The Spy and the Friend: Hungary, Russia, and the Art of Playing Both Sides

And Hungary's parliament wasn't even allowed to debate the financing terms for ten years.

Ten years of classified nuclear energy policy.

Correcto.

Correct.

Y eso nos lleva al corazón de lo que Rusia ha construido en Hungría durante los últimos veinte años: una dependencia estructural.

And that brings us to the heart of what Russia has built in Hungary over the last twenty years: a structural dependency.

No solo política o ideológica, sino económica y energética.

Not just political or ideological, but economic and energetic.

Hungría depende del gas ruso, depende de la financiación rusa para Paks, y eso le da a Moscú una palanca enorme sobre Budapest.

Hungary depends on Russian gas, depends on Russian financing for Paks, and that gives Moscow enormous leverage over Budapest.

So the spy in the think tanks fits into this larger picture.

You've already got the energy dependency, you've got the ideological sympathy, and then on top of that you have an intelligence operation running quietly through the intellectual infrastructure that produces the arguments Orbán uses to justify all of it.

Exactamente.

Exactly.

En Hungría hay toda una red de think tanks, fundaciones y medios de comunicación que están bajo el control directo o indirecto del gobierno de Orbán.

In Hungary there's an entire network of think tanks, foundations, and media outlets under the direct or indirect control of Orbán's government.

Es lo que los académicos llaman una captura de estado: no es solo que Orbán controle el gobierno, es que controla las instituciones que producen las ideas que legitiman ese gobierno.

Academics call this state capture: it's not just that Orbán controls the government, it's that he controls the institutions that produce the ideas that legitimize that government.

And that's exactly where you'd want to plant an SVR officer if you were Moscow.

Not in the ministry of defense, not near any military hardware.

Right in the middle of the people who write the papers, who organize the conferences, who shape the intellectual climate.

Mira, esto no es nuevo.

Look, this isn't new.

La Unión Soviética hacía lo mismo durante la Guerra Fría.

The Soviet Union did the same thing during the Cold War.

Financiaba revistas de izquierda en Francia, organizaciones de paz en Alemania, intelectuales en Italia.

It funded left-wing journals in France, peace organizations in Germany, intellectuals in Italy.

La diferencia ahora es que Rusia lo hace con la derecha nacionalista, no con la izquierda progresista.

The difference now is that Russia does it with the nationalist right, not the progressive left.

El instrumento es el mismo;

The instrument is the same;

el destinatario ha cambiado.

the target has changed.

That shift is something I find genuinely fascinating, and I don't think it gets talked about enough.

The old Soviet playbook was aimed at the Western left, at anti-NATO sentiment, at peace movements.

Putin essentially flipped that entirely.

He found his allies in the populist right, in the people who talk about national sovereignty and Christian values and opposition to liberal elites.

Es un cambio ideológico notable.

It's a remarkable ideological shift.

Y tiene una lógica clara: la derecha populista europea comparte con Putin la desconfianza hacia las instituciones liberales, la OTAN, la Unión Europea, el universalismo de los derechos humanos.

And it has a clear logic: the European populist right shares with Putin a distrust of liberal institutions, NATO, the European Union, the universalism of human rights.

No es que Putin sea un ideólogo de derecha, sino que encontró un lenguaje común con esos movimientos.

It's not that Putin is a right-wing ideologue, but that he found a common language with those movements.

Now, here's where the story gets interesting for the EU specifically.

Hungary is a member state.

It has a veto in the Council.

And for years it's used that veto, or the threat of it, to water down sanctions on Russia, to delay military aid to Ukraine, to complicate every major European decision on the war.

Y eso le da a Rusia un valor enorme tener a Hungría dentro de la Unión Europea.

And that gives Russia enormous value in having Hungary inside the European Union.

Un socio dentro del bloque vale más que diez socios fuera de él.

One partner inside the bloc is worth more than ten partners outside it.

Orbán no necesita abandonar la UE para ser útil a Moscú;

Orbán doesn't need to leave the EU to be useful to Moscow;

de hecho, es mucho más útil dentro.

in fact, he's far more useful inside.

So then why did Hungary expel the diplomat at all?

Because that's the part I can't quite work out.

If the relationship is this cozy, what happened?

Pienso que hay dos posibilidades.

I think there are two possibilities.

