B2 · Upper Intermediate
13 min
sports cultureglobal footballinstitutional powercommercialization
Infantino's Longest Day
El día que el fútbol dijo que no
Gianni Infantino tried to sell stakes in the World Cup to private investors including JPMorgan Chase, and the backlash was swift and brutal. Fletcher and Octavio dig into what happened, why football resists commodification in ways American sports never have, and what this episode reveals about the game's cultural DNA.
Gianni Infantino intentó vender participaciones del Mundial a inversores privados, incluido JPMorgan Chase, y la reacción fue inmediata y devastadora. Fletcher y Octavio analizan qué pasó, por qué el fútbol es diferente a cualquier otro negocio, y lo que este episodio revela sobre la cultura del deporte más popular del mundo.
5 essential B2-level terms from this episode, with translations and example sentences in Spanish.
| Spanish | English | Example |
|---|---|---|
| dar marcha atrás | to back down, to reverse course | El gobierno tuvo que dar marcha atrás en su propuesta después de las protestas. |
| vehículo financiero | financial vehicle (a legal structure for managing money) | La empresa creó un vehículo financiero para gestionar sus inversiones en el extranjero. |
| globo sonda | trial balloon (a test of public reaction before committing to a policy) | El ministro lanzó un globo sonda para ver cómo reaccionaría la oposición. |
| participación | stake, share (in a company or fund) | El banco quería comprar una participación en el nuevo fondo de inversión. |
| rendición | surrender, capitulation | Su retirada del proyecto fue vista por todos como una rendición ante la presión pública. |
There's a version of yesterday where JPMorgan Chase ends up owning a piece of the World Cup.
Think about that for a second.
Y lo más sorprendente no es que Infantino lo intentara, porque Infantino lleva años buscando formas de monetizar todo lo que toca.
And the most surprising thing isn't that Infantino tried it, because Infantino has spent years finding ways to monetize everything he touches.
Lo sorprendente es que en menos de veinticuatro horas tuvo que dar marcha atrás.
What's surprising is that within twenty-four hours he had to back down.
Right, so let me lay out what actually happened, because the timeline here is remarkable.
Infantino floated a plan to sell stakes in something called FIFA Forward Enterprise to private investors.
JPMorgan was named.
And then his own senior adviser, Carlos Cordeiro, resigned publicly and called it a bad deal for football's long-term future.
Cordeiro no es cualquier persona.
Cordeiro isn't just anyone.
Fue presidente de la Federación de Fútbol de los Estados Unidos.
He was president of the US Soccer Federation.
Es alguien que conoce el negocio del deporte americano desde dentro, y aun así dijo: no, esto va demasiado lejos.
He knows the American sports business from the inside, and even he said: no, this goes too far.
Which tells you something.
When a guy who spent his career in American sports, where private money is the whole architecture of the system, looks at a deal and says this is wrong, you have to ask why football draws that line differently.
Porque el fútbol no es simplemente un producto de entretenimiento.
Because football isn't simply an entertainment product.
Esa es la diferencia fundamental.
That's the fundamental difference.
Cuando dices que vas a vender participaciones del Mundial a un banco de inversión, no estás vendiendo un espectáculo, estás vendiendo algo que pertenece a la identidad colectiva de millones de personas.
When you say you're going to sell stakes in the World Cup to an investment bank, you're not selling a spectacle, you're selling something that belongs to the collective identity of millions of people.
Okay, but I want to push on that a little.
The NFL is owned by billionaires.
The NBA has private equity involved.
American fans don't seem to feel that their identity is being sold.
Porque esos deportes nacieron dentro de un sistema comercial.
Because those sports were born within a commercial system.
El fútbol, en cambio, nació en las calles, en los barrios, en los pueblos.
Football, on the other hand, was born in the streets, in neighborhoods, in villages.
En España, en Brasil, en Senegal, el fútbol es anterior al dinero.
In Spain, in Brazil, in Senegal, football predates the money.
Es parte de cómo la gente se reconoce a sí misma como comunidad.
