El carbón y el clima: La gran contradicción de China

Bueno, eso es lo que dice el gobierno chino, sí.

That's what the Chinese government says.

Pero muchos científicos y economistas dicen que el puente es demasiado largo.

But many scientists and economists say the bridge is too long.

Si China continúa con el carbón hasta 2035 o 2040, el planeta no puede llegar al objetivo de 1,5 grados.

If China stays on coal until 2035 or 2040, the planet can't reach the 1.5 degree target.

The 1.5 degree target from the Paris Agreement.

Just so everyone is on the same page, that's the threshold scientists identified beyond which climate change becomes significantly more dangerous.

More extreme weather, more displacement, more sea level rise.

It's not an arbitrary number.

Y China es responsable de casi el treinta por ciento de todas las emisiones de dióxido de carbono del mundo cada año.

And China is responsible for almost thirty percent of all global CO2 emissions every year.

Treinta por ciento.

Thirty percent.

Por eso, lo que hace China es tan importante.

That's why what China does is so important.

Si China no cambia, los otros países no pueden compensar esa diferencia.

If China doesn't change, no other country can compensate.

Here's something I find genuinely fascinating about the geopolitics of this.

China has consistently pushed back against what it calls Western hypocrisy on climate.

And the argument goes like this: you industrialized with coal for two hundred years, you got rich, and now you're telling us we can't do the same.

La verdad es que ese argumento tiene mucha fuerza.

That argument is genuinely powerful.

Gran Bretaña, Alemania, Estados Unidos, todos usaron carbón durante muchos años para hacerse ricos.

Britain, Germany, the United States, all used coal for years to get rich.

La contaminación histórica de esos países es enorme.

The historical emissions of those countries are enormous.

Es difícil pedirle a China que haga un sacrificio que los países ricos no hicieron.

It's hard to ask China for a sacrifice the rich countries never made.

I've sat across the table from Chinese officials and heard this argument made very calmly, very precisely.

And you can't just wave it away.

The concept in climate diplomacy is called 'common but differentiated responsibilities.' Which means we all have to act, but we shouldn't all be held to the same standard.

Mira, yo entiendo el argumento histórico.

I understand the historical argument.

Pero el problema es que el clima no lee la historia.

But the problem is the climate doesn't read history.

El CO2 que emitimos hoy es tan peligroso como el que emitieron los ingleses en 1850.

The CO2 we emit today is as dangerous as what the British emitted in 1850.

El planeta no distingue entre emisiones justas e injustas.

The planet doesn't distinguish between fair and unfair emissions.

That is, and I mean this, a genuinely devastating point.

The atmosphere doesn't have a conscience.

It just accumulates.

So the moral argument, however valid historically, doesn't actually change the physics.

Es que por eso la situación es tan difícil.

That's exactly why the situation is so hard.

Es un problema de justicia y al mismo tiempo es un problema de supervivencia.

It's a problem of justice and a problem of survival at the same time.

Y los dos objetivos no siempre van en la misma dirección.

And those two objectives don't always point in the same direction.

Let's come back to Shanxi for a moment, because I think the human dimension gets lost in these big macro conversations.

Four people died in a mine collapse this week.

And statistically, coal mining in China kills thousands of people every year, even with improved safety standards.

Sí, y eso es también un argumento climático, aunque no lo parece.

Yes, and that's also a climate argument, even if it doesn't look like one.

Las energías renovables son más seguras para los trabajadores.

Renewables are safer for workers.

Un parque eólico no mata a cuatro personas en un derrumbe.

A wind farm doesn't kill four people in a collapse.

Entonces la transición energética no es solo buena para el planeta, también es buena para las personas.

So the energy transition is good for the planet and good for people.

The extraordinary thing is that this argument, the worker safety argument, actually has more traction in Chinese political discussions than the abstract climate argument.

Because Chinese leaders are very sensitive to incidents that cause public unrest, and mine disasters do exactly that.

Bueno, China tuvo accidentes mineros muy graves en los años noventa y dos mil.

China had very serious mining accidents in the 1990s and 2000s.

Muchos muertos, mucha indignación pública.

Many deaths, a lot of public anger.

El gobierno respondió con nuevas leyes de seguridad.

The government responded with new safety laws.

Los números mejoraron, pero los accidentes continuaron.

The numbers improved, but the accidents continued.

Shanxi es un ejemplo de eso.

Shanxi is an example of that.

And there's another layer here that I think is worth naming.

The war in Ukraine, the energy crisis that followed, actually set back the global transition away from coal significantly.

Countries panicked about energy security and reopened coal plants they had closed.

Germany, South Korea, even Japan.

La verdad es que eso fue un momento muy triste para el clima.

That was a very sad moment for the climate.

Alemania cerró sus últimas centrales nucleares y volvió al carbón durante un tiempo.

Germany closed its last nuclear plants and went back to coal for a time.

Es una paradoja enorme.

One war in Europe accelerated emissions across the whole world.

Una guerra en Europa aceleró las emisiones en todo el mundo.

A massive paradox.