La primera: la inteligencia húngara, o quizás la inteligencia de un aliado de la OTAN, identificó al oficial ruso y Orbán se vio obligado a actuar para no aparecer como un gobierno completamente comprometido con Moscú.

The first: Hungarian intelligence, or perhaps intelligence from a NATO ally, identified the Russian officer and Orbán was forced to act to avoid appearing as a government completely compromised by Moscow.

La segunda posibilidad es más inquietante: que el SVR se hubiera pasado de la raya, que estuviera haciendo algo que incluso Orbán consideraba inaceptable.

The second possibility is more unsettling: that the SVR had overstepped, that it was doing something even Orbán considered unacceptable.

The second one is the one that keeps pulling at me.

Because there's a version of this where the Russian intelligence operation got too deep, too close, too presumptuous, and Orbán had to send a message.

Even friendly relationships have limits.

Even client states don't like being treated as fully owned subsidiaries.

Eso es muy posible.

That's very possible.

Y hay un precedente histórico interesante: incluso durante la Guerra Fría, los países del bloque soviético como Polonia o Checoslovaquia expulsaban ocasionalmente a agentes soviéticos cuando estos cruzaban ciertas líneas.

And there's an interesting historical precedent: even during the Cold War, Soviet bloc countries like Poland or Czechoslovakia would occasionally expel Soviet agents when they crossed certain lines.

Era una forma de afirmar una mínima soberanía dentro de una relación profundamente desigual.

It was a way of asserting minimal sovereignty within a deeply unequal relationship.

The vassal who occasionally says no, not because he's free, but to remind himself that he could be.

Muy bien dicho.

Very well put.

Y fíjate también en el contexto europeo más amplio.

And notice the broader European context too.

En este momento, la Unión Europea está debatiendo seriamente cómo aumentar su independencia estratégica, cómo reducir sus vulnerabilidades.

Right now, the European Union is seriously debating how to increase its strategic independence, how to reduce its vulnerabilities.

Polonia acaba de firmar un acuerdo de préstamo de defensa con Bruselas por cuarenta y cuatro mil millones de euros.

Poland just signed a defense loan agreement with Brussels for forty-four billion euros.

Hay una reorientación real en curso.

There's a real reorientation underway.

Poland and Hungary.

Two countries that were once seen as the twin troublemakers of Central Europe, both led by nationalist governments, both in conflict with Brussels over the rule of law.

And now they're moving in almost opposite directions.

Poland is doubling down on its Western commitments.

Hungary is still playing this ambiguous game.

La diferencia fundamental es la historia.

The fundamental difference is history.

Polonia tiene una memoria histórica muy profunda de lo que significa vivir bajo la dominación rusa.

Poland has a very deep historical memory of what it means to live under Russian domination.

Esa memoria alimenta un rechazo instintivo hacia Moscú que va mucho más allá de la política del momento.

That memory feeds an instinctive rejection of Moscow that goes far beyond current politics.

Hungría tiene una historia diferente, una relación más compleja con su propio pasado bajo el comunismo.

Hungary has a different history, a more complex relationship with its own past under communism.

1956.

The Hungarian uprising and the Soviet tanks rolling into Budapest.

You'd think that would produce the same instinctive anti-Russian feeling as Poland.

But it didn't, or at least not in the same lasting way.

Es una paradoja histórica fascinante.

It's a fascinating historical paradox.

En parte se explica por el llamado 'goulash communism': el régimen húngaro de János Kádár, después de 1956, llegó a un acuerdo tácito con la sociedad.

Part of the explanation is what's called 'goulash communism': the Hungarian regime of János Kádár, after 1956, reached a tacit agreement with society.

'No os molestéis en política y tendréis una vida razonablemente cómoda.' Ese compromiso dejó una huella muy diferente a la brutalidad más directa que vivió Polonia.

'Don't bother us about politics and you'll have a reasonably comfortable life.' That compromise left a very different imprint than the more direct brutality Poland experienced.

Goulash communism.

I remember writing about that in a piece years ago.

The softer authoritarianism that buys acquiescence with consumer goods and a kind of managed normalcy.

And maybe Orbán is in some sense the inheritor of that tradition, just dressed up in a different ideological costume.

Eso es exactamente lo que argumentan muchos politólogos húngaros.

That's exactly what many Hungarian political scientists argue.

