Cien dólares el barril: el petróleo y el precio de la guerra

Because that's the ghost that haunts every conversation about Middle East oil disruptions.

And I wonder how much of what we're seeing now rhymes with that moment.

Bueno, hay paralelismos claros, pero también diferencias fundamentales.

Well, there are clear parallels, but also fundamental differences.

En 1973, el embargo fue una decisión política coordinada de los países árabes de la OPEP para castigar a Occidente por su apoyo a Israel.

In 1973, the embargo was a coordinated political decision by the Arab members of OPEC to punish the West for its support of Israel.

Ahora estamos ante una guerra activa, no un embargo.

Now we're facing an active war, not an embargo.

Y el mundo energético de 2026 no se parece en nada al de 1973.

And the energy world of 2026 looks nothing like the one in 1973.

Right, in 1973 the US was a net importer, almost entirely dependent on foreign oil.

The shale revolution changed that equation dramatically.

The US became the world's biggest producer.

So theoretically, it should be more insulated from a Middle East disruption than it was fifty years ago.

Teóricamente, sí.

Theoretically, yes.

Pero el petróleo es un mercado global, Fletcher.

But oil is a global market, Fletcher.

Da igual que produzcas en Texas o en el Golfo Pérsico.

It doesn't matter whether you produce it in Texas or the Persian Gulf.

Si el precio sube en Rotterdam, sube en Houston.

If the price goes up in Rotterdam, it goes up in Houston.

Las refinerías estadounidenses compran en el mercado internacional.

American refineries buy on the international market.

La independencia energética es un eslogan político, no una realidad económica completa.

Energy independence is a political slogan, not a complete economic reality.

That's a point I've heard economists make for years and it never quite lands with the public.

People see American oil wells pumping and they think, why are we paying European prices?

But you're describing how commodity markets actually function.

Mira, es que la lógica es sencilla aunque el mecanismo parezca abstracto.

Look, the logic is simple even if the mechanism seems abstract.

Si puedo vender mi barril a ciento dieciséis dólares en el mercado internacional, no te lo voy a vender a ochenta solo porque seas americano.

If I can sell my barrel at a hundred and sixteen dollars on the international market, I'm not going to sell it to you for eighty just because you're American.

El mercado no tiene patria.

The market has no homeland.

Eso es lo que hace que estas crisis sean tan difíciles de aislar.

That's what makes these crises so hard to contain.

So let's bring in Europe, and specifically Spain, because Spain is in a very particular position right now.

It just closed its airspace to US military aircraft involved in operations against Iran.

That's a significant move for a NATO ally.

Es que España tiene una dependencia energética muy alta respecto al exterior.

The thing is, Spain has a very high energy dependence on imports.

Importamos más del setenta por ciento de la energía que consumimos.

We import more than seventy percent of the energy we consume.

Y aunque hemos avanzado mucho en renovables, seguimos siendo muy vulnerables a cualquier perturbación en los mercados de hidrocarburos.

And although we've made great strides in renewables, we remain very vulnerable to any disruption in hydrocarbon markets.

La decisión sobre el espacio aéreo tiene una lectura política, claro, pero también una lectura económica muy directa.

The airspace decision has a political reading, of course, but also a very direct economic one.

Here's what gets me about that decision.

Spain is essentially saying, we will not be instrumentalized in a war that is directly threatening our energy supply.

Which is a coherent position.

It's also going to create serious friction with Washington.

La verdad es que no es la primera vez que España adopta una posición incómoda en el contexto de una guerra con implicaciones energéticas.

The truth is it's not the first time Spain has adopted an uncomfortable position in the context of a war with energy implications.

Recuerda lo que pasó con Iraq en 2003.

Remember what happened with Iraq in 2003.

Aznar apoyó la invasión, y fue un cálculo político que tuvo consecuencias enormes.

Aznar supported the invasion, and it was a political calculation with enormous consequences.

Ahora el gobierno hace exactamente lo contrario, y también tendrá consecuencias.

Now the government is doing exactly the opposite, and it will also have consequences.

I mean, the Iraq parallel is interesting because that war also had a massive oil dimension that people talked about openly at the time and then sort of quietly agreed to stop discussing.

The phrase 'blood for oil' became almost a cliché, which paradoxically made the real analysis harder.

Exacto, el eslogan mató el análisis.

Exactly, the slogan killed the analysis.

Pero ahora mismo, con el crudo a ciento dieciséis dólares, nadie puede fingir que la energía no está en el centro de todo esto.

But right now, with crude at a hundred and sixteen dollars, nobody can pretend that energy isn't at the center of all this.

Israel ha anunciado que va a golpear objetivos económicos iraníes.

Israel has announced it will strike Iranian economic targets.

¿Cuáles son los activos económicos más valiosos de Irán?

What are Iran's most valuable economic assets?

Sus instalaciones petrolíferas.

Its oil facilities.

Eso es lo que está descontando el mercado.

That's what the market is pricing in.

And we already saw what happens when oil infrastructure gets hit.

There was a missile barrage from Iran and Lebanon yesterday that set a refinery on fire in Haifa.