And now we have another major conflict, this Iran situation, which is driving oil prices through the roof.

Over a hundred and sixteen dollars a barrel this week.

Which, paradoxically, makes coal look more attractive again as a cheap alternative.

Every geopolitical shock seems to buy coal a few more years.

A ver, eso es un ciclo muy peligroso.

That is a very dangerous cycle.

El carbón es barato cuando hay crisis de energía.

Coal is cheap when there's an energy crisis.

Entonces la gente lo usa más.

So people use more of it.

Pero el carbón también crea una crisis diferente, la crisis climática.

But coal creates a different crisis, the climate crisis.

Y la crisis climática crea más inestabilidad política, que crea más guerras, que crean más crisis de energía.

And the climate crisis creates more political instability, which creates more wars, which create more energy crises.

That is a tight little doom loop you've just described.

And look, there's real evidence for it.

Climate scientists have been arguing for years that resource stress, drought, food insecurity, these are conflict multipliers.

They don't cause wars directly, but they make unstable situations more explosive.

Mira, hay estudios que conectan el inicio de la guerra civil en Siria con una sequía muy grave entre 2006 y 2010.

There are studies connecting the start of the Syrian civil war with a severe drought between 2006 and 2010.

Muchas personas perdieron sus cosechas, se movieron a las ciudades, y eso creó una presión social enorme.

Many people lost their harvests, moved to cities, and that created enormous social pressure.

No fue la única causa, pero fue una causa importante.

Not the only cause, but an important one.

I covered Syria in the early days of the uprising.

I remember interviewing displaced farmers in Aleppo who had walked off their land.

They talked about the drought constantly.

It was in every conversation.

The political scientists back home were still arguing about whether climate caused the war.

The farmers were not confused.

Es que eso es muy humano.

That's very human.

Las personas que viven el problema saben la causa.

The people living the problem know the cause.

Los expertos en los despachos todavía debaten.

The experts in their offices are still debating.

Y mientras debaten, el problema continúa.

And while they debate, the problem continues.

So let's talk about where this leaves us.

China has committed to peaking emissions before 2030.

Six years away.

Is that commitment credible?

I know you have views on this.

Bueno, hay señales positivas y señales negativas al mismo tiempo.

There are positive and negative signs simultaneously.

Lo positivo: China instaló más energía solar en 2023 que todos los otros países juntos en toda su historia.

Positive: China installed more solar energy in 2023 than all other countries combined in their entire history.

Eso es increíble.

That's incredible.

Lo negativo: también aprobó más permisos para nuevas centrales de carbón que en los diez años anteriores.

Negative: it also approved more permits for new coal plants than in the previous ten years combined.

Both of those numbers are true simultaneously.

And I think that's the honest picture, isn't it.

China is running two energy systems in parallel.

A clean one that's growing fast, and a dirty one that hasn't stopped growing yet either.

The question is which one wins.

La verdad es que muchos economistas piensan que las energías renovables van a ganar simplemente porque son más baratas.

Many economists think renewables will win simply because they're cheaper.

En China, la energía solar ya es más barata que el carbón en muchas regiones.

In China, solar energy is already cheaper than coal in many regions.

Y cuando algo es más barato, la gente lo elige.

And when something is cheaper, people choose it.

Es simple.

It's that simple.

The economics-will-solve-it argument.

I want to believe it.

I really do.

But economics moves slowly compared to atmospheric physics.

And the question isn't whether the market eventually gets there, it's whether it gets there fast enough.

Those are two very different questions.

A ver, tienes razón.

You're right.

El tiempo importa mucho en el clima.

Time matters enormously with climate.

Una tonelada de CO2 emitida hoy tiene el mismo efecto que una tonelada emitida en diez años.

A ton of CO2 emitted today has the same effect as a ton emitted in ten years.

Por eso, actuar despacio es casi lo mismo que no actuar.

That's why acting slowly is almost the same as not acting.

Cada año importa.

Every year counts.

Every year counts.

And four people died in a coal mine in Shanxi this week, which is a small tragedy by the numbers, but it's a reminder of what the world still runs on.

The ordinary, unglamorous, deadly fuel that built the modern world and is now threatening to unmake it.

Bueno, y para terminar, yo creo que la historia de Shanxi no es solo una historia china.

To close, I think the story of Shanxi is not just a Chinese story.

Es una historia universal.

It's a universal one.

Todos los países tuvieron su Shanxi.

Every country had its Shanxi.

El carbón fue el motor del mundo moderno.

Coal was the engine of the modern world.

Ahora tenemos que encontrar un motor nuevo, sin destruir a las personas que todavía dependen del antiguo.

Now we have to find a new engine, without destroying the people who still depend on the old one.

That is, I think, the best summary of the climate transition challenge I've heard in a long time.

And it came from a man who thinks paella should have chorizo in it, so clearly judgment is not entirely reliable.

But on this one, he's right.

Es que la paella y el clima son temas completamente diferentes, Fletcher.

Paella and climate are completely different topics, Fletcher.

Aunque en los dos casos tú estás equivocado.

Although in both cases you are wrong.