Orbán no inventó el autoritarismo en Hungría;

Orbán didn't invent authoritarianism in Hungary;

encontró un terreno social que lo hacía posible.

he found a social terrain that made it possible.

Y eso es preocupante, porque significa que el problema no se resuelve simplemente con un cambio de gobierno.

And that's worrying, because it means the problem isn't solved simply by a change of government.

So what does this spy expulsion actually change, practically speaking?

Does it alter the fundamental dynamic between Budapest and Moscow?

Or is this, in the end, just a diplomatic adjustment that changes nothing about the underlying relationship?

En el corto plazo, probablemente nada.

In the short term, probably nothing.

Rusia reemplazará al agente con otro;

Russia will replace the agent with another;

Hungría seguirá bloqueando o complicando decisiones europeas sobre Ucrania cuando le convenga.

Hungary will continue blocking or complicating European decisions on Ukraine when it suits them.

Pero hay algo simbólicamente importante: es la primera vez en años que Orbán hace algo que provoca un conflicto visible con Moscú.

But there's something symbolically important: it's the first time in years that Orbán has done something that provokes a visible conflict with Moscow.

Eso no es insignificante.

That's not insignificant.

It might also tell us something about where Orbán calculates his political interests to be right now.

If he's starting to read the room in Brussels, if he sees the European defence financing deals, the rearmament, the shift in sentiment, maybe he's hedging.

Just slightly.

Just enough.

Es que Orbán es un superviviente político extraordinario.

The thing is, Orbán is an extraordinary political survivor.

Lleva más de quince años en el poder.

He's been in power for more than fifteen years.

No ha sobrevivido tanto tiempo por ser rígido;

He hasn't survived that long by being rigid;

ha sobrevivido por ser enormemente adaptable.

he's survived by being enormously adaptable.

Si las condiciones cambian, él cambia.

If conditions change, he changes.

No por principios, sino por instinto político.

Not out of principle, but out of political instinct.

The man who bends so he doesn't break.

I've interviewed that type more times than I can count, in more countries than I care to remember.

They're always the last ones standing.

Exacto.

Exactly.

Y mientras tanto, los servicios de inteligencia de los aliados de la OTAN seguirán vigilando muy de cerca lo que pasa en Budapest.

And meanwhile, the intelligence services of NATO's allies will continue watching very closely what happens in Budapest.

Porque el problema no es solo Orbán;

Because the problem isn't just Orbán;

es lo que representa para la arquitectura de seguridad europea.

it's what he represents for European security architecture.

Un agujero dentro del bloque vale más para Moscú que cualquier operación en el exterior.

A hole inside the bloc is worth more to Moscow than any operation on the outside.

One thing I noticed in Octavio's description earlier, and I want to come back to it: he used the phrase 'es que Orbán es un superviviente.' That construction, 'es que,' it does something I can't quite capture in English.

It's not just 'the fact is' or 'the thing is.' There's a weight to it.

Buena observación.

Good observation.

'Es que' es un marcador discursivo muy útil en español.

'Es que' is a very useful discourse marker in Spanish.

Lo usamos para introducir una explicación o una razón, muchas veces con un matiz de algo que debería ser obvio.

We use it to introduce an explanation or a reason, often with a nuance that something should be obvious.

'Es que no lo entiendes' significa 'la razón de fondo, la que debería estar clara, es que no lo entiendes.'

'Es que no lo entiendes' means 'the underlying reason, the one that should be clear, is that you don't understand it.'

So it carries a slight implication that the speaker thinks this explanation should already be evident.

Like a gentle 'come on, think about it.'

Sí, y también puede funcionar como una forma de suavizar una crítica o una corrección.

Yes, and it can also work as a way to soften a criticism or correction.

Si alguien me dice algo incorrecto, puedo responder 'es que...' antes de corregirle, y resulta menos brusco que un 'no, estás equivocado.' En conversaciones cotidianas lo oirás constantemente.

If someone tells me something wrong, I can respond with 'es que...' before correcting them, and it sounds less blunt than a flat 'no, you're wrong.' In everyday conversations you'll hear it constantly.

So it's simultaneously an explanation, a mild rebuke, and a way of keeping things polite.

I'm going to try using it.

I'll probably deploy it incorrectly and you'll spend the rest of the month correcting me.

Es que no me sorprendería nada.

I wouldn't be surprised at all.

Pero al menos no dirás que estás embarazado.

But at least you won't say you're pregnant.