It's part of how people recognize themselves as a community.
There's something to that.
I was in Buenos Aires in 2003, covering the economic collapse, and people had lost their savings, their jobs, everything.
But on a Sunday afternoon the streets would empty and everyone was watching football.
It was the one thing that still felt like it belonged to them.
Exactamente.
Exactly.
Y eso es lo que Infantino no entiende, o quizás sí entiende pero le da igual.
And that's what Infantino doesn't understand, or maybe he does understand it but doesn't care.
El problema es que lleva años tratando el fútbol como si fuera una empresa normal, cuando en realidad es una institución cultural con responsabilidades que van mucho más allá del balance económico.
The problem is that for years he's been treating football like a normal business, when in reality it's a cultural institution with responsibilities that go far beyond the financial balance sheet.
Let's talk about what FIFA Forward Enterprise actually is, because when I first saw the name I genuinely thought it was a parody.
Es el vehículo financiero que Infantino ha creado para gestionar los ingresos del Mundial.
It's the financial vehicle Infantino created to manage the World Cup's revenues.
La idea era vender participaciones de ese fondo a inversores privados, incluido JPMorgan, lo que significaría que un banco tendría derecho a una parte de los beneficios generados por el torneo más visto del planeta.
The idea was to sell stakes in that fund to private investors, including JPMorgan, which would mean a bank would have a right to a share of the profits generated by the most watched tournament on the planet.
And UEFA said no.
The AFC, which covers Asia, said no.
And the threat on the table was a boycott of the 2030 World Cup.
That's not a minor threat.
Claro que no.
Of course not.
Sin Europa y sin Asia, el Mundial no existe.
Without Europe and Asia, the World Cup doesn't exist.
Es como organizar una final sin los dos finalistas.
It's like organizing a final without the two finalists.
Infantino lo sabía, y aun así lo intentó.
Infantino knew it, and he tried anyway.
Eso dice mucho de cómo funciona la cabeza de este hombre.
That says a lot about how this man's mind works.
Here's what I keep coming back to.
This isn't Infantino's first time at this particular rodeo.
He expanded the World Cup to forty-eight teams.
He pushed through a Club World Cup that nobody asked for.
He moved tournaments around for TV money.
There's a pattern.
El patrón es el siguiente: Infantino propone algo que parece imposible, genera escándalo, negocia, cede parcialmente, y al final consigue algo que antes era impensable.
The pattern is this: Infantino proposes something that seems impossible, generates a scandal, negotiates, partially concedes, and in the end gets something that was previously unthinkable.
Lo del Club Mundial funcionó así.
The Club World Cup worked that way.
Pero esta vez se fue demasiado lejos y la respuesta fue demasiado rápida.
But this time he went too far and the response was too fast.
The reversal happened the same day.
Which means either he massively miscalculated the reaction, or this was a negotiating tactic from the start, throw out the extreme version and see what sticks.
Yo creo que fue un globo sonda.
I think it was a trial balloon.
Infantino quería ver hasta dónde podía llegar.
Infantino wanted to see how far he could go.
Y la respuesta fue clara: hasta aquí.
And the answer was clear: this far and no further.
Lo que no sabemos es qué versión más discreta de lo mismo sigue sobre la mesa.
What we don't know is what more discreet version of the same idea is still on the table.
That's a sharp point and I think you're probably right.
Let's zoom out a bit, though, because FIFA's relationship with money is a long story.
We're talking about an organization that was essentially a criminal enterprise for a decade.
La era Blatter.
The Blatter era.
Los sobornos para adjudicar los Mundiales, el FBI investigando a directivos de la FIFA en hoteles de Zúrich, la imagen de la organización por los suelos.
The bribes to award World Cups, the FBI investigating FIFA officials in Zurich hotels, the organization's reputation in ruins.
Infantino llegó prometiendo transparencia y reforma.
Infantino arrived promising transparency and reform.
Esa promesa lleva tiempo siendo una broma.
That promise has been a joke for a while now.
