B2 · Upper Intermediate
15 min
environmenteconomicspoliticsglobal affairsscience and technology
¿Cuánto vale contaminar? Los mercados de carbono explicados
What's the Price of Pollution? Carbon Markets Explained
Fletcher breaks down this story in English. Octavio reacts and expands in Spanish. Follow along with the live transcript, tap any word for its translation. Upper Intermediate level — perfect for confident speakers refining their skills.
Here's a question that used to keep me up at night covering the climate beat.
If pollution is a problem, and markets are good at solving problems, why not just make pollution expensive?
Seems almost too simple.
Bueno, es que esa es exactamente la idea detrás de los mercados de carbono.
Well, that's exactly the idea behind carbon markets.
La lógica es muy sencilla: si contaminar tiene un coste real, las empresas tienen un incentivo para contaminar menos.
The logic is very simple: if polluting has a real cost, companies have an incentive to pollute less.
Right.
And Octavio's pointing at what economists call internalizing externalities.
Basically, pollution has always had a cost.
We just made everyone else pay it, not the people doing the polluting.
Exacto.
Exactly.
Durante décadas, las empresas podían emitir dióxido de carbono sin pagar nada.
For decades, companies could emit carbon dioxide without paying anything.
Era como si el aire fuera un vertedero gratuito.
It was as if the air were a free dumping ground.
Los mercados de carbono intentan cambiar eso.
Carbon markets try to change that.
So walk me through the mechanics.
Because I've heard the terms cap and trade, carbon credits, carbon offsets, and I'm not entirely sure they mean what I think they mean.
Mira, el sistema más importante se llama cap and trade, que en español sería algo como 'límite e intercambio'.
Look, the most important system is called cap and trade.
El gobierno fija un límite máximo de emisiones para toda una industria o un país.
The government sets a maximum emissions limit for an entire industry or country.
Luego distribuye permisos, y cada permiso representa el derecho a emitir una tonelada de CO2.
Then it distributes permits, and each permit represents the right to emit one ton of CO2.
And the cap goes down over time, ideally.
So there are fewer permits in circulation every year, which means the whole system is supposed to tighten the screws gradually.
Sí, eso es.
Yes, exactly.
Y aquí viene la parte del mercado: si una empresa contamina menos de lo que permiten sus derechos, puede vender los permisos que le sobran.
And here comes the market part: if a company pollutes less than its permits allow, it can sell its surplus permits.
Si contamina más, tiene que comprar permisos a otras empresas.
If it pollutes more, it has to buy permits from other companies.
Es un mercado como cualquier otro.
It's a market like any other.
Which is either elegant or deeply cynical, depending on who you ask.
I mean, it essentially lets rich companies buy the right to keep polluting.
That's the critique that dogs this whole system.
Es que esa crítica tiene cierta validez, pero también es incompleta.
That criticism has some validity, but it's also incomplete.
El punto clave es que el total de emisiones no supera el límite.
The key point is that total emissions don't exceed the cap.
No importa quién contamina, sino cuánto se contamina en total.
It doesn't matter who pollutes, but how much is polluted in total.
Esa es la diferencia fundamental.
That's the fundamental difference.
The extraordinary thing is that this idea didn't start with climate change at all.
It was actually tested in the US in the 1990s, on acid rain of all things.
And by most accounts, it worked.
Exactamente, y ese precedente fue muy influyente.
Exactly, and that precedent was very influential.
Cuando se negoció el Protocolo de Kioto en 1997, los economistas americanos insistieron en incluir mecanismos de mercado.
When the Kyoto Protocol was negotiated in 1997, American economists insisted on including market mechanisms.
La Unión Europea era más escéptica al principio, aunque después construyó el sistema más grande del mundo.
The European Union was more skeptical at first, even though it later built the largest system in the world.
Which is one of history's great ironies.
The US pushed for markets to be in Kyoto, then refused to ratify the treaty.
And Europe, which was resistant, ended up running with the idea.
La verdad es que el Régimen de Comercio de Derechos de Emisión de la UE, el RCDE, empezó en 2005.
The truth is that the EU Emissions Trading System, the EU ETS, started in 2005.
Y los primeros años fueron un desastre.
And the first years were a disaster.
Se distribuyeron demasiados permisos, el precio del carbono se hundió, y las empresas no tenían ningún incentivo para cambiar.
Too many permits were distributed, the carbon price collapsed, and companies had no incentive to change.
So the price of carbon basically fell through the floor.
I remember reporting on this around 2007, 2008.
The permits were nearly worthless.
And if carbon is nearly free, then the whole incentive structure collapses.
Claro, es un problema de diseño.
Of course, it's a design problem.
Si el límite es demasiado generoso, el precio es demasiado bajo, y nadie cambia su comportamiento.
If the cap is too generous, the price is too low, and nobody changes their behavior.
Para que el sistema funcione, el precio del carbono tiene que ser lo suficientemente alto como para que las inversiones en energías limpias sean rentables.
For the system to work, the carbon price has to be high enough for investments in clean energy to be profitable.