The BAZAN refinery.

Both sides are now targeting each other's energy infrastructure.

A ver, golpear refinerías no es nuevo en los conflictos modernos.

Well, hitting refineries is nothing new in modern conflicts.

Lo vimos en la guerra del Golfo, lo vimos en Yemen con los ataques a Aramco en 2019.

We saw it in the Gulf War, we saw it in Yemen with the Aramco attacks in 2019.

Pero cuando esa lógica se aplica a instalaciones iraníes, el impacto potencial en los mercados mundiales es de un orden de magnitud completamente distinto.

But when that logic is applied to Iranian facilities, the potential impact on global markets is of a completely different order of magnitude.

The 2019 Aramco attack is a good reference point.

Drones hit two Saudi facilities and for a moment, about five percent of global oil supply vanished overnight.

The price spiked fifteen percent in a single day.

Biggest one-day jump in history.

And that was Saudi Arabia, with enormous spare capacity to compensate.

Y ahí está la clave de lo que estamos viviendo ahora.

And there's the key to what we're living through now.

En 2019, Arabia Saudí tenía reservas estratégicas y capacidad de producción adicional.

In 2019, Saudi Arabia had strategic reserves and additional production capacity.

Pudo absorber el golpe.

It could absorb the blow.

Hoy, con la OPEP ya bombeando cerca de sus límites y la demanda global sin ceder, ese colchón es mucho más delgado.

Today, with OPEC already pumping close to its limits and global demand not letting up, that cushion is much thinner.

El margen de error es mínimo.

The margin for error is minimal.

So let's talk about who's actually benefiting from this.

Because a hundred and sixteen dollar barrel is terrible news for oil-importing countries.

But someone is making an extraordinary amount of money right now.

Bueno, los grandes ganadores son los que siempre ganan en estas situaciones.

Well, the big winners are the ones who always win in these situations.

Arabia Saudí, los Emiratos, Kuwait, Irak.

Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, Iraq.

Y Rusia, que sigue vendiendo petróleo a pesar de las sanciones, sobre todo a China y a India, y a estos precios está recaudando cantidades ingentes para financiar su guerra en Ucrania.

And Russia, which keeps selling oil despite the sanctions, especially to China and India, and at these prices is collecting enormous sums to finance its war in Ukraine.

La ironía es brutal.

The irony is brutal.

There's also a Venezuela angle here that I find fascinating given the other news today.

The US just reopened its embassy in Caracas after seven years.

And Venezuela, under the current government, is sitting on the world's largest proven oil reserves.

At a hundred and sixteen dollars a barrel, that relationship suddenly becomes very interesting.

Es que eso no es una coincidencia, Fletcher.

That's not a coincidence, Fletcher.

La diplomacia del petróleo tiene su propia lógica, que a veces supera a la lógica ideológica.

Oil diplomacy has its own logic, which sometimes overrides ideological logic.

La administración Trump lleva años calificando al gobierno venezolano de dictadura ilegítima.

The Trump administration has spent years calling the Venezuelan government an illegitimate dictatorship.

Y aun así, cuando el barril se acerca a ciento veinte dólares, alguien en Washington decide que es el momento de reabrir la embajada.

And yet, when the barrel approaches a hundred and twenty dollars, someone in Washington decides it's time to reopen the embassy.

El pragmatismo energético es muy poderoso.

Energy pragmatism is very powerful.

The thing is, this pattern repeats itself endlessly.

I was in Buenos Aires in the late nineties when Venezuela was becoming a major diplomatic flashpoint, and even then, every conversation eventually looped back to oil.

Ideology gets suspended when the tanker arrives.

Y hablando de tanqueros, hoy también hay noticias de un barco ruso con cien mil toneladas de crudo que ha llegado a Cuba desafiando el bloqueo estadounidense.

And speaking of tankers, today there's also news of a Russian ship with a hundred thousand tonnes of crude oil arriving in Cuba in defiance of the US blockade.

Mira, cada uno de estos movimientos, Venezuela, Cuba, Irán, tiene una dimensión energética que no siempre se nombra con claridad.

Look, each one of these moves, Venezuela, Cuba, Iran, has an energy dimension that isn't always named clearly.

Right, so you're essentially describing a shadow energy economy that runs parallel to the official one.

Sanctioned oil moving through gray-market channels.

The official price is $116, but there's a whole other market operating underneath that, and in a crisis, those channels become more important, not less.

Exactamente.

Exactly.

Y China es el gran actor en ese mercado en la sombra.

And China is the major player in that shadow market.

Lleva años comprando petróleo iraní con descuento, a veces a través de terceros países, a veces directamente.

It's been buying Iranian oil at a discount for years, sometimes through third countries, sometimes directly.

Con el crudo a estos niveles, ese descuento sigue siendo enorme incluso si pagas cincuenta o sesenta dólares menos que el precio de mercado.

With crude at these levels, that discount is still enormous even if you pay fifty or sixty dollars less than the market price.

Es un negocio muy rentable.

It's a very profitable business.

Let me push on the inflation angle because I think it's the one that matters most to most people.