I was in Geneva when some of the early indictments came down.
And what struck me was how unsurprised everyone in football seemed.
There was this collective shrug, like, yes, obviously, we knew.
Porque lo sabían.
Because they did know.
El problema no era que fuera un secreto, sino que parecía imparable.
The problem wasn't that it was a secret, but that it seemed unstoppable.
Y ahí está la paradoja del fútbol: es el deporte más popular del mundo, con millones de aficionados apasionados, y sin embargo durante décadas no fue capaz de controlar a sus propios dirigentes.
And there's the paradox of football: it's the most popular sport in the world, with millions of passionate fans, and yet for decades it couldn't control its own leadership.
Part of that is structural, isn't it?
FIFA has two hundred and eleven member associations, more than the United Nations has member states.
When you have that kind of diffuse power base, with smaller federations dependent on FIFA development money, you create structural leverage that's very easy to abuse.
Exacto.
Exactly.
Y Infantino aprendió bien esa lección.
And Infantino learned that lesson well.
Sabe que si mantiene contentas a las federaciones pequeñas de África, Asia y el Caribe con dinero de desarrollo, ellas votan con él en los congresos.
He knows that if he keeps the small federations of Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean happy with development money, they vote with him at congresses.
Es la misma estrategia que usaba Blatter, solo que con mejor imagen pública.
It's the same strategy Blatter used, just with better public relations.
So what does it mean that UEFA and the AFC were able to stop this so fast?
Is that a sign that the power balance has actually shifted, or was this just too blatant even by FIFA's standards?
Las dos cosas, creo.
Both things, I think.
UEFA tiene un poder económico enorme porque controla los mercados televisivos más valiosos del mundo.
UEFA has enormous economic power because it controls the most valuable television markets in the world.
Si UEFA se va, los ingresos del Mundial caen de forma dramática.
If UEFA leaves, World Cup revenues fall dramatically.
Y esta propuesta era tan evidente en su intención de enriquecer a inversores privados que incluso los aliados habituales de Infantino no podían defenderla.
And this proposal was so obvious in its intention to enrich private investors that even Infantino's usual allies couldn't defend it.
I want to come back to something you said earlier, about football belonging to communities in a way American sports don't.
Because I think there's a generational shift happening even in the US that complicates that.
Es verdad.
That's true.
El fútbol crece en Estados Unidos precisamente porque atrae a generaciones más jóvenes y a comunidades inmigrantes que traen consigo esa relación diferente con el deporte.
Football grows in the United States precisely because it attracts younger generations and immigrant communities who bring with them that different relationship with the sport.
No es un producto que se consume, es algo en lo que se participa emocionalmente de otra manera.
It's not a product you consume, it's something you participate in emotionally in a different way.
And hosting the 2026 World Cup in the States, that's already changed things there.
I have former colleagues in Texas who never cared about football and now they're arguing about whether the USMNT's midfield has enough pressing intensity.
Something got unlocked.
El fútbol siempre llega tarde a los sitios donde ya tiene que estar.
Football always arrives late to the places where it was always meant to be.
Pero cuando llega, se queda.
But when it arrives, it stays.
That's almost poetic.
I'm writing that down.
But here's what I think is the real cultural question underneath all of this: can football's cultural meaning survive the level of commercialization it's already undergone, let alone what Infantino was proposing?
Esta es la pregunta que me quita el sueño, te lo digo en serio.
This is the question that keeps me up at night, I'm telling you seriously.
Los derechos televisivos ya han cambiado los horarios de los partidos, la estructura de las ligas, la relación entre los clubes y sus aficionados locales.
Television rights have already changed match schedules, league structures, the relationship between clubs and their local fans.
El dinero ya está dentro del sistema.
The money is already inside the system.
La pregunta es si hay un punto de no retorno.
The question is whether there's a point of no return.
And you think yesterday's reversal is evidence that maybe we haven't crossed that point yet.
Quiero creer que sí.
I want to believe that yes.