So what's the magic number?
I've seen figures ranging from something like twenty dollars a ton all the way up to two hundred dollars.
And those are very different worlds.
A ver, muchos economistas dicen que necesitamos al menos cien dólares por tonelada para alcanzar los objetivos climáticos.
Well, many economists say we need at least a hundred dollars per ton to meet climate targets.
Hoy en el mercado europeo estamos cerca de sesenta o setenta euros, que es mucho mejor que hace diez años, pero probablemente todavía insuficiente.
Today in the European market we're around sixty or seventy euros, which is much better than ten years ago, but probably still not enough.
Look, I want to bring in the offsets question, because this is where it gets really murky.
Carbon offsets are a separate thing from the cap and trade permits.
These are credits you can buy by paying someone else not to pollute, often in a developing country.
Bueno, la idea es que una empresa en Alemania puede financiar la protección de un bosque en Brasil, y a cambio recibe créditos que representan el CO2 que ese bosque absorberá.
Well, the idea is that a company in Germany can finance the protection of a forest in Brazil, and in return receives credits representing the CO2 that forest will absorb.
En teoría, el resultado climático es el mismo.
In theory, the climate outcome is the same.
In theory.
But there was that huge investigation, I think it was The Guardian in 2023, that found something like ninety percent of the rainforest offset credits certified by one of the biggest certifiers were essentially worthless.
The forests weren't being protected.
Ese informe fue demoledor.
That report was devastating.
El problema técnico se llama 'adicionalidad': un proyecto de compensación solo es válido si ese bosque no se habría protegido de todas formas.
The technical problem is called 'additionality': an offset project is only valid if that forest would not have been protected anyway.
Y verificar eso es extraordinariamente difícil.
And verifying that is extraordinarily difficult.
Hay demasiados incentivos para hacer trampas.
There are too many incentives to cheat.
And the dirty secret is that a lot of major corporations have been using these dodgy offsets to claim they're carbon neutral, while barely changing their actual operations.
It's a marketing exercise dressed up as climate policy.
Greenwashing, lo llaman en inglés.
Greenwashing, they call it in English.
En español decimos 'lavado verde' o 'ecopostureo'.
In Spanish we say 'lavado verde' or 'ecopostureo'.
Pero mira, no todos los mercados de carbono son iguales.
But look, not all carbon markets are equal.
El mercado regulado de la UE es mucho más estricto que los mercados voluntarios donde las empresas compran créditos por su propia iniciativa.
The EU regulated market is much stricter than voluntary markets where companies buy credits on their own initiative.
So there's a two-tier system, essentially.
You've got the mandatory cap and trade schemes, run by governments, with real teeth.
And then you've got this voluntary market, which is enormous but far less regulated, where a lot of the greenwashing lives.
Exacto.
Exactly.
Y el mercado voluntario global valía más de dos mil millones de dólares en 2021.
And the global voluntary market was worth more than two billion dollars in 2021.
Es mucho dinero para un sistema que todavía tiene problemas de credibilidad muy serios.
That's a lot of money for a system that still has very serious credibility problems.
La reforma de los estándares de verificación es urgente.
Reform of verification standards is urgent.
Here's what gets me, though.
Even if we fix the technical problems, there's a deeper philosophical question lurking under all of this.
Is it morally acceptable to put a price on the atmosphere?
Some things maybe shouldn't be for sale.
Es una pregunta filosófica muy importante.
It's a very important philosophical question.
Hay quienes dicen que convertir el clima en una mercancía es un error fundamental, porque permite a los ricos comprar el derecho a destruir un bien común.
There are those who say that turning the climate into a commodity is a fundamental mistake, because it allows the rich to buy the right to destroy a common good.
Es el argumento del filósofo Michael Sandel, por ejemplo.
That's the argument of philosopher Michael Sandel, for example.
Sandel makes that argument about a lot of things, actually.
That markets corrupt what they touch.
And it's compelling.
But the counterargument is pretty brutal: we've tried moral persuasion for thirty years and emissions are still rising.
Maybe we need the market precisely because the moral argument hasn't worked.
La verdad es que estoy de acuerdo con eso.
The truth is I agree with that.
Podemos debatir la filosofía todo lo que queramos, pero mientras debatimos, la temperatura sube.
We can debate the philosophy all we want, but while we debate, the temperature rises.
A mí me parece que un instrumento imperfecto que funciona es mejor que ningún instrumento.
It seems to me that an imperfect instrument that works is better than no instrument.
El problema es que este instrumento todavía no funciona lo suficientemente bien.
The problem is that this instrument still doesn't work well enough.
No, you're absolutely right about that.
And the urgency question is real.
I spent time in Bangladesh years ago reporting on flooding.
The people who will suffer most from climate change have contributed least to it.
That's not abstract.
That's a village underwater.
Y ahí está otro problema fundamental de los mercados de carbono: la justicia geográfica.
And there's another fundamental problem with carbon markets: geographic justice.