In 2022, when Russia invaded Ukraine and oil spiked, inflation in Europe hit double digits in some countries.

Central banks raised rates aggressively.

That rate cycle is barely over.

And now this.

La situación para el Banco Central Europeo es casi kafkiana.

The situation for the European Central Bank is almost Kafkaesque.

Por un lado, la economía europea todavía necesita tipos bajos para crecer.

On one hand, the European economy still needs low interest rates to grow.

Por otro, si el petróleo se queda en estos niveles, la inflación vuelve a dispararse y tienes que subir tipos.

On the other, if oil stays at these levels, inflation shoots up again and you have to raise rates.

Es una trampa.

It's a trap.

No hay una respuesta buena, solo respuestas menos malas.

There's no good answer, only less bad answers.

And here's the longer-term question I keep coming back to.

Every one of these oil shocks, 1973, 1979, 1990, 2008, 2022, produces a wave of rhetoric about energy transition and reducing dependence on fossil fuels.

And then the price comes down, and the urgency disappears.

Is this time different?

A ver, hay razones para pensar que sí es diferente.

Well, there are reasons to think it is different.

La infraestructura de energías renovables ya es enorme comparada con lo que había en 2008.

The renewable energy infrastructure is already enormous compared to what existed in 2008.

Los costes de la solar y la eólica han caído de manera espectacular.

The costs of solar and wind have fallen spectacularly.

Pero también hay razones para el escepticismo.

But there are also reasons for skepticism.

El mundo sigue consumiendo cien millones de barriles al día.

The world still consumes a hundred million barrels a day.

Eso no se sustituye de un año para otro.

You can't replace that from one year to the next.

Spain is actually one of the more interesting case studies here, I think.

You've been building renewable capacity aggressively, there are moments when the grid runs entirely on renewables.

Is the pain of a $116 barrel different in Spain than it was a decade ago?

La verdad es que sí, aunque menos de lo que nos gustaría.

The truth is yes, although less than we'd like.

El sector eléctrico ha cambiado mucho.

The electricity sector has changed a lot.

Hay días, muchos días, en que España genera más electricidad renovable de la que consume.

There are days, many days, when Spain generates more renewable electricity than it consumes.

Pero el transporte, la industria pesada, la petroquímica, todo eso sigue dependiendo del petróleo.

But transport, heavy industry, petrochemicals, all of that still depends on oil.

La transición es real pero parcial.

The transition is real but partial.

So when people ask when we can stop caring about what happens in the Persian Gulf, the honest answer is, not yet.

Maybe not for another generation.

The political will is there in some places, the technology is advancing, but the physical infrastructure of the global economy still runs on oil.

Mira, yo pienso en eso a menudo.

Look, I think about that often.

Vivimos en un mundo que habla constantemente de descarbonización, de coches eléctricos, de hidrógeno verde.

We live in a world that talks constantly about decarbonization, electric cars, green hydrogen.

Y al mismo tiempo, una guerra en Oriente Medio hace temblar los mercados globales exactamente igual que en 1973.

And at the same time, a war in the Middle East shakes global markets in exactly the same way as in 1973.

Hay una brecha enorme entre el discurso y la realidad física.

There is an enormous gap between the discourse and the physical reality.

I want to end with something concrete.

If you're someone living in Madrid or Seville right now, watching the news, seeing that price ticker, what should you actually be watching for in the next few weeks?

What's the number or the event that tells you this gets worse, or that it starts to stabilize?

Bueno, hay tres indicadores que yo seguiría de cerca.

Well, there are three indicators I would watch closely.

Primero, cualquier ataque israelí sobre infraestructura petrolífera iraní, porque eso podría disparar el precio a niveles que aún no hemos visto.

First, any Israeli strike on Iranian oil infrastructure, because that could push the price to levels we haven't seen yet.

Segundo, las negociaciones entre Irán y Estados Unidos, que según algunos indicios ya están en marcha.

Second, the negotiations between Iran and the United States, which by some indications are already underway.

Si hay acuerdo, el precio cae.

If there's an agreement, the price falls.

Y tercero, lo que decida hacer Arabia Saudí con su producción.

And third, what Saudi Arabia decides to do with its production.

Esos tres factores van a determinar si en verano estamos pagando dos euros el litro de gasolina o tres.

Those three factors will determine whether in summer we're paying two euros a liter of gasoline or three.

Two euros or three.

Framed that way, geopolitics suddenly becomes very personal.

That's a good place to leave it.

What the price at the pump actually costs is not just a number on a screen in London or Chicago.

It's a war, a strait, a negotiation, and fifty years of unresolved history, all at once.

Es que eso es lo que me parece más importante entender.

That's what I think is most important to understand.

El precio del barril no es un dato económico abstracto.

The price of a barrel is not an abstract economic data point.

Es la suma de todas las decisiones políticas, militares y diplomáticas que hemos tomado, y que no hemos tomado, durante décadas.

It is the sum of all the political, military, and diplomatic decisions we have made, and failed to make, over decades.

Cuando ves ese número en la pantalla, estás viendo la historia en tiempo real.

When you see that number on the screen, you are watching history in real time.