Cuando la UEFA, la AFC, y el propio asesor de Infantino se levantan al mismo tiempo y dicen no, eso es el fútbol defendiéndose a sí mismo.
When UEFA, the AFC, and Infantino's own adviser stand up at the same time and say no, that is football defending itself.
No los gobiernos, no los reguladores, sino el propio sistema del fútbol rechazando algo que va en contra de lo que es.
Not governments, not regulators, but football's own system rejecting something that goes against what it is.
Though the cynic in me notes that UEFA's objection isn't purely philosophical.
They have their own competing commercial interests.
The Champions League is a financial empire.
Their resistance to Infantino is partly about protecting their own piece of the pie.
Sin duda.
Without a doubt.
Los motivos pueden ser impuros y el resultado puede ser bueno al mismo tiempo.
Motives can be impure and the result can still be good at the same time.
No me importa por qué se opuso la UEFA si el resultado es que el Mundial no acaba en manos de JPMorgan.
I don't care why UEFA opposed it if the result is that the World Cup doesn't end up in JPMorgan's hands.
Fair enough.
That's an interesting kind of pragmatism.
The right outcome for the wrong reasons still counts.
En política y en fútbol, muchas victorias son así.
In politics and in football, many victories are like that.
Oye, y hay algo más que me parece importante: el hecho de que esto se resolviera en un día demuestra que la presión pública todavía funciona.
And look, there's something else I think is important: the fact that this was resolved in a day shows that public pressure still works.
Las redes sociales, los aficionados, los medios.
Social media, fans, the press.
Infantino vio que la tormenta era demasiado grande.
Infantino saw that the storm was too big.
Which is something I find genuinely encouraging after years of covering institutions that seemed completely impervious to public opinion.
There's something different about football's relationship with its audience.
La diferencia es la pasión.
The difference is passion.
Un aficionado al fútbol no es un consumidor que puede elegir otro producto.
A football fan isn't a consumer who can choose another product.
Para muchas personas, su equipo, su selección, el Mundial, son parte de su identidad.
For many people, their club, their national team, the World Cup, these are part of their identity.
Y cuando sientes que algo amenaza tu identidad, reaccionas de una manera que no reaccionarías ante cualquier otra cosa.
And when you feel something threatens your identity, you react in a way you wouldn't react to anything else.
You know, you used a phrase a few minutes ago that I want to ask you about.
You said Infantino had to "dar marcha atrás." Give ground, back down.
But there's something about that phrase that feels more vivid in Spanish than any English equivalent I can think of.
Es que es literalmente lo que hace un coche cuando mete la marcha atrás.
Because it's literally what a car does when it reverses.
Estabas avanzando, y de repente das marcha atrás.
You were moving forward, and suddenly you back up.
Puedes usarlo con cualquier cosa: un político da marcha atrás en una ley, una empresa da marcha atrás en una decisión.
You can use it with anything: a politician backs down on a law, a company reverses a decision.
Siempre tiene ese sentido de retroceder sobre tus propios pasos.
It always carries that sense of retracing your own steps.
So it's more physical than "to reverse" or "to back down" in English.
It puts you behind the wheel.
Exacto.
Exactly.
Y tiene una connotación ligeramente negativa.
And it has a slightly negative connotation.
Cuando dices que alguien ha dado marcha atrás, estás insinuando que tuvo que retroceder porque no le quedaba otra opción.
When you say someone has given reverse gear, you're implying they had to retreat because they had no other choice.
No es una retirada elegante.
It's not an elegant withdrawal.
Es una rendición.
It's a surrender.
So "Infantino dio marcha atrás" is actually doing more work than "Infantino backed down." It's saying he didn't choose to stop, he was forced to stop.
Eso es.
That's it.
Y en este caso, es la descripción más precisa de lo que ocurrió.
And in this case, it's the most accurate description of what happened.
No fue una revisión estratégica.
It wasn't a strategic review.
Fue un hombre que pisó el freno porque alguien se puso delante del coche.
It was a man hitting the brakes because someone stepped in front of the car.