyone in the international community is willing to give him that.

Exacto.

Exactly.

Y aquí es donde la historia de otros regímenes que buscaron legitimarse mediante instituciones formales es muy relevante.

And that is where the history of other regimes that sought to legitimize themselves through formal institutions becomes very relevant.

Franco hizo algo similar en España durante décadas: fue construyendo una arquitectura institucional, las Leyes Fundamentales, unas Cortes corporativistas, incluso un referéndum en 1947.

Franco did something similar in Spain for decades: he built an institutional architecture, the Fundamental Laws, a corporatist parliament, even a referendum in 1947.

Todo ello sin ceder el control real.

All of it without surrendering real control.

La formalidad como sustituto de la legitimidad democrática.

Formality as a substitute for democratic legitimacy.

No, you're absolutely right about that parallel.

Franco governed for thirty-six years by constantly updating the costume while keeping the same power structure underneath.

The question for Myanmar is whether the international environment, the sanctions, the ICC pressure, the actual military situation on the ground, makes that kind of slow normalization remotely possible.

My instinct is no.

La verdad es que el contexto internacional es mucho menos favorable para Min Aung Hlaing de lo que fue para Franco, que se benefició de la Guerra Fría y de la utilidad estratégica de España para Estados Unidos.

The international context is far less favorable for Min Aung Hlaing than it was for Franco, who benefited from the Cold War and Spain's strategic usefulness to the United States.

Min Aung Hlaing no tiene esa carta.

Min Aung Hlaing does not have that card.

Tiene a China, a Rusia, y la inercia de unos vecinos que prefieren la estabilidad al principio.

He has China, Russia, and the inertia of neighbors who prefer stability over principle.

Pero eso es un apoyo mucho más frágil.

But that is a much more fragile form of support.

And the military situation.

I keep coming back to this.

The junta is becoming president of a country where significant territory is no longer under its control.

The Karen National Union controls parts of the east.

The Arakan Army has taken huge portions of Rakhine State.

The Kachin Independence Army is active in the north.

This is not a unified state by any reasonable definition.

Bueno, hay quien argumenta que Myanmar nunca fue realmente un estado unificado en el sentido pleno del término, que el control del centro siempre fue disputado por la periferia étnica.

Well, there are those who argue that Myanmar was never truly a unified state in the full sense, that control from the center was always contested by the ethnic periphery.

Lo que ha cambiado es que la resistencia ya no es solo étnica: es también urbana, es birmana, es la mayoría.

What has changed is that the resistance is no longer only ethnic: it is also urban, it is Burmese, it is the majority.

Y eso hace que la ecuación política sea mucho más difícil de resolver para el ejército.

And that makes the political equation far harder for the military to resolve.

So where does this end?

Genuinely, I don't think anyone knows.

The scenarios range from a prolonged frozen conflict to some kind of negotiated federal structure to a complete collapse of central authority.

What seems off the table is a return to the status quo before 2021.

Min Aung Hlaing being president does not change that calculus.

A ver, lo que sí me parece claro es que esta presidencia no va a producir el reconocimiento internacional que la junta busca, al menos no de los actores que importan.

What does seem clear to me is that this presidency will not produce the international recognition the junta is looking for, at least not from the actors that matter.

Occidente no va a levantar las sanciones.

The West will not lift sanctions.

La CPI sigue activa.

The ICC remains active.

Y dentro de Myanmar, el Gobierno de Unidad Nacional ya ha rechazado esta elección como ilegítima.

And inside Myanmar, the National Unity Government has already rejected this election as illegitimate.

Min Aung Hlaing puede tener el título, pero el estado que gobierna es cada vez más pequeño y más frágil.

Min Aung Hlaing may have the title, but the state he governs is shrinking and becoming more fragile.

What I find most haunting about this whole story is the gap between the formality and the reality.

There's a man who was made president with 429 votes from a body he controls, while the country around him is in flames.

And the world is busy with Iran, with Ukraine, with everything else.

Myanmar is a catastrophe happening in a news blind spot.

Sí, y esa invisibilidad tiene un coste real para la gente que lo está viviendo.

Yes, and that invisibility has a real cost for the people living through it.

Pero quiero terminar con algo que me parece importante: a pesar de todo, la resistencia birmana existe, funciona y no se ha rendido.

But I want to end with something important: despite everything, the Burmese resistance exists, it functions, and it has not surrendered.

Eso no es poca cosa después de cinco años.

That is not a small thing after five years.

La legitimidad que Min Aung Hlaing no puede comprarse con votos controlados es precisamente la que esa gente, en la selva y en las ciudades, lleva cinco años construyendo con su sangre.

The legitimacy that Min Aung Hlaing cannot buy with controlled votes is precisely the legitimacy that those people, in the jungle and in the cities, have been building with their blood for five years.