Las comunidades que más sufren las consecuencias del cambio climático, en el Sur Global, raramente se benefician de estos mecanismos de mercado.
The communities that suffer most from the consequences of climate change, in the Global South, rarely benefit from these market mechanisms.
Es que el dinero fluye entre empresas ricas, no hacia las personas más vulnerables.
The money flows between wealthy companies, not toward the most vulnerable people.
Which brings us to the global picture, because this only works if everyone's playing the same game.
And right now they're not.
China has its own carbon market, which launched in 2021, but the coverage is uneven and the price is low.
India barely has one.
The US federal system still doesn't exist.
Eso crea lo que los economistas llaman 'fuga de carbono'.
That creates what economists call 'carbon leakage'.
Si Europa tiene un precio alto del carbono y China no, las industrias tienen un incentivo para trasladar su producción a China.
If Europe has a high carbon price and China doesn't, industries have an incentive to move their production to China.
Las emisiones no desaparecen, simplemente se mueven.
The emissions don't disappear, they simply move.
Y Europa pierde empleos además.
And Europe loses jobs on top of it.
So Europe came up with what I think is a genuinely interesting policy response to that.
The Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, the CBAM.
Essentially a carbon tariff on imports from countries that don't have equivalent carbon pricing.
It's controversial, but it's clever.
Mira, el CBAM empezó su fase de transición en 2023 y será completamente operativo en 2026.
Look, the CBAM started its transition phase in 2023 and will be fully operational in 2026.
Afecta al acero, al cemento, al aluminio, a los fertilizantes.
It affects steel, cement, aluminum, fertilizers.
La idea es que si produces acero en un país sin precio al carbono y quieres venderlo en Europa, tendrás que pagar por las emisiones que generaste.
The idea is that if you produce steel in a country without a carbon price and want to sell it in Europe, you'll have to pay for the emissions you generated.
The thing is, China called it a trade barrier.
India called it protectionism.
And I get why, honestly.
It does look different depending on where you're standing.
From Brussels it looks like leveling the playing field.
From Delhi it looks like a rich country moving the goalposts.
Es que hay una historia detrás de ese argumento.
There's a history behind that argument.
Europa y Estados Unidos se industrializaron durante siglos emitiendo carbono libremente.
Europe and the United States industrialized for centuries emitting carbon freely.
Y ahora le dicen a los países en desarrollo que ellos no pueden hacer lo mismo.
And now they're telling developing countries that they can't do the same.
Desde la perspectiva de India o Nigeria, eso parece muy injusto.
From the perspective of India or Nigeria, that seems very unfair.
I mean, that's a real tension without an easy answer.
The historical emissions argument is factually correct.
Rich countries built their wealth on cheap fossil fuels.
But we can't wait for that to be resolved before cutting emissions.
The atmosphere doesn't care about fairness.
A ver, eso nos lleva al debate más profundo sobre qué tipo de política climática necesitamos.
Well, that brings us to the deeper debate about what kind of climate policy we need.
Algunos economistas, como Nordhaus, ganador del Premio Nobel, defienden los mercados de carbono como la herramienta más eficiente.
Some economists, like Nordhaus, a Nobel Prize winner, defend carbon markets as the most efficient tool.
Otros, como Mariana Mazzucato, dicen que necesitamos inversión pública masiva, no solo señales de precio.
Others, like Mariana Mazzucato, say we need massive public investment, not just price signals.
And this is where it stops being an abstract economics debate and becomes a real political question.
Because markets and government investment aren't mutually exclusive, but they do reflect different theories about how change happens.
And that disagreement is very much alive in European politics right now.
En España tenemos esa tensión claramente.
In Spain we have that tension clearly.
El gobierno ha invertido mucho en energías renovables, sobre todo en eólica y solar, y los resultados son impresionantes.
The government has invested heavily in renewable energy, especially wind and solar, and the results are impressive.
Pero también hay industrias, como el acero o el cemento, que se quejan de que el precio del carbono europeo les pone en desventaja frente a competidores de fuera de Europa.
But there are also industries, like steel and cement, that complain that the European carbon price puts them at a disadvantage against competitors from outside Europe.
So where does all this leave us?
I've been covering international policy for a long time, and I'll be honest: I came into this topic somewhat skeptical.
The gap between the theory and the practice has always been wide.
But I think I've come around, partially.
The EU ETS, for all its early failures, has actually reduced emissions in the sectors it covers.
Bueno, la conclusión honesta es esta: los mercados de carbono son una herramienta necesaria pero no suficiente.
Well, the honest conclusion is this: carbon markets are a necessary but not sufficient tool.
Necesitamos precios del carbono más altos, mercados voluntarios mejor regulados, y también inversión pública en tecnologías limpias.
We need higher carbon prices, better regulated voluntary markets, and also public investment in clean technologies.
Y sobre todo, necesitamos que el sistema sea global, porque el clima no respeta fronteras.
And above all, we need the system to be global, because the climate doesn't respect borders.
Sin eso, estamos jugando a medias.
Without that, we're only playing at half measures.